


JPRS-NEA-94-045

18 August 1994



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JPRS Report

Near East & South Asia

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Near East & South Asia

JPRS-NEA-94-045

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ALGERIA

Military Prisoners Held in Morocco Identified

94AF0241B Algiers LE MATIN in French
20 Jul 94 pp 1, 2

[Article by Said Bel; first paragraph is LE MATIN introduction]

[Text] In barracks located opposite the royal palace and watched by the king's closest personal guard, 25 Algerians are imprisoned; some of them have been there for over 20 years. They include servicemen and draftees who were taken prisoners during the seventies and eighties. Since then, they have been kept in solitary confinement. Moroccan authorities never reported them to international institutions.

Brik Mustapha, Banane Cheikh, and Lakouiri Lahbib, three Algerian civilians residing in the border town of Tindouf were taken prisoners by the royal armed forces.

That was back in 1976. Today, they are still held in solitary confinement at the Moulay Hassan barracks in Rabat. The king does not want to report them. Seriously ill, they will complete 20 years of imprisonment next year.

Some 20 servicemen, many of them draftees enrolled during the eighties, and reported as missing or considered to have deserted, recently got in touch with their respective families. Their messages to Algeria came from the Moulay Hassan barracks.

Just like the three Tindouf civilians, these imprisoned servicemen were not reported by Morocco.

The International Red Cross Committee (CICR) always tried to have Morocco recognize the existence of these prisoners. Until now, it did not succeed.

Did the king manage to acquire "the friendship" of the international organization? Some day, we shall know. Meanwhile, the suffering of these prisoners in solitary confinement continues.

They are referred to as "unreported"; the royal armed forces staff refuses to present them to international humanitarian organizations.

Yet, the International Red Cross Committee (CICR) discovered their existence accidentally. Today, they are still held (secretly, of course) at the Moulay Hassan military barracks in Rabat, in the Akkari suburb.

"Buried" in basements, the prisoners are kept by the security light brigade (BLS), a unit considered to be the king's closest personal guard.

With these Algerian servicemen, three civilians from Tindouf, now aged over 60, will complete 20 years of imprisonment next year. They are said to be "very ill." The others, most of them young draftees, were taken

prisoners long after the Amgala business. Thirteen of them were taken prisoners during the eighties.

Testimonies from Amgala prisoners released in May 1987 confirmed the existence of unreported prisoners at the Moulay Hassan barracks.

The Spark

After their arrival at the barracks in 1976, the first Amgala prisoners discovered in time that other Algerians were there too. The CICR, which visited these barracks six times from 1976 to 1986, did not learn of the existence of these unreported prisoners until its last but one visit, in 1984. Looking at the prisoners' medical files, in the infirmary, the CICR delegate, Mr. Callos Lozer, accidentally discovered one extra file. Forgotten by the guards, the medical file was that of an unreported prisoner. This omission aroused the delegate's suspicions.

To obtain more information, Mr. Lozer interrogated the Algerian prisoners, and the 99 Amgala prisoners unanimously confirmed the existence of unreported prisoners in the barracks. The delegate continued his investigation and eventually met with the "secret prisoners."

Before writing his report, Mr. Lozer met with the Moroccan general secretary to foreign affairs, representatives of the Moroccan Red Crescent, and representatives of the royal armed forces. He informed them of his discovery and told them he had met with more than the 99 initially scheduled prisoners.

The reaction of Moroccan authorities was violent and immediate. In addition to having abuse uttered at him, the CICR delegate was declared persona non grata in Morocco.

Back in Geneva, he faced many unexpected difficulties. Some time afterward, he was transferred.... The last time we heard from Mr. Lozer, he was working for the BIT [International Labor Bureau].

It goes without saying that, after this incident, the CICR showed itself more "lenient" with Morocco. Did the king manage to acquire the "friendship" of the international organization?

Some day, we shall know.... In recent years, the CICR office in Tunis took over the case. While waiting for the existence of these prisoners to be recognized, it helps them exchange messages with their families.

The camera that was used to take the pictures published here was purchased in France and illegally introduced into the barracks.

Released Amgala prisoners say that some draftees imprisoned at the Moulay Hassan barracks were taken prisoners by the royal forces while patrolling the Algerian-Moroccan borders.

The last message received from the Moroccan prison/barracks was dated from last June; one of the prisoners, whom we shall not name for the time being, informed his brother of his state of health and asked him about the outcome of the requests addressed to international organizations. In that same letter, he told him that he has received the latest family pictures sent to him from an Algerian town. The envelope also contained a message from another prisoner to his family.

Thus, the painstaking work of former prisoners of the Moulay Hassan barracks and the Tunis CICR has resulted in the identification of about 25 Algerian prisoners held in Morocco.

Will they be reported some day, and then released?

In spite of the affirmed will to build the Greater Maghreb, these questions remain unanswered.... We shall keep you informed....

List of Prisoners Identified So Far

Last and first names	Date of Birth	Place of Birth	Rank	Date of Enrolment	Date Taken Prisoner
Hannachi Nacer	February 10, 1957	Bejaia	Djoundi	January 19, 1981	June 5, 1981
Yahiaoui A/Hamid	March 1956	Laghouat	Djoundi	October 10, 1975	April 15, 1976
Chebli Khemissi	February 3, 1958	Gueljel	Djoundi	January 15, 1978	May 8, 1979
Loubachria Benazouz	February 20, 1954	Blida	Sergeant	January 26, 1976	January 26, 1980
Ghoulef Mohamed	1957	Chlef	Djoundi	May 15, 1976	January 26, 1980
Chantouh N/Eddine	-	Chekfa	Sergeant	-	September 14, 1985
Aidouni Said	-	A. Timouchent	Djoundi	-	September 14, 1985
Bouamrane Aissa	Djoundi from Mostaganem, missing at the border on October 15, 1984.				
Belghaite Nesseridine	24, from Hammam Boughrara, taken prisoner on February 4, 1985 at Nador				
Benakouche Ramdane	Born in Bordj Menaiel, aged 25, Djoundi, taken prisoner on March 19, 1985				
Belala Mohamed	26, taken prisoner at Oudjda with Benakouche, on March 19, 1985, expatriate from Sig				
Debouche Mourad	Sergeant, regimental number: 822400232, 26, taken prisoner on January 26, 1986 at Fort Lotfi				
Djaziri Lotfi	Djoundi, from Maghnia, 23, 40th Tindouf battalion				
Hadj Aek Farid	22, sergeant, from Tlemcen, taken prisoner on August 4, 1986 at Oudjda				
Boumacha Sid Ali	Son of Larbi, 21, class of 66A				
Brik Mustapha Banane Cheikh. Lakouiri Lahbib	All three are civilians from Tindouf taken prisoners in 1976. They are now all over 60. All are seriously ill				

[Box, p 2]

Open Letter to the Chairman of the Higher State Council [HCE]

This letter, written in 1993, was sent to the HCE chairman by the family of a prisoner.

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Having never received any answers to my letters to the chief of State and all successive prime ministers, I am most respectfully approaching your eminence to inform you that my family and myself have been living a tragedy for over 14 years with respect to my brother, a draftee now imprisoned at the Moulay-Hassan military camp in Rabat, Morocco. Since openness is now the order of the day, I take the liberty, Mr. Chairman of the Higher State Council, to ask when my brother will be released, considering that nearly all his fellow prisoners came back in 1987 and that our country is calling loud and clear for a united Greater Arab Maghreb?

The case of Western Sahara, Mr. Chairman of the Higher State Council, is a matter for the State and the Algerian Government, who are in part responsible for the situation we have been experiencing for so many years. It is, therefore, their responsibility to find a solution to the problem of the prisoners, and more particularly that of my brother, who is the subject of my appeal to you (...).

Mr. Chairman of the Higher State Council, before the families of the Algerian prisoners still held in Morocco decide to meet in Algiers and take their protest to the street, I would like, through this last appeal to your wisdom and your authority, to be granted the favor of a meeting so you could talk to me frankly and honestly about the case of my brother who is prisoner in Morocco.

Yemeni Ambassador Discusses Kidnapping

94AF0241A Algiers EL WATAN in French
24 Jul 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Quassem Askar Djebrane, Yemeni ambassador to Algeria, by Amel Boumediene in Algiers;

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date not given: "Release Layada and Foreigners Assassinations Will Stop; the Two Arab Ambassadors' Kidnappers' Blackmail"—first four paragraphs are EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] The ordeal is over for the Yemeni ambassador, Mr. Quassem Askar Djebrane, his guest Mr. Quassem El Thour—a member of the PSY (Yemeni Socialist Party) political bureau on his first visit to Algeria—and the Omani ambassador, Mr. Hilal Essiabi, and his Moroccan chauffeur.

They were kidnapped by an armed group one week ago and liberated Friday.

The minister of foreign affairs, Mr. Saleh Dembri, received the two ambassadors yesterday.

On this occasion, the ministry spokesman read a communique stating that "Algeria was relieved to learn the release of the ambassadors of Oman and Yemen, who were found one week after their kidnapping. This liberation is the result of considerable efforts on the part of State organs." Reporters, however, were not allowed to come close to the diplomats. An enigmatic case? In an interview with EL WATAN, the Yemeni Ambassador, Mr. Quassem Askar Djebrane, said they were kidnapped by accident, as the terrorists believed they were policemen.

[Boumediene] Could you tell us how you were liberated?

[Djebrane] First, you should know that only a few hours after our kidnapping, our kidnappers told us that we must absolutely meet their emir. On Wednesday, therefore, six days after being kidnapped, the leader of the group told us bluntly that he intended to use us as bargaining counters to obtain the release of Abdelhak Layada.

He added that it was our fault that the police had destroyed the locations where we had been kept, and that there had been many deaths in their ranks. We answered the emir that the Omani and Yemeni governments could not agree to the proposed exchange.

We asked them to release us and to think up other ways to solve the problem.

After long discussions of that question, the emir answered that he would give us a letter to hand over to the Algerian authorities.

[Boumediene] Can you disclose the content of that letter?

[Djebrane] Its very terms were that armed groups are ready to stop their campaign of assassination of foreigners if the government will release Abdelhak Layada. We did transmit the message to the Algerian authorities.

[Boumediene] When did they decide to liberate you?

[Djebrane] After our discussions with the emir, he told us that we would be liberated on Thursday or Friday. He

also told us that we would be taken to a location from where we would be able to go back home quite safely.

On Friday, they left us near the Ben-Aknoun zoological park; they also gave us a vehicle to go back home.

[Boumediene] Where were you kept?

[Djebrane] We have no way of knowing. We changed locations at least 20 times. Moreover, we were transported either by night, or during the day in windowless vans. We traveled long distances through mountains and forests.

[Boumediene] Do you know to which group your kidnappers belong?

[Djebrane] The Armed Islamic Group (GIA).

[Boumediene] Do you know the emir's name?

[Djebrane] He answered to the name of Abou Abdallah Ahmed.

[Boumediene] Could you tell us under what circumstances you were kidnapped?

[Djebrane] We had decided to take a ride toward the El-Hamiz dam. When we got out of the car to take a closer look at the dam, we were surrounded by about 10 armed individuals.

At first, they thought we were members of the security forces, which proves that we were kidnapped by accident. But after hearing our accent, they understood that we were not Algerians.

[Boumediene] Did they handle you roughly?

[Djebrane] Absolutely not. We were treated very decently.

French, Algerian Women Unite Against Terrorism

94AF0237A Algiers EL WATAN in French
10 Jul 94 p 4

[Article by Nadjia Bouzeghrane: "Terrorist Attacks Against Women Create Stir in France"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] The terrorist attacks, rapes, and intimidating acts of every kind that are victimizing more and more Algerian mothers, young women, and adolescents have created a great commotion in France, especially among women's groups. The barbaric actions of terrorist groups that have been publicized in France and the courageous resistance of Algerian women to the reign of terror have stirred organizations of French and Algerian-born women into action, and a broad solidarity movement is gradually taking shape.

Paris—Last Thursday, at the initiative of the Union of French Women [UFF], and with the support of organizations such as the International League of Women for Peace and Liberty, the International League Against

Racism and Antisemitism, Justice and Solidarity, Ayda, "Nanas Beurs," RISFA [International Support Network for Algerian Women], AFEPEC [Women's Association for Personal Growth and Exercise of Citizenship] of Oran, and the RAJD [Algerian Rally of Women for Democracy], along with a number of French-based associations of Algerian women for democracy, a rally was held in Paris to denounce the 29 June attack on demonstrators in Paris.

On that occasion, the UFF issued an appeal for solidarity with Algerian women whether living in Algeria or France. Hundreds of notables endorsed the appeal, including actresses Anemone, Marie Christine Barrault, and Viviane Theophilides; historians Laurence Klejman and Michelle Perrot; deputies Aline Paillet and Muguette Jaquaint; Pauline Salmona, member of the Economic and Social Council; Gisele Halimi, president of "Chosir" ["Choice"]; singer Catherine Ribeiro, and many others.

In addition to the Union of French Women, other individual women, organizations, and associations have mobilized to support Algerian women and raise their voice against the acts of violence and terror to which they are subjected.

On 21 April, for example, 34 female deputies and senators formed a support committee for Algerian women under the leadership of Nicole Catala, parliamentary deputy and vice president of the French National Assembly.

Since then, the committee has grown with the addition of dozens of female elected officials at different levels (mayors, deputy mayors, general councillors, regional councillors, etc.). The committee was created to "protest the violence against women in Algeria and express solidarity with women who want to live in freedom," said Nicole Catala, noting that "we are not 'Crusaders' for one religion against another or one culture against another. What we are denouncing are the acts of violence and attacks on the life and dignity of women committed in the name of a distorted interpretation of the Koran."

Not Silenced

"We respect that religion, but we denounce its distortion, and we raise our voices forcefully against the fantastic regression in the status of women."

To clarify her position further, Nicole Catala emphasized that the movement she has initiated "affirms our belief that Islam does not mean the enslavement of women. Such enslavement can only be desirable in a warped conception of the Islamic faith, a conception that must be fought, on both sides of the Mediterranean."

In northern France several weeks ago, a number of groups—"Solidarity with Women Here and Elsewhere" (SAFIA), "Women's Way," UFF, the League of Human Rights, and the French Movement for Family Planning—launched an appeal for "solidarity with Algerian

women against the civil war and for democracy." The appeal underlined that "we here in France cannot remain indifferent to what is happening on the southern side of the Mediterranean, which concerns us in a number of ways. We cannot allow ourselves to be silenced in the face of organized crime, the public and private violence perpetrated against women and democrats... We must tell the world about their struggle."

Still in northern France, female notables in an appeal that drew close to a hundred signatures say "Algerian women need our support for respect for their lives and their civic freedoms. Building the modern Algeria to which they aspire concerns us all." The appeal adds that "rejecting any surrender of principle in the face of bullying coercion, Algerian women were in the forefront of the 22 March demonstration in Algiers, despite threats and attempted intimidation. Social, juridical, and physical violence is inflicted on them because they represent the future, progress, and change."

"Pluri-Elles" ["Woman-ifold"]—an international group established several weeks ago to promote solidarity with Algerian women for democracy and civil peace—has set itself three objectives. The first is to provide concrete material aid on the basis of needs expressed and the group's capacities, by becoming a pluralistic voice for women's associations helping women in Algeria in their daily lives in various ways and working to promote democratic values and individual and collective freedoms.

The second objective of "Pluri-Elles" is solidarity in putting out the welcome mat to women seeking refuge in France, by demanding they be given a provisional one-year visa, the right to work, and eligibility for welfare services and benefits. It should be noted that this demand is also echoed by most humanitarian organizations and other groups supporting solidarity with Algeria.

"Pluri-Elles" is also committed to working to build networks based on interpersonal or intergroup solidarity to help in the first phases of resettlement of women who emigrate here (housing, medical care, contacts, jobs). "Pluri-Elles" also sees itself as a forum for reflection and interchange on the status of women in Algeria and on the environment in which they are living.

The group says it is open to "the most diverse viewpoints. But unequivocal condemnation of assassinations, terrorism, and repressive exactions, and absolute defense of the rights of man and the rights of woman, constitute fundamental ethical principles that must not be compromised."

"Pluri-Elles" says it is for "freedom of dress and movement, freedom of expression, and equal rights, against terrorism, intolerance, obscurantism, and authoritarianisms, and for the peaceful battle of ideas, democracy and modernity." Another group, RISFA, is made up of

women (whether or not they belong to other associations) committed to do everything possible to support Algerian women in "their struggle against exclusion, obscurantism, and all the fundamentalisms—religious, economic, political, social, and ethical."

The creation of RISFA on 17 March, according to its founders, is part of a broader worldwide, long-term struggle of women for their rights. "Our struggle is for the Algerian society of the future: the advent of democracy, one of whose most important results should be fully equal civic status for women," they say.

RISFA is committed to objectively informing and sensitizing the public to the resistance struggle of Algerian women, breaking the wall of silence that surrounds that resistance, and providing unreserved support to any action aimed at enabling Algerian women to express themselves and participate with full freedom in the civic life of the country.

In Marseille, Algerian women—and first-, second-, and third-generation immigrants—joined together, at a constitutive assembly held on 26 March, to form associations to support the women's struggle in Algeria.

"Because we are moved by the plight of this country, because the cries and tears of our sisters in Algeria cannot leave us indifferent, because we are greatly distressed to see men and women fall under the bullets of fundamentalist assassins," they say.

Algerian and French women are launching so many associations, collectives, committees, and initiatives in cities all over France (Paris and environs, Lyon, Marseille, Grenoble, Montpellier, Roubaix, Lille, etc.) that we cannot list them all, not to mention those that prefer to work anonymously and in the shadows.

All the same, a broad movement of sensitization and mobilization on behalf of Algeria and its women in particular is taking shape. Stories of the atrocities taking place in Algeria and the determination of women to resist are what is fueling this solidarity movement.

New Round of Dialogue With FIS Considered

94AF0241C *Algiers EL WATAN in French*
13 Jul 94 pp 1, 3

[Article by S. Bensalem: "Political Dialogue: Another National Conference Next Fall?"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] A new national dialogue conference might take place next fall, we learned from reliable sources.

According to the same sources, the preparation of this new meeting would again be entrusted to Mr. Youcef Khatib, adviser to the State presidency and chairman of the National Dialogue Commission [CDN]. This new round of the dialogue will be enlarged to include the banned FIS [Islamic Salvation Front] which, according to some leaks, would this time be a full-fledged partner to

the dialogue, in a way that still has to be found. The two leaders of that party who were recently released from the Blida prison, i.e., Messrs. Ali Djeddi and Abdelkader Boukhamkham, would be quite suited to represent this movement, together with other members of that party. Actually, the idea of continuing and deepening the dialogue started by the HCE (Higher State Council), from which the CDN (National Dialogue Commission) later on took over, is part of the platform of last January's CDN, which provides for a national consensus. The seats reserved for the parties that boycotted the national conference were even left vacant, in the hope that these parties would later on join the CNT [National Transition Council].

In a speech delivered at the celebration of the 32d anniversary of independence, the president of the State, Mr. Liamine Zeroual, affirmed that "we are firmly persuaded that dialogue is necessary to eliminate misunderstandings, bar the way to manipulations and plots, and rally the nation."

The president of the State seized this opportunity to renew his "invitation to dialogue to all those who firmly believe that the Algerians are capable of finding the solutions that their problems require, while respecting the Constitution and rejecting violence," and he expressed the hope that "this invitation will receive the echo that the whole nation is expecting." The terms of the future dialogue are therefore clearly set: respect of the Constitution and rejection of violence.

These very conditions were already set during previous dialogue initiatives, sponsored by the HCE or by the State presidency, but that did not prevent the new authorities, especially after the HCE had left, from establishing contacts, long kept secret, with representatives of that movement, including the imprisoned leaders.

These contacts took place in spite of the fact that the imprisoned leaders did not issue a call to renounce violence, which would have caused them to be recognized as negotiation partners. This shows that speeches and political realities are not the same thing.

The communique published by the State presidency after the release of the two leaders of that party—noting that the imprisoned leaders had refused to issue a call to restore law and order in exchange for the release of other imprisoned party officials—seemed to indicate that the dialogue between the government and that party had reached a deadlock.

The appeal addressed to the State presidency by Algeria's main foreign partners at the recent G-7 summit in Naples, to open a dialogue with all the segments of society that reject terrorism, and well before that by President Liamine Zeroual who, on 5 July, repeated his appeal to start a new dialogue under the same conditions as those set by the G-7, are as many indications that new initiatives can be expected in that respect in the next few months.

If it were confirmed that a new national conference will take place, the question then will be what is to become of the new transition authorities already in place and of the objectives assigned to this period in accordance with the provisions of the "platform providing for a national consensus."

A platform, we should recall, to which neither this much-courted movement nor other political formations contributed.

'Terror' in El-Abadia Described

94AF0237C Algiers EL WATAN in French

6 Jul 94 pp 1, 4

[Article by Abia Cherif: "Life in El-Abadia: Blood, Tears, and Terror"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] "Blood and tears flow like a river, rapes and abductions are beyond counting...." In El Abadia, in the wilaya of Ain-Defia, no day passes without a new terrorist outrage. A wave of terror has descended on the locality, leaving inhabitants in a state of abject fright. Entire families have been forced to leave the "cursed city" and take refuge in relatively calmer regions. One of them talked to us and described the agony of everyday life there.

"Do you know what it's like to wait for death to strike at any moment? Do you know what it's like not to be able to sleep or eat, to have only scenes of horror before your eyes? Neighbors riddled with bullets, old women decapitated, young women kidnapped, raped?"

A twisted smile plays nervously over our interlocutor's face. Eyes haggard, body trembling, he interrupts the conversation time after time to come back to an earlier question. "I'm ready to tell you everything, but only if you promise not to use my name, or the place where my family and I have taken refuge." The promise was readily given, but in the course of this interview to which he agreed with so many misgivings he needs to be reassured again and again, whenever his emotions get the better of him. Emotions and feelings such as can be felt only by those who have barely escaped death and ever since have been prey to a nameless foreboding.

Several weeks ago a group of terrorists descended on the resettlement center for victims of the October 1989 earthquake and surrounded the shanty of his closest neighbor.

"We heard two terrorists climb up on the roof, while three others broke in the door. They forced our neighbor to follow them outside and ordered the rest of the family to stay calm and not move. A few moments later shots were heard. A new victim..." That evening, he continues, the terrorists decided not to stop there. Within seconds, they surrounded my house, which fortunately I had fled,

and began to question my family, with whom they left the following message: 'We didn't find him, but tell him his turn will come.'"

Our interlocutor has to stop, again overwhelmed by emotion. In El-Abadia, his wife continues, no value is placed on human life. "Complete strangers come and wipe out innocent people. They've decided to eliminate anyone who gets in their way."

The fear and horror are especially intense at night, when dozens of people tremble at every sound, when any distant report could mean that terror stalks the night.

"You know the worst thing? It's when you wake out of a fitful sleep, to hear the screams of a family whose father's been assassinated, just because he spoke his mind too openly, because he was against the politics of arms, blood, and terror."

By this family's account, the pain and suffering of the citizens of El-Abadia is beyond all measure.

At least one-third of all the families have been visited by the terrorists, who they say don't hesitate to rip bars off the windows to break into houses. An unendurable situation, and one that also victimizes women, "whose heads they shave if they refuse to wear the [traditional Muslim] scarf."

Gangsterism and Abduction

"It's even worse than that," continues the wife, "because there have been instances of girls defiled and dishonored while their family, powerless to help, was forced to watch." Many young women have been forcibly abducted and taken to the mountains to be "married" or simply to cook for them.

"By now, most families have had to send their daughters away. The terrorists show up, especially at night, and force parents to turn over their daughters, who are taken away and very seldom reappear."

According to this family's account, not even the old women are spared. "But they're usually released after a time, since they're only taken off to cook for the terrorists."

In El-Abadia, women are sometimes even murdered. Some have ended up decapitated or with their throats slit because they refused to yield to terrorist demands. "The rest, those who escaped their captors, are still extremely cautious, most of them refusing to go outside at all."

And gangsterism must be added to the list of horrors. "They've taken everything we had—jewelry, money—and some of us don't even have enough left to live on."

"How long can we live in the grip of such fear? How long will the blood and tears flow? How long can we hold on?"

Unless the state takes stronger steps, the entire locality seems doomed to remain hostage to these lawless, unscrupulous armed bands.

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Ait Ahmed on Democratic Rally, Future Elections

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[Interview with Ait Ahmed, leader of the Front of Socialist Forces, by A. Bahmane and M. Larbi, place and date not given: "Ait Ahmed Says Democratic Rally Must Be Created Quickly"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] The FFS [Front of Socialist Forces] has decided to launch itself into another "battle": the struggle to bring together all the country's prodemocracy forces, which the party considers "the best political and institutional approach to resolving the all-encompassing, systemic, and worsening national crisis." The 30 June congress of the wilaya of Oran adopted that as its battle-cry. FFS officials have initiated contacts with a "broad spectrum" of parties, trade unions, and associations in recent weeks with a view to involving them in the emergence of this "democratic pole." Ait Ahmed warns the government about this "new challenge" and urges it not to stand in the way of the democratic advance.

[EL WATAN] In recent days, all the news in Algeria has been about the MPR [Movement for the Republic] march, the president's appeal to the opposition to participate in a dialogue on solving the country's problems, and your democratic rally initiative. What's your assessment of things?

[Ahmed] Regarding the 29 June demonstration and the tragedy that ensued, I must express my repugnance and revulsion, and shout to the rooftops: This is enough! It is shameful for Algerians to be victimized by a cowardly attack while marching peacefully. And by no means was this the first such attack. We have consistently denounced violence and terrorist attacks of every kind, especially indiscriminate attacks. But the 29 June incident leads us to believe it is also a message warning the people against expressing themselves freely in the street, warning the political parties and the whole populace against any peaceful initiative to militate for their demands. In other words, a further suppression of democratic freedoms. We cannot accept it.

[EL WATAN] Who do you think is the author of this message?

[Ahmed] Without getting into that question, I will say it is a message we totally reject, because the Algerian people are going to take back control of their own destiny. I wish to express my solidarity with the victims, and to present my most grieved condolences to the family of the person who died. Naturally, we are paying attention to what the president says, but what does "dialogue" mean? That is the question. Does anyone need reminding that we said, even before the interruption of the electoral process, that you must eschew violence in order to end it? We should be doing everything possible to avoid getting caught in a vicious circle. That was why we urged, even then, that contact be made

with the leaders of the FIS [Islamic Salvation Front]. As a result, we became the target of a hysterical and slanderous campaign. We also warned the regime, at the highest levels, about the need for dialogue. So the issue, when it comes to dialogue, is over its content. We in the FFS have come out with one proposal after another.

We are accused of pursuing an "empty chair" policy, but in terms of proposals we have played a positive role, and we have followed our proposals with action and contacts. It is we who have sought contact with the regime. Obviously, when our proposals are systematically distorted, it is natural we should ask ourselves what dialogue really means. We still support a democratic transition. But we have not abandoned our demand for a sovereign national conference at the outset, or at least at a certain point in its evolution. We are waiting for the regime to take concrete steps. That's what's important to us. We no longer believe the promises of the regime, which made three commitments back when the democratic process was interrupted: to restore security, to resume the democratic process within 2 years, and to implement economic reform. None of these promises has been kept. Even worse, especially after the fiasco of the so-called consensus conference—which I would call the "discord conference," and which we did all we could to save—we are forced to conclude the regime did not want a real conference.

[EL WATAN] Some people blame the parties for its failure.

[Ahmed] I would very much like to see published the minutes of the talks between the CDN [National Dialogue Commission] and the various parties with which it held discussions. Those minutes would show among other things the need to make serious preparations for the conference, to refrain from presenting the parties with a fait accompli, to avoid a repetition of the mistakes of the previous dialogue, like those Stalinist-type meetings of the FNL [National Liberation Front party] in the 1970's, when a "paper" drawn up in advance would be circulated so we could "endorse" a program, decisions, and institutions that we had nothing to do with. Yes, even the supporters of the regime, the small parties, withdrew. It was a real international humiliation for Algeria, because it bore all the trappings of a "rump conference." Instead of learning from this fiasco, they reverted to the colonial practice of "designation," or selection from above. It was on the recommendation of that conference that the CNT [National Transition Council] was born—but what credibility or legitimacy could that conference have? And what political import, since it had no voice in choosing the president? Let's have no more word games. All our proposals have been twisted, denatured. What's important to us is the meaning behind the words, for as we see it, dialogue is always valuable. I think we must never lose faith in the virtues of dialogue.

[EL WATAN] But how can the government be prevented from making the same mistakes as before?

[Ahmed] The regime must quit wasting time. That is true too for the press, the parties, and the voluntary associations. The stakes are too high now for us to continue playing around. This means we must jointly define the rules of the game and respect them. Why has the process of democratization succeeded in South Africa but not even begun here? It's because in South Africa the words really meant something. The partners and protagonists were willing to trust each other. You can't decree that kind of trust. It comes from action and experience, and what experience has taught us is not to trust anymore. That does not free us from the need to continue trying to convince, to "win over." And confidence building is what is needed in the first instance for a credible process to get started. It is a sad fact, but Algeria has served as an object lesson for the South Africans. Already we have had close to 10,000 deaths, and by the end of the year, if it isn't stopped, we will have close to 15,000. Algeria has become a nightmare, a great slaughterhouse, and it is time to stop the madness! For us, transition means a democratic process, and we must work together to put mechanisms in place without trickery or condescension, as was done in South Africa, which created a new constitution. We don't want a "resumption of democracy" that derails and ends up with any sort of totalitarian regime.

[EL WATAN] Your assessments of the Algerian situation sometimes seem exaggerated.

[Ahmed] Even one murdered Algerian means one more death, an unacceptable death. The figures I give are those circulating in the diplomatic community. With regard to the tactics used by the forces of repression, the issue is not whether artillery or napalm was used. We know that repression, by both the army and the armed [Islamist] groups, is out of control.

Unfortunately, most often it is the country that pays the price, an intolerable price, and the death toll continues to grow two and one-half years after the electoral process was interrupted. It is time now to stop the hemorrhaging.

[EL WATAN] Based on your contacts with the regime, can you tell us what its intentions are?

[Ahmed] In the past we have had contacts with the regime, sometimes at my initiative, sometimes at the regime's instigation, in an effort to overcome the impasse. But so far its deeds have not matched its words. The Algerian people want a break with the past. But we cannot ignore the fact that extremist tactics are being used. The regime resorts to extremist measures to prevent any break with the past. And this is what we find so surprising. Of course, we have our 5 July [i.e., Independence Day], we may be obsessed with colonialism, but the Algerian people did free themselves from colonial oppression and especially from practices of cooptation, appointment from above, rubber-stamp assemblies, etc. We must free ourselves again, I think.

[EL WATAN] Perhaps Zeroual's appeal to the parties offers a way to circumvent transition bodies like the CNT?

[Ahmed] We will not reject any path that leads forward, but there are practices we cannot accept. Isn't Algeria's destiny more important than a decision made by a narrow, exclusive circle? We are forced to conclude that there has been a reversion to the "designated assembly" approach after the failure of the CCN [National Consultative Council], which was created in the same way and didn't work.

We're not going to give our endorsement to an entity that has no future. We are ready to involve ourselves in a real discussion that would lead to democratic management of the transition.

[EL WATAN] How do you explain your silence with respect to this government since it came to power?

[Ahmed] We have waited for some months for the head of state to show his colors. We have said many times we were always ready to enter a dialogue. We denounced the interruption of the electoral process, but we have always said we were ready to hold discussions with the de facto authorities. What more do you want? Our actions must be consistent with our strategy: We're for nonviolence and peaceful action. There is so much unrealistic thinking in Algeria that we, the FFS, must try to be a force for political consistency and hope.

Since the designation of Zeroual, we have been trying constantly to make contact, but the system is weighed down under so many political and sociological constraints, with all the clans and rumor mongering... On what basis can we judge the positions of the regime if not its own statements and actions? We still favor giving people the benefit of the doubt, but we expect some action from them. What does an appeal for dialogue mean, when it enacts decrees regulating the news and political parties, an electoral code, an information code, with no consultation? This is what we mean by concrete actions. The regime has to act more credibly. First of all, by lifting the restrictions on political activity and the press, because the role of the press is important. In reality, political parties are being thrust into a standardized mold, and the press is forced to march in step. That means, as far as we're concerned, the regime is trying to buy time.

[EL WATAN] Who needs to take the first step—the opposition or the regime—especially given that Zeroual has now sent two messages to critics of his government?

[Ahmed] You cannot judge the government, as powerful as it is, by the same standards as a political party, regardless of its autonomy and capacity for action, especially not in an emergency situation. If we were as powerful as the regime, wouldn't we have lifted all the restraints on the press? What amazes us is how the regime can deny responsibility for the consequences of its own actions. It unleashes a process of violence, and finds it has even more violence on its hands. Whose fault is that? Do they think the Algerian people want to die? It spends its time sowing division among democrats, then

to the surprise at their decisions. It shuts down political initiatives that would have opened up space for democrats to begin to work together, instead of reinforcing and exacerbating the polarization. The regime knows the FFS does not really find a solution for the crisis but does know itself to hold the keys to the solution. The regime knows the keys. If we put an end to all this scheming, all this backbiting intrigues? If so, Algerian democrats have a political initiative to make. And they can make it by forming a front in a rally of all the democratic forces.

[EL WATAN] Why do you think your contacts with the Front (Algerian State Council) have come to nothing?

[Ahmed] Because these contacts led to the fiasco of 26 January. And that failure was due to a lack of dialogue and a lack of any conversation. Responsible people must understand a process that was precooked in the corridors. We ask the current regime clearly to understand that it must learn to respect all of these mistakes, to listen to the people, even more than hearing of the cadets in primaturely. We opted at a certain point for good enough contacts at a fairly high level, in an attempt to get more serious agreements, privately, out of respect for mediation by the media. The ball is in the regime's court now. What the regime could get, ultimately, would be a green—not different organs of the same business to talk people, perhaps, and an endorsement by the various parties and notables.

[EL WATAN] In that regard, it seems to me that the current crisis uncovered this very point.

[Ahmed] What is of concern to the people is not whether the crisis is continuous. What we sensed, in the regime's contacts with the FFS in Paris and Geneva in June 1993, was that the real concern was just to put new people on the scene. There was no drive to return to the democratic transition. We dare not about to go against our convictions and be played for fools.

[EL WATAN] What happened with the contacts you attempted in January 1993?

[Ahmed] We should all quit mythologizing about problems. We have been in constant contact with notables and political figures. That is what a political party is all about. It was just that the state of emergency imposed insurmountable constraints on us that prevented these contacts from bearing fruit. We circulated a petition asking for a democratic contract and an appeal against violence and our democracy. But the pressures being exerted, and the deterioration in the security situation, made the democrats who were committed to these initiatives were put under pressure. The domestic situation was not conducive to serious contacts. What matters took on a few cosmetic steps, changing the names on the players, but in-depth social change.

[EL WATAN] From Washington, you called for the formation of a front against terrorists and for democracy. What's really behind that appeal?

[Ahmed] I deny that allegation, because I have always continued to believe in the necessity of creating a true, autonomous democratic rally. Again I protest against what amounts to plain political scheming. I have made public the main points I made in New York, and I stand by my statement. Never did I use the phrase "democratic front against terrorists." It is obvious that if I had to use some expression, I would say "against terror." But I have always been willing to participate in a true rally of democratic forces.

[EL WATAN] What would be the goal of such a rally?

[Ahmed] We must not denature the word rally, above all we must not divest of its substance this proposal that is so very important for the Algerian people. The democratic rally must not be just one more acronym or gimmick. It is only thanks to the overwhelming majority of the people that we have not descended into civil war, and today it is they who are waiting for concrete steps, for coherent actions, to ensure that this rally will not simply reflect relational problems but rather correspond to a real strategy. The best outcome of the crisis today, and the best institutional political guarantee for a step-by-step democratic transition, is the creation of this rally. Algeria must find this indispensable pillar of democracy in itself, must recognize it in itself, and empower itself to make it a reality. The problem cannot be reduced to personalities or political parties. There are democrats throughout society, in voluntary associations, in the bureaucracy, officers and NCOs in the army, young cadres who come face to face with society's problems every day of their lives, who cannot fail to see their country's misery. I think they must get involved in the democratic process. The debate on how to form this democratic rally—and it must be debated—should also involve the army cadres, who have never involved themselves in political decisions, who have always been a kind of mandarin class.

[EL WATAN] But how, when the cadres still have obligations as reservists?

[Ahmed] The FFS has always called on Algerians to get involved wherever they are. We know how politics works in Algeria. Whenever anyone tries to strengthen the democratic camp, all kinds of obstacles appear. It is up to the cadres to prevent fragmentation and to work peacefully with the democratic forces for the consolidation of the democratic project.

[EL WATAN] At one point, the FFS declared itself to be the democratic pole. Later, it has said it wants to be a dynamic element of that pole. Does this signal a change of tactics?

[Ahmed] Closer analysis would show that the FFS position is consistent. We were the only party to say we should not interrupt the democratic process, that to do so would take us down the path to violence, and we have stuck by that position, saying we want neither a police state nor a fundamentalist state. Obviously, political

polarization has led both sides to increasing violence. The political scene has never stabilized, or only briefly: There are too many players, and the result has been not a symphony but cacophony. The democratic rally has become vital for everyone, even for those who wanted to play a personal role. The country is at an impasse. If it doesn't evolve toward democracy, it runs the risk of following in the footsteps of Yugoslavia or Rwanda.

But our appeal is not directed solely at the parties.

The number of voters who abstained was larger than the combined total of ballots cast for the FFS, FLN, and FIS. Let's get serious: The dice were loaded, so the results were false. What must be taken into account is that the millions of Algerians who abstained from voting were thunderstruck by the results. If the regime really were not trying to hang onto its privileges, it would have understood what happened on 2 January 1992. It would have responded to that shock by creating structures of support to prevent the country from falling into violence, or least reduce the level of terrorism.

[EL WATAN] You have talked about a preliminary debate on this rally. But how does that square with the urgent need to move into action?

[Ahmed] We don't want a bureaucratic initiative. In other words, we're not going to put the political situation to one side and cogitate indefinitely about the need to create a democratic rally at some point in the future. We have to move quickly. But quickly does not mean with reckless haste. We must first of all reach an understanding on overarching principles and the main obstacles to avoid, and we must not reduce the rally to a question of political luminaries. The latter have their place, as do the parties. But there are also associations, trade unions, and the women's movement.

We will work together to ensure that this rally becomes a reality under the best possible conditions and with minimal delay. The regime must not create obstacles. The nation's destiny is at stake.

[EL WATAN] Don't you think there is a risk obstacles will emerge, in light of the 29 June attack, and with regard to the media's role?

[Ahmed] The regime is blatantly at fault in the 29 June attack, in the sense that it had an obligation to provide security for a demonstration it had authorized. The interruption of that demonstration may mark the beginning of a new clampdown on freedom of political assembly. And if that proves to be the case, we can expect nothing further from the regime.

If it turns out they're going to strangle the press even further, why bother to dupe the people and maintain the myth of dialogue? Ever since independence we have been crushing the essence of democracy while trying to repair the details. Since 1962, we have seen the growth of an imperial presidency around which clans and clienteles have formed. This is what we must free Algeria from.

We're not going to free it from the government, we want to free it with the government, because we maintain that change and progress in the future should be peaceful, not antagonistic.

[EL WATAN] Do you already have some steps laid out?

[Ahmed] What's important is that we put our hearts into the rally, and we'll leave no stone unturned in our effort to make it a reality as rapidly as possible. The best way to ensure its success is not to present anyone with a fait accompli. It's true we need to bring together as many parties, associations, and democrats as possible, and when I say democrats we must specify that this does not mean that anyone who is against terrorism is automatically a democrat. That's not enough. It's up to everyone who wants to play a role to prove his discernment and not sow seeds of discord. We're not trying to establish a rally that will fade over time or be undercut by manipulation and intrigue. What we need are men and women of conviction, so the rally can become a strategic rather than just tactical concern. That said, our goal is to make a difference on the ground. We need to express our views in the street and in public demonstrations, because the rally should be present in cities all around the country. The people who feel isolated need to be aware of a political presence. The message must be delivered. For me, history as taught by Algeria's leaders has been a political swindle, since the backbone of the resistance was the people themselves, who have held onto their dignity despite all their misfortunes. So we must not deceive them, and the best way to proceed is not just to spout slogans but to go directly to the people and give them the opportunity to build the rally themselves. That can't be done in a climate of bipolar violence. The regime must take cognizance of its responsibilities.

We ardently support any dialogue, discussion, or concertation with all the democratic forces, but we are not prepared to countenance reversion to the fashionable social distortion of conferring the status of "democrats" on all the old retreads of the system. When one has helped draft Article 120 and been a pillar of the regime for 30 years, when one has participated in the destruction of this country, then one's supposed opposition to terrorism does not by itself entitle one to be called a democrat. That is what we call sowing the seeds of discord. We Algerians all know what that means. Those people, who are very active in certain restricted circles and proclaim themselves "pulleys" for democracy, are in reality just defending their own privileges. Democracy does not interest them: They had 30 years to build it and never did so.

In the FFS, we are ready for any discussions, to receive or to give, but not to cut deals or compromise our principles.

Since the failure of the so-called consensus conference, the FFS executive has intensified its contacts with numerous parties.

The ground needed to be cleared, and today we can see a little more clearly, and we're going to mobilize ourselves to accelerate the formation of the rally.

[EL WATAN] What has been done end the parties' attacks on each other?

[Ahmed] If we can start with calmer, more reasoned, discussion between the various sides—and contacts have been made to this end—we can rehabilitate politics, which hasn't existed in Algeria since colonial days. We must put invective and personal attacks aside and begin debating policies and programs. We've all been victims of this at one time or another. We have to find the most durable path, because the boat we're all in together is in danger of sinking. We must do everything possible to bring the boat safely into port.

[EL WATAN] Will we see Ait Ahmed and Said Sadi shake hands anytime soon?

[Ahmed] We must put personal problems behind us. The problem is not between Ait Ahmed and Zeroual or between Ait Ahmed and Said Sadi. Formation of the democratic pole should not be held up by personal antagonisms. We must learn to look at things differently.

[EL WATAN] Is a democratic SMIG [expansion not given] possible in the very near future?

[Ahmed] Not only a democratic SMIG. The people in their intuitive genius are demanding we move toward a constitution and democratic elections. It is not just a question of resolving personal enmities. Sure, it's important to resolve them, but the people want to see a concrete, well-thought-out program to resolve the crisis.

Initially, this might be provided by the democratic rally, serving as one of the guardrails to ensure the electoral process doesn't go off track. The government must give us concrete proof that the guardrails it has in mind are not erected to thwart democratic forces but rather to prevent extremists and advocates of violence from triumphing over the democratic forces.

[EL WATAN] That initiative is apparently being reinforced by action at the international level, where the regime claims success in winning support for its program.

[Ahmed] In the FFS, we are working to see that pressure is exerted on the Algerian Government to restore democracy and civil peace, and to consolidate democracy by bringing enough resources to bear so that once democracy is restored in our country, it will have credibility with the most disadvantaged sectors of the population. We ourselves must solve Algeria's problem, but internationalization is already at the heart of the debate.

This is what I tried to tell the United States, that Algeria's problems are very complex, and complexity always leads to confusion, and confusion leads almost ineluctably to manicheism. We don't want the United

States to fall into the manicheistic view that there is nothing but the regime on one hand and the armed groups on the other.

Why the United States? Because it is the greatest power, and because it talks about establishing a new international order, which we do not want built on the backs of our people. As much conditionality as has been imposed, quite openly, on the countries of the former Soviet Bloc to move toward democracy, very little pressure has been exerted, it seems to me, on the Algerian regime. We have noted also that the United States refuses to intervene in the specifics of the Algerian situation the way it has with Israel and the Palestinians. All the same, we do have significant backing in the United States, where I was warmly welcomed and treated with great consideration.

[EL WATAN] At what level?

[Ahmed] At the highest level, including Messrs. Robert Pelletrau and Mark Parris and three officials in the Maghreb department. [sentence as published] Internationalization in the best sense is beginning to take effect. It's clear that the violence threatens security not only in Algeria but also in the Maghreb and the western Mediterranean. Almost all the Western countries realize the current situation does not favor stability. We want the international community to be mindful of the existence and suffering of the Algerian people and help it find the most positive means of expressing itself in the creation of this democratic pole.

[EL WATAN] And what was the response of your American interlocutors?

[Ahmed] It was clear that what interests the Americans most is a return to stability.

One need only recall the three points in President Clinton's statement: dialogue, continuation of reforms, and opposition to violence, including Islamist violence. The United States was against interruption of the electoral process.

The FFS, after noting the evasions of certain European countries, decided to go to the country that is most influential on the international scene to prove that the game's not over yet, that the democratic pole is a reality, that it can contribute not only to peace but also to the disappearance over time of the vestiges of terrorism, once the political problems are solved and the democratic transition actually gets under way. And also to durable stability in Algeria and the Maghreb.

I think our work in the United States had positive results and will be useful vis-a-vis Europe as well. The problem that most concerns us is French policy in Algeria. Just as we favor a non-interfering international presence in Algeria in many diverse forms, including monitoring—and we think it's time to do away with the so-called taboos on "external interference"—so do we favor an

international presence to monitor the transition, because we do not have full confidence in the de facto authorities.

But we are also for full monitoring of elections. The international community owes it to the Algerian people to provide financial support, which could be realized through a kind of "Marshall Plan," to which Algeria is morally entitled. First of all because of the seven years of war to which the international community turned a blind eye. And because it should do everything possible to make democracy succeed in our country. Unfortunately, there is a serious risk that the Algerian crisis will be internationalized in a negative sense. France is playing a role in this conflict.

[EL WATAN] In what way?

[Ahmed] It supports the political polarization of violence. We note that the statements made several months ago by the Quai d'Orsay concerning a need for dialogue have disappeared. All indications are that the financial support for which France labored so strenuously will be provided without conditions. Human rights and the lives of the Algerian people were given short shrift. I wonder if political considerations having to do with the French presidential elections may be responsible for this, in the last analysis. It amounts to telling the Algerian people, "just leave us alone." All the same, it is unpleasant to think the lives of thousands more victims would be sacrificed for electoral reasons.

That is unacceptable, especially for a country that styles itself a champion of human rights. France, by virtue of its historic and geographic proximity, should have played an active role in restoration of peace and legitimacy, in resumption of the democratic process and respect for human rights. It has done just the opposite: It is against any showdown with the de facto authorities and thus stands in the way of that international reprobation which is the minimal gesture of solidarity required. By its silence it encourages indiscriminate repression, the appointment from above of "puppet" institutions—all these reminders of the colonial past.

[EL WATAN] Don't you run the risk that your call for foreign intervention will be misinterpreted?

[Ahmed] The important thing is to act in a very open way and not to get involved in any plotting against one's country. The important thing is for the community to mobilize to make democracy succeed in Algeria. It's not foreigners that are going to do it, but rather all Algerians working together.

An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Today, countries are making a great show of humanitarian concern (as in the Gulf) to stop massacres, but what have they actually done to stop them? Who would have thought two and one-half years ago that Algeria would become known as the country of slit throats? What's going to happen in another month or two? What's the

point of me saying no to foreign interference if tomorrow we're going to ask foreigners to help stop the massacres? The responsible thing is to prevent the irreparable from happening. We don't need lessons from anyone in patriotism. I said in New York that the United States has allowed France to dissuade it from supporting democracy in Algeria. I know as well as anyone that Algeria is under no one's tutelage and is no one's protectorate.

But France has an obligation to participate—after all, why should it not?—an obligation to play an active role in establishment of an international commission for restoration of civil peace and revival of the democratic process. I am not appealing for foreign interference. I have always believed the moral obligation of solidarity transcends national borders when defense and promotion of human rights is at stake. We must bring down all taboos when it is a question of preventing massacres.

[EL WATAN] Much has been said about the FFS's position, which is described as confused, perhaps because of divergences between you and the party executive. What's the truth?

[Ahmed] The FFS tries to operate as democratically as possible. It is not a monolithic party with a "line" that must be followed slavishly. As the political situation evolves, it is only natural for shades of difference to emerge as new factors appear. There is no internal problem in the FFS. It is not always easy to deal with the fact that the members of the executive give me a certain amount of autonomy because I also have a role—I would never call it a historic role—that permits me to advance certain ideas. It is a question of getting civil peace restored, and finding the ways and means that are most adequate to the task.

[EL WATAN] How do you see the restoration of civil peace coming about?

[Ahmed] A crucial condition, for any solution of the crisis that puts Algeria back on a solid footing and restores its former influence, is the peaceful and rapid emergence of the democratic pole as a stabilizing element. The second condition is that there must be discussion, for total repression has not worked. We must draw conclusions from earlier failures and engage in dialogue with all political forces, including the moderate Islamist current, which must be willing to appeal to reason to put an end to Algeria's nightmare. Alas, we must confess that the moderates have not responded. Is this because they have been overtaken by the armed groups? We are asking ourselves this question.

At any rate, there can be no justification for a policy of silence. Voices should be raised within the Islamist camp to say that Islam is the culture of all Algeria. No one has the right to say what is and what is not Islamic. The basic value in Islam is "rahma," i.e., a better life for the Algerian people. Personally, I expect there may be some reversals of position within the Islamist camp, appeals

for an end to terrorism. Naturally, that should not prevent them from denouncing the terror perpetrated by the apparatus of repression.

[EL WATAN] The government doesn't rule out holding elections before the end of the transition period. What do you think about that?

[Ahmed] The move for early elections apparently covers presidential elections and nothing else. Considering the fact that since 1962 the regime has been organized around an imperial presidency, the problem is too serious to be treated unthinkingly, implicitly, and indirectly. We favor a return to constituent elections, which means doing the opposite of all that's been done since 1962. In Algeria, the president is not just part of a whole, he's everything. The government is not supposed to be a law unto itself, there are constitutional limits. So before anything else we say we must look at things differently, put our country on really sound foundations.

So much for basic principles, but the form is also important: How to organize the process to bring society and state into harmony. It's quite literally true that the administration is ready to "stage" elections, because it's ready to steal them. There are various forms of trickery, including falsified voter registration cards.

Here again, the democratic rally will have to play a monitoring role. Both the regime and the FIS have falsified voter lists. The dead have cast ballots while the living have been deprived of the vote. For once, let's not have elections Algerian-style, as the French used to say—or "French-style" as I myself would put it.

The other aim is a strong state, not a government that seems completely lacking in credibility. We must take all possible steps to ensure that for once in our history people can participate freely in elections and exercise their rights fully without being cheated.

[EL WATAN] Can you tell us when you plan to return to Algeria?

[Ahmed] My return will be an act of political significance. I do not want it to signify an endorsement. If I can truly play a useful role, that must be within some sort of framework: I must not be under constraints, and the party must not be hemmed in by continual pressures exerted on its leadership. I don't take blind risks; I evaluate everything I can, and my ambition is to serve my country by well-considered and responsible action.

With all my heart I want to participate in this glorious project called the democratic rally.

Higher Bread Prices, Air Fares Reported

94AF0237B Algiers LE SOIR D'ALGERIE in French
10 Jul 94 p 3

[Article by Cherif Berkache: "Price of Bread and Air Fares Rising"—first paragraph is LE SOIR D'ALGERIE introduction]

[Text] As could have been predicted, higher prices have been decreed for bread and air transport. Bread prices will go up immediately, while air fare increases take effect next Monday. A 250-gram loaf of "plain" bread will now cost 3 dinars [DA] instead of DA2.50, while the price of "improved" bread climbs from DA3 to DA4.

Fares will go up on all international and domestic flights, but the amounts have not yet been announced. Air Algerie, which invites interested parties to visit its ticket offices for more information, explains the hike by "changes in the economic environment." Meaning, of course, the devaluation of the dinar and increases in the cost of fuel. Another factor, by no means the least important, has to do with the subsidies of domestic routes and certain international routes maintained—or even established—for political reasons despite their unprofitability. In March of 1992, a year that saw international fares go up 30 to 40 percent (in February) and domestic fares 30 to 60 percent (in September), Air Algerie's general manager told the press the hikes were ordered "primarily by Treasury." We also recall the airline was complaining of the low fares for domestic flights, "among the least expensive in the world", which accounted for 49 percent of its total traffic but only 12 percent of its revenue. In part this was because 13 percent of the proceeds from each plane ticket goes to the treasury, DA50 is paid to the airport management company, and DA10 is paid for tax stamps.

While the logic behind the air fare augmentation may be convincing, especially given the fully liberalized market in this sector, the bread increases come as something of a surprise, since this basic necessity, which along with flour, semolina, milk, and sugar has always been subsidized—and thus immune to price "realities"—was not slated for an increase over the short term. The minister delegate for the budget department reaffirmed state support for the five "base products" in late May, after adoption of the supplementary finance bill, asserting that "the state is not walking away from its responsibilities to the disadvantaged strata of society." The Commerce Ministry's directorate general for competition and prices justifies the increase, according to APS, by the need to allow bakeries to "cover their increased operating costs" and "improve wages of bakery workers," something they have been unable to do, according to the directorate, because bakery profit margins on bread are so low. Perhaps so, but everyone knows the most profit is made on pastry, pizzas, and other fancy foods. We also note the Commerce Ministry hopes this measure will encourage investment in the bakery industry, which produces far too little bread. The number of bakeries should be doubled, according to estimates from the ministry. There is currently one bakery per 4,000 inhabitants, whereas the "desired" rate is one per 2,000.

The competition and pricing directorate is demanding "strict respect" for production quality standards and for

the annual leave schedule drawn up by directorate officials after consultation with the General Union of Algerian Traders and Artisans. On pain of "severe sanctions." We'll just have to see what happens, but in the meantime the increase in bread prices is raising questions—and anxiety levels.

Most Unemployed Professions Discussed

94AF0241D Algiers EL WATAN in French
20 Jul 94 pp 1, 2

[Article by Amel Boumediene: "Billions Wasted in Education: No Prospects for Graduates"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] Out of 6,000 students on the average trained every year by Algerian universities—in all fields—only 200 or 300 are lucky enough to find a job. As for the others, they have long given up hope to be able to work in their fields some day. How did we get there?

The above-mentioned figures may surprise, but they actually reflect the sad reality. A reality that strengthens the conviction that Algeria, unfortunately, is wasting billions of dinars to train students who become unemployed. What may seem still more surprising is that, during our survey, no institutions, not even universities, were in a position to provide statistics concerning unemployed graduates.

In order to obtain these figures, therefore, we had to crosscheck information provided by unemployed students committees.

The struggle they have been leading in recent years, and the hundreds of job applications they centralize, actually enable them to get a good idea of the numbers involved.

One of the major problems that many students must now face is undeniably linked to the lack of a supervising authority.

According to the information provided by unemployed students committees, it seems that biologists are the first to suffer. Not because they are the most numerous among the unemployed—the committee identified 800 unemployed biologists in the country's largest towns—but quite simply because they have the least chance of being hired.

In more concrete terms, it seems that out of 400 biologists who graduate every year, only 30—sometimes fewer—are thus able to find a job. "Yes," the chairwoman of the unemployed biologists committee answered, "this may seem absurd, but we do not have a supervising authority; we were trained for five years, but we do not have any status."

"Personally, I was part of the first class, which graduated in 1987 (the biology program started in 1983)," she went on, "and I am still unemployed."

"What will become of the other classes?"

"When we contact industrial companies," other students told us, "they often answer: a biologist, what is that? Others just tell us that their organization charts contain no provisions for biologists and that, therefore, they cannot hire us. If we had a status, a supervising authority, things would be quite different."

After many requests from the committees, the authorities decided to consider the problem. On 19 May 1993, a ray of hope appeared. At a meeting of representatives of Mr. Belaid Abdesselam's government and students committees, it was announced that 394 positions were made available for biologists and chemists (who suffer from the same problem).

A few months later, in September 1993, the unstable conditions in the country resulted in a change of government. Unfortunately, the fine promises vanished when Mr. Belaid Abdesselam left. "Mr. Redha Malek's government, which we approached again, has not only not followed up on his predecessor's promises, but it also informed us that, of the 394 positions mentioned, only 190 remained. We are still waiting..."

According to the people we talked to, Algeria might yet save millions of dollars if biologists were employed in their field. In recycling, processing, and in the food industries, biologists actually can play an important role, they told us.

The situation is the same for chemists, although their problem may look less serious because there are fewer of them. "There are fewer of us, that is true, but there are still hundreds of us who cannot be hired because we have neither status nor supervising authority," the representative of the unemployed chemists told us.

The unemployed chemists we met also wondered how the Medea antibiotic complex can operate with only...one chemist (all the others are mere technicians).

After biologists and chemists, psychologists come third on the list of unemployed graduates. Like biology, psychology started being taught to reduce overcrowding in other fields, but no consideration was given to a status or a supervising authority.

Twelve hundred unemployed psychologists were identified on Algerian territory. The figure recently published by the unemployed psychologists committee increased the anxiety of the new graduating class, as they are well aware that only two or three of the 130 graduates will be lucky enough to find a job in their field.

"Yet, clinic and school psychologists and speech therapists have a major part to play in their fields. Why are they not hired?"

"The recent hiring of 180 by the Ministry of Youth really gave much hope to the others, but unfortunately, that was it," unemployed psychologists told us. For those who have a status, the problem started in 1989, with the hiring conditions that were then imposed. Pharmacists

were the first to suffer, as they found themselves faced with the problem of the Pharms [pharmacies] independence (chemists encountered the same problem). "The Pharms and the drugstores were recruiting sales people. We still managed to have the law of April 85-05 enforced, which provides that every drugstore must be managed by a pharmacist."

For practitioners—physicians, dentists, and the remaining pharmacists—the obstacle is currently that of residence. According to the chairman of the unemployed physicians committee (there are 2,000 unemployed physicians in Algeria), the Ministry of Health requires that, to be hired in a town, candidates must be natives of that town.

"The problem is that 80 percent of the candidates come from large towns, where they cannot be hired because unfortunately all positions are already filled.

"Paradoxically, they can not find work in other regions of the country, because of the residence problem," he indicated.

The other problem facing the candidates, the committee chairman went on, is that of professional experience. "As paradoxical as that may seem," he told us, "an individual who has already worked has priority over new graduates. How do you expect us not to end up with thousands of unemployed people?"

"Mr. Belaid Abdesselam's government had indeed announced that 2,900 positions would be made available, but unfortunately nothing was done. The country's unstable conditions are an excuse. What we need, is to solve basic problems."

The State spend billions to train these men and women. Now they are unemployed, looking for a job, any job even if it has nothing to do with their qualifications.

Some limit their ambition to driving taxis. Theirs is a huge tragedy. Yet, the State, which is fully responsible for this state of things, does absolutely nothing to gather the fruit of several years of investment.

Out of despair, some dream of going abroad to survive, but even that possibility is now closed to them since the West has decided to close its doors to Third World immigrants.

Participation in Scientific, Cultural Exchange

94AF0241E Algiers EL WATAN in French
20 Jul 94 p 24

[Article by Paris correspondent Nadja Bouzeghrane: "Montpellier: Summer University for Some Algerians"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] Academics and their families, coming from Algiers, Oran, and Constantine, and a few who withdrew to Tunis and in France, i.e., some 70 people, participate in the Mediterranean Summer University (18-29 July)

organized by the Mediterranean university pole of Montpellier with the support of local communities, a number of institutions and associations such as the Rene Seydoux Foundation, the Arab World Institute, the Journalists' Training and Proficiency Center, the CISIA [expansion not given], France-Algerie, Coup de Soleil, the CIMAPE [expansion not given], Mediterrana, France liberte, Solagral, and the Mutations and Development Club.

The participants are housed in the residence of the Mediterranean Agronomic Institute [IAM], surrounded by a 7-hectare park, while those who came with their children and spouses are the guests of families, 13 in all. One of the objectives of the Mediterranean Summer University is to get a breather, to relax, to get some fresh air—something that the 20 or so children who have come with their parents are doing in the park of the IAM residence until they can enjoy the beach on the weekend.

However, the main objective of the Mediterranean Summer University, which was organized this year for the first time, is to promote cultural exchanges and scientific cooperation among intellectuals, researchers, and men of culture coming from various Mediterranean countries; to enable researchers from Mediterranean countries to maintain and strengthen their ties to the Mediterranean community as a whole; to promote an open reflection on Mediterranean areas, their history, their culture, their economic and social development, and their future; to understand the nature of the mutations in progress, their impact on societies and institutions; to consider the historic paths followed by the various regions, the breakup processes, and the identity crises; to testify, through cultural and artistic events, to centuries-old influences, a common heritage, and the region's contribution to the world's civilization; and to consolidate the ties of friendship and solidarity among Mediterranean countries by debating ideas and comparing experiences.

This first Mediterranean Summer University, placed under the sign of hope—the hope to see Algeria's problems dissipate soon—hinges around two major themes that will be treated by French and Algerian academics and academics from other Mediterranean countries.

The first theme, "cultures and identity representations," will deal with questions concerning the emergence and history of state institutions, citizenship, and modernity. Other subjects will also be debated, e.g., identity-related reasoning, historical identities, cultural interactions and multicultural spaces in the Mediterranean region.

The second overall theme, which will be discussed during the second week, will deal with "peoples, areas, and development in the Mediterranean region." This theme will deal with questions as varied as the Mediterranean landscapes and agrarian systems, migrations, Mediterranean towns and ports, industrial development, and the future of the Mediterranean region.

Another aspect of this summer university is the cultural events that will enliven the participants' evenings. Note the presence of students and teachers from the Algiers Arts School, members of the Asselah Association. In addition, one day will be devoted to "Albert Camus and the memory of Algeria."

In a message to the participants and organizers of the summer university, Professor Pierre Bourdieu will summarize its spirit, especially where Algeria is concerned: "To break the isolation of researchers, academics, and creators; to strengthen intellectual and professional ties; to intensify exchanges of ideas and experiences; to promote the creation of new poles of intellectual cross-production; to educate and inform; all this seems to me to be a first, an imperative modality of support to Algerian intellectuals, whether withdrawn abroad or still carrying out their activities essentially in Algeria..." "Intelligence, creativity, spiritual values constitute a rampart, which may look frail but is in fact impregnable, against the dissoluteness of societies."

Earlier this month, Pierre Bourdieu, the CISIA president, supported by some 50 French prominent researchers and academics, some of whom hold positions of responsibility in institutions, wrote to the minister of education and research and to the minister of foreign affairs, asking for the creation of a few positions of guest associate professors in universities, research centers and French centers abroad.

Unions Battle To Resolve Garbage Collectors Strike

94AF0241F Algiers EL WATAN in French
20 Jul 94 p 24

[Article by Zineb O.: "Algier Garbage Collectors: Illegal Strike"—first paragraph is EL WATAN introduction]

[Text] Garbage, rats, mosquitoes, open sewers, and stray cats and dogs are now an integral part of the Algerians immediate surroundings. And, as if to make the decor still more dramatic, the garbage collectors' local (UGTA [General Union of Algerian Workers]) went on strike for an unlimited period last Sunday.

The decision, taken without any warning, is illegal according to the law on union activities, all the more so as union officials did not inform either the administration or the public of their decision.

In the CIVA [expansion not given] hall, where a few strikers gathered, two billboards draw attention. The first one is from the UGTA. Dated 17 June, i.e., the day before the strike, it ascribes the strike to the everlasting problem of the construction of 532 housing units in El-Alia, to benefit CIVA workers, and to the freeze of the new status. This demand was already used in a strike notice early in June. After several meetings with officials, especially governorate officials, union members announced at a general meeting held on 11 June that they had canceled their decision.

The second billboard, containing communiques denouncing the strike and calling workers to go back to work, is from the SNAPAP [expansion not given] local. It goes further in its statements, bluntly calling UGTA representatives "saboteurs."

This strike seems to indicate that there are considerable differences between the two unions, especially considering that the decision was made the very day (17 June) when the new governor was to install, in the presence of all workers and their unions, the new Community Urban Council (CUC) that will replace the CIVA. Faced with the absence of government officials, some cadres who wished to remain anonymous stated that "the UGTA local was quite simply infiltrated by members of the former SIT [Islamic Labor Union] wishing to regain the ground lost already three years ago."

Faced with a fait accompli, however, the new governor ordered requisitions to enable the APCs [People's Communal Assemblies] and districts of Greater Algiers to take charge of garbage collection. For its part, the SNAPAP union is categorically opposed to the strike and called for "the government to fulfill its responsibilities to taxpayers."

Mr. Zerari, the SNAPAP general secretary, said he was "revolted" by the irresponsible behavior of UGTA union members. He indicated that "large CIVA depots were paralyzed by some individuals. The staff opposed to the strike were unable to do their work for lack of transportation means." He further added that "the SNAPAP is not against the principle of a strike, but rather against the strikers' platform of claims."

The work stoppage of night teams resulted in garbage accumulation on the sidewalks of the town. In collaboration with the APCs and the districts, the workers not affected by the strike took the initiative of renting trucks in order to collect garbage during the day and deposit it near the parking lot located below the Tafourah ramp; this, until the other garbage collectors return to work.

If this dramatic situation persists, this place may turn into a garbage dump within a few days, with all the attendant risks for local residents.

EGYPT

Arab Regional Media Strategy Reviewed

94LD0071B Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic
20 Jul 94 p 14

[Article by Usamah 'Ajaj]

[Text] It is a special session for the Arab information ministers, filled with new and serious discussions, touching on the cares and issues of the Arab nation in general, and the media specifically. Egypt, represented by Information Minister Safwat al-Sharif, participated with most of the ministers and delegation heads

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attending. He brought up a new idea: the Arab alternative for confronting imported satellite broadcasting. The latter is one of the challenges facing Arab societies in the future, with the growth of global and Arab channels. They appear and start broadcasting without prior coordination. The gravity of the terrorism issue was discussed, and the role of the media in confronting and resisting it.

Two things lent exceptional significance to the 27th meeting of the Council of Arab Information Ministers:

First, in general, was when Arab League Secretary General 'Isma't 'Abd-al-Majid pointed out that next year would mark the 50-year anniversary of the establishment of the Arab League. "The Secretariat is in the process of preparing a program to celebrate this occasion," he said, "aimed foremost at making Arab citizens aware of the League's role, and getting them involved in joint Arab action." He asserted that the Arab ministries of information and the media have a major role in giving this occasion its due importance in the Arab world, and acknowledging the role and mission of the Arab League over a half century. Thus it was natural that the translation of this occasion into a media event would be of key interest to the ministers.

Second, specifically, is the passing of 30 years since the establishment of the Council of Arab Ministers of Information, which met for the first time in 1964. A number of the ministers mentioned this occasion: Bahraini Minister of Information and chairman of the current session Tariq al-Mu'ayyad said, "We have achieved a great deal through the League's information agencies, but we are striving for more. We hope our annual meetings will continue, because we must rely on our Arab institutions for the continued fruitful dialogue on all matters that affect us."

United Arab Emirates Information Minister and chairman of the last session, Khalfan al-Rumi, spoke of the leading role the meetings had played in serving Arab causes, and its commitment to a systematic program in its orientation and media discourse, which has played a major role in delivering true information to the Arabs. Ahmad Muhammad Ibrahim, Secretary (minister) of Libya's General People's Committee for Information and Culture, emphasized the need to conduct a financial review and comprehensive assessment of the three decades of joint Arab information work, "to investigate, with all objective responsibility, its good points, to strengthen them, and its bad points, to overcome them. We must acknowledge the successes and failures of the joint Arab media effort, so that we may produce, with joint conviction and absolute determination, a unified Arab media policy, one which defines precisely the strategy we want, which carefully sets out the goals we yearn for, and through which we may apportion responsibility for the program and its elements, facilities, and methods, by which we may achieve our pan-Arab media objectives."

The Libyan minister proposed a review of "the working method of the Council of Arab Information Ministers; giving the Arab media a chance for systematic planning; striving towards the creation of a new mechanism; and giving each session of the information ministers' council a major strategic topic, on top of the other routine media topics."

New Ideas

Perhaps the significance of this session is that it abounded with new ideas and serious proposals to help forge an Arab strategy for the future. Egyptian Information Minister Safwat al-Sharif, for example, spoke of "the Arab alternative for confronting imported satellite broadcasting." He clearly identified one of the crises of the Arab world when he said that, "when we seek to accomplish a media achievement at the individual and regional levels, we do not spare any effort or expense, and in a flood of joy at having accomplished it, we fritter away with our own hands the energies and capabilities we have. The result is that the elements we want to confirm the Arab citizens' belonging and his security, to preserve his cultural identity, values, customs, and traditions, he reckons as a quantitative achievement whose condition we sometimes lack, though it is the basis we want to develop. This is caused simply by a lack of coordination." Safwat al-Sharif called for existing and future satellite channels to be a genuine and effective addition. He also called for the formation of an Arab council "to coordinate the satellite channels, to determine what we want from them, and on anything we must necessarily take into consideration, to create an Arab alternative in space for all countries, in a true, genuine, and integrated way; to reaffirm our citizens' affiliation with their history and their community, and to safeguard their cultural identity, giving them an openness to the world without any fear of his identity being encroached upon or his customs, traditions, or values being threatened. We must also find better ways of making the Arab world known and guiding it towards comprehensive development."

Egypt's Pioneering Experience

In order that Safwat al-Sharif's speech not be mere words, especially regarding the Arab alternative, he evinced the Egyptian experience in the area of direct broadcasting, when he said, "As we planned the Egyptian satellite channel, we had before us and beside us the Global Nile Channel—which is now broadcasting in two languages, English and French, and in other languages very soon—a set of goals to comprise a true and effective addition, relying on the noble Arab tradition on one hand, and the ability to direct media discourse in its own language on the other. It must be capable of withstanding imported and hostile Western media." Safwat al-Sharif also pointed out that "this logic and philosophy are the basis of plans to establish strategic projects adopted by our Arab and pan-Arab media, moving towards the new century in good form. This was exemplified in the

establishment of the Media Technical Production City as an Arab production center, and in addition to that planning to implement the Egyptian satellite project, to embark upon the age of specialized channels."

The ministers' discussions in the closed sessions touched on the threats facing the Arab world, the role of the media in this confrontation, and the coordination efforts among the Arab media services to make them instruments of unity. Saudi Arabian Information Minister 'Ali al-Sha'ir spoke of the need for pan-Arab integration to resist the propaganda campaigns at war with the Arab nation. Kuwaiti Information Minister Shaykh Sa'ud Nasir al-Sabah called for the Arab media to be integrative rather than competitive, so that they may carry out the mission their countries entrusted them with. Safwat al-Sharif discussed his vision of the Arab media as bringing together rather than dividing, as uniting rather than separating, bringing our nation's emotions to a future of solidarity, and eliminating conflicts, and standing up for right and justice.

The role of the media in combating terrorism and extremism is an issue no longer confined to one country, and in recent years, as Safwat al-Sharif said, has represented a grave phenomenon negatively affecting the course of peace and development. He called for the highest levels of cooperation and coordination to cut off this phenomenon at the roots, seeing it as a phenomenon foreign to the values of our Arab societies. "We have confronted terrorism," he said, "from the standpoint of a vision that distinguishes between terror and extremism, and true religion. Terrorism based on erroneous ideas and concepts is a crime to be fought with all determination and the law. At the same time, Egypt has opened the door to repentance and dialogue." He said that Egypt has a well-defined media policy with a clear vision characterized by responsibility and openness. Many of the Arab ministers indicated that the Egyptian experience combating terrorism at all levels, especially using the media, is exemplary, and possible to implement, especially as it has clearly been successful.

Recommendations for Implementation

The large Western news services' position on Arab issues is what Libyan Secretary of Information Ahmad Ibrahim was referring to, describing what is now occurring as a "news war," with these wire services intentionally practicing clever distortion of the news they produce and publish—the Arabs, regrettably, take the bait. The Arab media takes this news and rebroadcasts it just as it is. The minister called for the holding of a pan-Arab symposium to adopt an Arab defense plan to confront the news war produced and published by the Western news agencies, a symposium carefully prepared and coordinated with the Federation of Arab News Agencies, in order to liberate Arab news from dependency and hegemony.

The meetings of the Arab ministers of information may certainly be considered political meetings, in which

issues of political nature were discussed, especially as the ministers are responsible for adopting formulas for each state's political positions, in terms of the media. This was why issues of a similar nature, such as support for the emerging Palestinian media along with the Palestinian intifadah, and support for the Lebanese media, were on the agenda. This was reflected in the recommendations, which called, for example, on the Arab media to focus on the danger of Jewish immigration to Palestine and the occupied territories, on providing material and technical assistance to Palestinian media institutions, especially radio and television, which have begun broadcasting, supplying them with radio and television recordings that reaffirm the Arab and Islamic identities, supporting radio and television in the Comoros Islands, and paying out the funds allocated for the completion of the media and cultural plan to help Lebanon. Saudi Information Minister 'Ali al-Sha'ir supported this plan with the nominal sum of \$100,000. It also called for supporting Arab cooperation and coordination in the field of using satellite channels and assigning the Federation of Arab Broadcasting to continue studying the issue, guiding the discussions in the permanent committee's meetings, and the delegations' proposals and views, calling on all sides to play a role in completing the studies before submitting them to the Council of Arab Ministers of Information in its next meeting, holding a meeting of experts, organizations, and media federations to prepare a plan of Arab foreign media objectives and submitting it to the Permanent Media Committee as well. And, most important of all, the Arab media plan adopted to guide Arab news agencies and oppose terror and violence, must be implemented.

Challenges Facing Coptic Community Examined

Social, Political Barriers Noted

94LD0073A Cairo *WATANI* in Arabic 12 Jun 94 p 1

[Article by Antun Sayyidhum: "Persecution Suffered by Coptic Youth"]

[Text] Now that the storm kicked up by numerous writers against Ibn Khaldun Center for its endeavor to organize a conference to discuss concerns of the Middle East's minorities, including the Coptic minority in Egypt, has subsided; that the storm has taken a purely superficial turn, namely not to consider the Copts a minority; and that the esteemed writers have abandoned the original goal, namely the Copts' problems and concerns and the blind fanaticism and persecution they encounter—now that all this has happened, we will review the pains and the suffering experienced by the Copts, regardless of whether this storm has been stirred for the sake of the purely superficial while the crux of the issue is left unstudied and unmentioned and regardless of whether this omission is premeditated or unintentional. In the past two editions of *WATANI*, we reviewed briefly the problem of the imperial creed and of its marginal interpretations and directives, which obstruct

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and prevent building and restoring churches and their facilities. We also reviewed the problem of usurpation of Orthodox Coptic religious trusts by the Ministry of Awqaf. This is an Egyptian Government ministry but it totally disregards all the laws issued by the government to organize the management of these religious trusts with the consent of the Coptic Religious Trusts Authority, which was created on a decree by his excellency the president of the republic. Here is another painful problem because it is connected with Coptic youth. As soon as they open their eyes to life, Coptic youth are confronted at school with revilement and persecution by their Muslim teachers and peers whose hearts have been charged with malice and hatred by weak-spirited, blindly-fanatic, and detestably radical teachers who ruin the souls of these young blossoms with this spirit of hostility and with evil ethics and character. Thus, Coptic and Muslim youth are alienated the moment they come out to life. This is the regrettable seed of disunity between the nation's two elements.

Coptic youth carry on with their studies in this climate of extreme tension in which their Muslim brothers lie in wait to revile and renounce them because of religion. Coptic youth carry on in this manner until they get to universities, where they suffer the worst at the hands of some unconscionable professors who persecute and cheat in marking their examinations, especially in final years. As a result, Coptic youth who struggle and strive with their sweat and blood to learn and attain graduate from universities with the worst and most unjust grades. Thus, Coptic youth find the door to higher education shut in their face. This is fully evident in the scarcity of Coptic professors in all Egyptian universities. It is as if stupidity and laziness have descended upon Coptic students suddenly in this rancorous age. Consequently, Coptic youth emerge to practical life filled with pain and sorrow and with sadness for all their efforts that are wasted because of this injustice and for their country where they are exposed to the worst hardships.

After strife, struggle, and pain from the time they open their eyes to life and until the age of 20, these young Coptic men come out only to see a dark future facing them. Government and public sector employment is blocked to them because, very regrettably, the state's general policy now is not to appoint Copts at all. What is more, the arrogance of the rulers and of those who control state policy has reached such a degree that they have instructed managers of joint banks not to appoint Copts to their jobs. The wave has reached its crest and some private sector companies now prevent the appointment of helpless job-seeking Copts. Where can these young men go when their persecution in their country has reached this degree of insanity? Is this reasonable in a country whose constitution stipulates complete equality in rights and duties among all citizens? What is truly regrettable and despicable is that this blind fanaticism comes from the rulers of this miserable country. Where is Egypt heading with this malicious spirit?

Copts appointed in the government and the public sector suffered from poor and abnormal treatment, were overlooked in promotion to higher grades, were transferred to remote areas, and were assigned to tasks incompatible with their education and their capability even before fanaticism escalated to reach this degree. I receive an endless stream of letters from Coptic employees who complain of the maltreatment, persecution, and injustice they experience and of the plots hatched against them by colleagues who have lost their conscience, their ethics, and the right of comradeship. Copts are completely denied higher state positions. If one sees on rare occasion the name of a Copt promoted to one of these positions, then it is certain that this Copt has neared retirement age and that he will be pensioned off in a matter of months.

This article is presented to the esteemed writers who descend like vultures on Ibn Khaldun Center to declare angrily and tempestuously that Copts are not a minority but a part of the Egyptian people's fabric. This is the condition of this poor fabric, which is the Copts.

Pope on Church at Home, Abroad

94LD0073B Cairo AL-MUSAWWAR in Arabic
29 Jul 94 pp 28-33

[Interview with Pope Shinudah, head of the Coptic Church, by Sana' al-Sa'id; date and place not given]

[Text] "I am tied to AL-MUSAWWAR by warm relations. It is a sedate magazine."

This is how His Holiness Pope Shinudah talked to AL-MUSAWWAR. After two weeks in which AL-MUSAWWAR opened its pages to what is happening in the arena of the Egyptian Church and after 15 days of presentation of opinion and counter opinion, here is the leader of the church in Egypt answering all questions raised at the gates of the Egyptian Church in search of answers.

The pope has spoken about church unity, democracy, and opposition inside the church, asserting that what has happened is no more than an act by a noisy minority of church members who haven't been able to submit to the church and who have sought instead to control the church.

The pope has refused to characterize what has happened in the church as a coup because what has happened is a purge and the removal of elements who are in the wrong.

The pope recounted the tale of Aghathun from A to Z, talked about the right of the press to discuss church affairs, and debated the Coptic Reform Group's ideas. Generally, his holiness the pope answered all questions.

But during the conversation, the pope surprised us with his accomplishments. He assumed the papacy when Egypt had just seven churches in the diaspora. Now, it has 127 churches which ultimately constitute parts of Egypt abroad. While conducting this interview with the

pope, Egyptian Copts were celebrating the 40th anniversary of the pope's ordination as a monk.

Let us turn to the interview which has come at the right time and on the most appropriate occasion.

[Sa'id] What is happening in the Coptic Church? To be specific, is the church in a crisis?

[Shinudah] There is absolutely no crisis in the church. However, there is a minority of some noisy individuals whose voice wouldn't be heard in the church if it weren't for the press. The press has opened its arms to these individuals. They are some of our sons who haven't been able to submit to the church and so they have sought to control the church. These individuals have also taken up the policy of defending and protecting culprits without realizing what was happening. They have played no positive role in the church and have specialized in negative action and in criticism.

[Sa'id] Is this the first time in which the opposition note surfaces so sharply?

[Shinudah] This isn't the first time. MADARIS AL-AHAD [SUNDAY SCHOOLS] magazine has adopted this note. I say that in the church, the term 'opposition,' which some people have used, isn't a church term. The church is supposed to be one in spirit and in thought and it should not borrow this political term.

Purge

[Sa'id] If it isn't a coup, then how can what has happened and is happening in the Coptic Church be characterized?

[Shinudah] What coup? There is no coup. Here you are seeing the church as it has always been, unless there is a coup in explaining facts to the people. All that there is to the matter is that the church wanted to purify and purge elements at fault existing in it. There is no doubt that mistakes have been made by some people, and by some priests and monks in particular. We couldn't keep silent on such faults because they trouble our conscience greatly. On a related matter, how can we let these faults go uncorrected and unpunished and how can we not take a stance on them? We are concerned with purity of the church, especially purity of the clergy who represent in the people's eyes an ideal model to be followed and the example of every virtue?

A clergyman doesn't lead an ordinary marital [sic] life. He is supposed to be the high standard that the faithful emulate. His fault is harder and more serious than the fault of an ordinary man. We deal with unpublicized faults in unpublicized ways. As for faults which become obvious and about which we receive complaints, we have to take a position on them. In any public civil service department, the department head is empowered to punish those who are in the wrong. So, it is more behooving that the church should have this power.

[Sa'id] Did you have any reservation on seeing these people go to the press to defend them?

[Shinudah] In truth, I totally pity these priests and monks who have been discussed by the press. With the clamor they created around themselves, they have publicized themselves as punished individuals or as individuals with whom their religious leadership isn't pleased.

This isn't in their interest because people who knew nothing about them do so now and their affair has become public to all. This clamor will do these priests and monks no good whatsoever. Rather, they have harmed themselves with it. I wish that those who have been defending them would try to persuade them to repent, would counsel them spiritually and ecclesiastically, and wouldn't defend their faults, thus confirming them in their faulty ways and doing them no good.

I wonder: is what has been published about them a plus for them or a minus against them? A monk around whom press clamor is created can (only hurt himself?) with such clamor because abbots will not accept him in their monasteries for fear of the clamor he creates. They will say: if he has dealt with the pope in this manner, then to what limits will he go in dealing with us? Moreover, no church can enlist him in its service because monks serve in churches only on the pope's order.

Press and Church

[Sa'id] Is the press entitled to debate church affairs or is such debate considered intervention in the internal affairs of the church as a religious authority?

[Shinudah] The church has its ecclesiastical regulations, traditions, and laws. Moreover, monasticism is a life that has its spirituality. It is a life dedicated to asceticism, celibacy, and obedience and a life that has its special laws. Whoever proposes to write about the church or about monasticism must know all their laws and traditions and the relations that bind their members to each other. Moreover, before a paper writes about a church issue, I wish it would investigate it through all parties involved. Thus, the paper will not defame one party and then leave it to this party to respond or not respond, especially since the church doesn't punish an individual until an extensive investigation is conducted.

[Sa'id] Are there investigation controls that govern the dismissal process, for example, and that determine the degree of punishment?

[Shinudah] Of course, investigation has its controls. It may last a [long] time, witnesses are heard, and there is a special file for it. But at the same time, an investigation has its confidentiality because we are keen on the reputation of our sons, regardless of the mistake they make. But to prove their innocence before the people, some of our sons publicize among the people that which we don't want the people to know about them. If we don't want clergymen's faults to be known even within the sphere of their local church, then how do you think we feel when

such faults are chewed up in the press? If there are those who want their files opened, then the files are available, and it wouldn't please them to see them opened. However, because these individuals are certain that we don't open these files which condemn them, they dare talk and depict themselves as innocent victims. Logically, what interest does the church leadership have in punishing individuals who aren't guilty?

[Sa'id] Does the church judiciary seek to be fair? We ask so that nobody will interfere in its decisions or arouse doubts about it on the pretext of defending the guilty.

[Shinudah] The church judiciary must be respected by the people. It is as if those who try to defend the clergymen in the wrong are, on the other hand, trying to cast doubt on the fairness of the church judiciary, and we don't accept this from them. The matter started initially with a Coptic paper, namely MADARIS AL-AHAD, which went as far as demanding in one of its editions that the pope revoke all the decisions issued against dismissed or detained clergymen. This is a fantasy. How can the pope revoke decisions issued by the Clerical Council, which is headed by a bishop and whose membership consists of a number of clergymen who are well-known for their piety? The council has an official legal status and its decisions are based on certain proven facts. Some of the clergymen confessed to their faults and signed to the fact. Can the decisions be revoked so lightly just because some people working in the Coptic press have demanded it? It isn't just one of the rights of the head of the clergy to punish those who are at fault but it is, moreover, his duty to punish them in order to maintain order in the church and to preserve church purity and sanctity.

The Bible recounts the story of the high priest whom God punished very severely because he didn't raise his sons, the priests, as they should have been raised and because he allowed them to persist in their faults with a light warning that didn't deter them. If we don't punish those who are in the wrong, then we will be condemned and God will punish us. But despite this, a convicted priest can, calmly and without clamor, appeal his sentence before a higher clerical authority. This authority will do him justice whereas clamor in the press will do him no good at all.

[Sa'id] What is your response to the demand that the policy of reconciliation and forgiveness be pursued with those who have erred?

[Shinudah] It is surprising that some have said: we urge the pope on the anniversary of his ordination to the priesthood to launch a policy of reconciliation and love. What reconciliation is this? Do we tell a judge, for example, that he should be reconciled with the culprits he has sentenced after investigation? Is it love to let the erroneous persist in their error and to allow their faults to affect others and to go unpunished? What idealism will there be in the church if it allows those at fault to go untasked and unrenounced and if it ends up without

controls? If this happens, we will find in the other faction those who say that the church allows things to go unchecked, that it isn't decisive, and that it doesn't preserve the purity of its spiritual climate. We should keep in mind that we never begin with punishment but rather with advice and guidance. We then warn of punishment. If we get absolutely no response, then we are compelled to punish. There is something to which we would like to draw attention in the area of pardon and forgiveness. In the church system, forgiveness is based on sincere repentance. A condition of repentance is to acknowledge one's mistake and to try as hard as possible to repair its consequences. We have forgiven some who have proven their repentance.

Aghathun's Tale

[Sa'id] What about a monk, such as Aghathun, who is removed from a church to which he is ordained?

[Shinudah] In the church system, a monk is never ordained to a church. A monk is ordained a parson in the abbey to which he belongs. A monk's work in a church isn't a right to which he is entitled but a permission given to him. It is well-known that monasticism is essentially a life of devotion, seclusion in deserts, asceticism, and remoteness from people. Even in foreign languages, the word 'monk' denotes that one is alone and the word 'monasticism' denotes solitude. It isn't in the interest of monks to remain in the outside world for a long time because they will lose touch with the monastic atmosphere in which they live.

How will a monk leave the world to return to a life of solitude in the desert, unless he is compelled to obey his superiors? Out of concern for monastic life, people have often asked me not to let a monk stay in the outside world for a long time and to return them to their monasteries at least every two or three years so they will maintain the monastic life to which they have dedicated themselves and so they will return to constant prayer, which is a monk's permanent call. A monk shouldn't be tempted by the world, by its easy and comfortable life, and by its relations and friendships. A monk's return to his monastery isn't punishment. A true monk is pleased to return to his monastery, far from the noise of cities and from their preoccupations that impede a life of prayer.

[Sa'id] So, what kind of punishment has your holiness imposed on Monk Aghathun?

[Shinudah] Very frankly, I haven't imposed any punishment on Monk Aghathun to date. I haven't touched his status as a monk or a clergymen and I haven't tasked him for his faults, and they are many. Sometime ago, I received numerous complaints about him from the monasteries and churches surrounding Abu-Sayfayn Church in Misr al-Qadimah. The area isn't just a historical area but also an area characterized by a special spiritual climate because it abounds with churches and monasteries. It isn't permissible for a monk to act of his own

volition without referring to his superiors and without maintaining good neighborly relations in the area where he lives. I didn't dismiss Aghathun from his work in that church until after I had dispatched three bishops to him. One of them was a monastery head, the other was the bishop of Misr al-Qadimah, and the third was my private secretary. But he received them rudely and paid them no heed. He even left while they were still talking to him. But they brought him back and gave him advice, which he didn't take. He later went to the papal headquarters and entered the Clerical College library forcefully by breaking a window and leaping into the library, which is something that doesn't befit a monk. The police in the area were compelled to intervene and proposed to me that they cite him for breaking and entering. But I turned down the proposal and said that I didn't wish to harm him at all. But he then returned to the church in Misr al-Qadimah after he had been relieved from his duty there in order to incite its parishioners against the pope. Despite this, I haven't harmed him. Even though a decree has been issued ending his service in Cairo and returning him to the monastery, he is still in Cairo to this day.

[Sa'id] This pertains to the principle of obedience. I wonder: does this mean that Monk Aghathun has rebelled?

[Shinudah] Yes, he has. Obedience is a fundamental principle in monasticism. It is also a sign of tranquility, of purity of the heart, and of meekness. A monk may not lose these spiritual qualities. What is surprising is that after all this, Aghathun sent us a certificate from a hospital attesting that he suffers from extremely poor blood circulation because of heart irregularities. On the same evening, I received a report that he was going to conduct prayers in Jazirat al-Dahab Church in al-Jizah. It is well-known medically that a person suffering from extremely poor blood circulation must be under careful treatment.

He cannot perform the mass in any church. Al-Jizah Archbishopric has, of course, prevented him from performing prayers in that church. It is as if he is determined to stay away from the monastery, even on the pretext of medical treatment. Meanwhile, this treatment hasn't prevented him from trying to go to al-Jizah to perform prayers there. I don't wish to dwell on this issue. But the press has waded into it and has presented an inaccurate picture of what has happened and is happening. One magazine has defended Aghathun and has said that he hasn't been promoted to the rank of bishop like the rest of his colleagues. Are all monks promoted to bishops?

Dismissal of Monk

[Sa'id] How can Monk Aghathun be dismissed when he was ordained parson for Abu-Sayfayn Church in Misr al-Qadimah?

[Shinudah] Originally, Aghathun was ordained a monk in Anba Maqqar Monastery in Wadi al-Natrun. He

disagreed with his superiors there and came to me and I attached him to Anba Bishawi Monastery. I then ordained him a priest and appointed him secretary of the Clerical College library. When he asked me to permit him to conduct mass in a church, I permitted him to do this in Abu-Sayfayn Church in Misr al-Qadimah. I didn't permit him to change the area's map any way he likes and without consultation. He wasn't assigned to Abu-Sayfayn Church so he would turn it into his sphere of influence but so it would become a sphere of prayer and service. If I have relieved him from service in this church, then it is for his good. But his clinging to the city and to his post indicates that his love for monastery and monasticism requires him to return to the starting point.

The importance of monks' bond to their monasteries and to the roots of monastic life motivated some popes to order the return of all monks to their monasteries. This happened in the days of Pope Yuwannis [or Yoannes] XIX in the 1930's and in the days of Kilurus VI in the 1960's. In the days of other popes, a papal order was issued to all monks serving in the country's churches to return to their monasteries, and they all obeyed the order. As for service by monks, the pope didn't permit more than one monk to serve in each archbishopric, and this monk served as the archbishopric agent. Monks returned to monasteries include some who spent more than 20 or 30 years serving in churches, and none of them complained.

[Sa'id] Is the reason for Monk Aghathun's issue the popularity that he has gained?

[Shinudah] This doesn't mean that he should use this popularity against his religious leadership. He shouldn't forget that his leadership assigned him to this service. He shouldn't be ungrateful to those who gave him the priesthood and the job. Another thing is that in the past, monks avoided popularity out of modesty on the one hand and, on the other hand, so it wouldn't divert them from their spiritual work.

Church and Secularists

[Sa'id] Is church unity in danger?

[Shinudah] This is a strange phrase that I hear for the first time. Church unity is growing firmer and firmer by the day. The entire church holds one opinion. At the Holy Synod meetings, decisions are made unanimously and not by majority. The same applies to the General Local Council, which is comprised of laymen [even though the word 'ilmaniyun, which means precisely secularists, is used] and in which decisions are also made unanimously and not by majority. Very great love exists between us and our people. If a few individuals who deviate out of millions of Christians, then this deviation doesn't affect church unity. These individuals don't at all reflect the Coptic public opinion. Some of those who write in the press have no influential presence in the church and some of them use aliases, as when some articles were published in magazines and signed by the

Coptic Reform Group. This group has no presence at all. Some conceal their names so as not to create an uproar and some want to settle old accounts. But what concerns us in all this is the secularity issue, because of which some people criticize us.

[Sa'id] Is there any problem between his holiness the pope and the secularists and do you prevent them from serving?

[Shinudah] The church has given secularists a broad opportunity to serve it. For example, members of the General Community Council (24 members) are laymen, and so are members of the provincial community councils. What is more, there is in every church a committee of laymen who supervise the church's financial and administrative affairs. There are tens of thousands of laymen who serve in the religious education schools. There are other laymen who serve to meet the church's architectural, engineering, financial, scientific, and other needs.

We don't prevent laymen from serving. But we like to see that their service is organized.

With us, church membership is of four kinds: general membership, which is for all Christians; spiritual membership, which is for those who attend church meetings and participate in church prayers and mass services and who lead a sound spiritual life that begins with repentance and grows in charity and virtue; active membership, which is of men and women who serve in the church spiritually, administratively, and socially; and leadership membership. But some of those who advocate secularism want to leap all at once to membership of the leadership without going through spiritual and active membership and without having within the church a mainstay of people who know them. Some of those who promote secularism blame the pope for not including them in the General Community Council, keeping in mind that this council is formed by a general popular election with which the pope has nothing to do. So, membership to this council isn't by appointment. Perhaps they say the pope didn't nominate them. Generally, the pope doesn't nominate anybody because he is everybody's father. If a group publishes a certain slate, if some people think that this slate is supported by the pope, and if the slate wins as a result, then what is the pope's fault if people insist on giving the slate attributed to him success? We should keep in mind that people select a certain slate because its members are in harmony and because they can work together without disagreement. Those selected may have numerous other talents but what is important isn't just the talents but harmony and collective action. An indication of the pope's interest in laymen is that he meets on every third Monday of the month with members of Coptic associations and on every second Monday of the month with secretaries of religious education. He also holds constant meetings with the parishioners of every church that needs to have a new priest ordained. He listens to their observations

and proposals and carries out their recommendations. There is great love between us and our people, and this love isn't troubled by what some people advocate, such as the people who use the word 'reform.'

[Sa'id] Why don't you lead a reform that ends the church concerns and solves its problems?

[Shinudah] I was greatly amazed when AL-MUSAWWAR published articles reiterating words alien to our Coptic community, such as 'crisis, church concerns,' church problems, and demand for reform. The article writer undoubtedly knows what the church concerns and problems are, and they are all from outside, not inside, the church. At a time when some writers talk about the Copts' problems and about what their situation in the Egyptian society requires, we see a serious shift embodied in the attempt to make the reader think that what Copts suffer from are internal problems. The shift is also embodied in the attempt to exaggerate and to say that these internal concerns are turning into concerns for the entire country, and we thank God they haven't said they are turning into concerns for the Middle East and the entire world. Should an order by the pope to a monk to return to his monastery become a crisis, problems, and concerns for the entire church when such an order is an ordinary thing dictated by the circumstances? Perhaps the reader who reads the words 'crisis,' problems, and concerns thinks that the church is experiencing a real problem that has compelled the magazine to use on its cover a sensational title that reads: "What is happening in the Coptic Church?" and an even more sensational title that says: "Pope's Crisis With Parsons, Monks, and Secularists." I say that the church is well and that no individual case should be made this sensational. The Holy Bible says, "Blessed be those who come to bring good tidings."

I wish the article writer researched what truly concerns the Copts and what would correct their political and economic conditions. Generally, this issue of transferring a monk isn't the issue preoccupying the Coptic environment, and it isn't right that it should. There is an attempt here to shift attention from the external problems to trivial problems fabricated inside the church. We say this at a time when the Coptic Church rejoiced greatly in big celebrations and historic events throughout the past two months. For the first time ever, the church ordained five Eritrean bishops to form the holy synod for the Church of Eritrea. This is a historic event, which was noted with interest by the world and African press, but not the Egyptian press.

We also ordained the first British archbishop who, along with his followers, vicars, monks, and churches, has joined the Coptic Church. Moreover, a Dutch archbishop and a French bishop were ordained to tend French citizens who have joined the Coptic Church. Seven parsons from South Africa who have joined the Coptic Church, along with all their parishioners and churches, were also ordained. During this period, a

protocol was also concluded with the Ethiopian church. Should the press forget all these major historic events and preoccupy itself with the return of a monk to his monastery and with talking about the church's crises and problems?

Old Guard

[Sa'id] Did the archbishops forming the old guard attend the Holy Synod meeting that discussed church and clergymen's affairs?

[Shinudah] The fact is that there was no Holy Synod meeting and no boycott. All that there was to the matter is that a celebration was held on occasion of the 40th anniversary of the pope's ordination to the priesthood. Some archbishops and bishops came to convey their congratulations. As a sign of their love, 48 archbishops and bishops came. It was announced that a seminar would be held for the synod. This is a new idea according to which some people can meet to engage in scientific dialogue so as to clarify matters. This seminar didn't represent an official synod meeting. Despite this, 48 members attended it. Not everybody was required to attend. Some didn't attend because of old age and some because of poor health. Four bishops didn't attend because we delegated them to supervise the celebration marking Saint Anba Shinudah holiday in Sawhaj Monastery.

Something surprising that the article writer said is that His Beatitude Anba [Domadius], the archbishop of al-Jizah, didn't attend when the fact is that this archbishop was in the United States for treatment. He also said that His Beatitude Anba Haydra, the archbishop of Aswan, didn't attend whereas this archbishop did attend, and so did Anba Bimwa, the bishop in charge of old monasteries, and Anba Butrus. The article further said that Khartoum Archbishop Anba Daniel [Danyal] didn't attend. We are all aware of Sudan's current circumstances. So, it isn't a matter of boycott. Great love exists between His Beatitude Anba Daniel and the pope, who promoted Anba Daniel to the rank of archbishop during his visit to Sudan.

In any case, we don't assume on any occasion that all will attend. Every individual has his own circumstances. The Holy Synod law stipulates that a synod meeting has quorum if two-thirds of the members attend, excluding from this figure archbishops who work outside Egypt. So, what should we think of this attendance when there was no official meeting!

I will return to the phrase 'old guard boycott of the synod.' The phrase 'old guard' is a new phrase because there is no so-called guard. The church is guarded by God alone. As for human capability, it lies in the entire synod. Moreover, the word 'boycott' signifies something which, I hope, isn't meant by the writer and isn't understood by the reader. The word means some sort of split and hostility, and such a thing doesn't exist. As I have already said, Holy Synod decisions are made unanimously.

Accomplishments

[Sa'id] There are those who have said that the establishment of churches in the diaspora led to the creation of cohesive communities, with the Orthodox Church as their center. I wonder: have these churches become a mainstay of power for the Copts or for the pope?

[Shinudah] We have had to devote attention to Copts in the diaspora and to establish churches for them for fear that they would fuse in the Western society, with all of this society's morals that are alien to us and with its intellectual and ideological deviations. The objective has been to strengthen the Copts in the diaspora and not to strengthen the mother church through them. When I assumed church leadership, we had just seven churches in the diaspora: two in the United States, two in Australia, two in Canada, and one in London. Now, we have 127 churches in the west, divided as follows: 54 in the United States, 14 in Canada, 21 in Australia, and 38 in Europe. Whereas Copts used to lease or borrow churches in the past to hold mass, we have now built our own big churches there, some of which own quite a bit of land. We now have a monastery in California that owns 240 feddans; one in Melbourne, Australia, that owns 46 feddans; and a Coptic center in Birmingham, which has 11 feddans. Moreover, we have a Coptic center in (Kerfeldbach?), near Frankfurt in Germany, which is tantamount to a semimonastery. All these establishments are Egyptian establishments abroad and lands that belong to Egypt abroad. They form Egyptian, not just Coptic, communities. Should we forget all this and talk about the desire for reform? We tend our sons abroad so as to maintain their belonging to the Coptic Church and to Egypt and so we can keep their life pure in a society in which perversions abound. We have been keen on allowing our children abroad freedom of movement and the freedom to manage their financial affairs. I have never asked at any time that the accounts of a single church in the diaspora be examined. Thus, our churches have grown and proliferated. We have also founded three theology colleges in the diaspora: one in Jersey City, another in Los Angeles, and the third in Sydney, Australia. A number of institutes are in the foundation phase. We have tended youth in the diaspora by organizing for them conferences that have been tantamount to study seminars in which they meet under the leadership of Anba Musa, the youth bishop, who is accompanied at time by His Beatitude Anba Thomas and His Beatitude Antonius Marks. We now have numerous new churches in Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa. Is all this to be forgotten and should the reader be preoccupied with the issue of a monk who has exceeded his jurisdiction and whose transfer has been ordered by the pope? Should we create out of this an issue that preoccupies the Egyptian reader and that, in the writer's opinion, creates for the church concerns that are considered a part of the state's entire concerns. We thank God that this issue didn't become a part of the national dialogue when it was held. The church's actual concern is the talk about its concerns.

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When people talk about the church, I hope they will note the efforts, the sacrifices, and the offerings we make, not just what they think to be crises, which are actually trumped up crises.

[Sa'id] You said at the outset of this interview that the Copts are in one place and the press is somewhere else. What does your holiness mean?

[Shinudah] Copts are concerned with certain issues that touch their lives and their future in particular. The questions raised by some magazines are questions connected with marginal issues to Copts. Rather, Copts resent greatly press intimations about their church—intimations which turn this church into the subject of idle talk. As for the pope, Copts consider him their leader. Anything that touches him touches them also. Moreover, Copts feel happy with the spiritual and social care and with the religious education the church offers them. They also feel happy with the position of the Coptic church abroad and in the work of church organizations for church unity.

[Sa'id] But will the church experience democracy?

[Shinudah] If it weren't for democracy, these people wouldn't be allowed to talk and to undermine their church without an effort to verify the facts from their sources.

Debate on Democratic Goals, Concepts Illustrated

Democratic Failure of Revolution Noted

94LD0078A Cairo AL-AKHBAR 21 Jul 94 p 3

[Column by Sa'id Sinbil under rubric: "Good Morning"]

[Text] Revolutions are stations in the history of peoples.

All revolutions have victories and defeats, splendid great works, and deadly errors. The revolution of 23 July 1952, like other revolutions, achieved splendid victories and faced horrible defeats.

The 23 July revolution was able to free Egypt from British colonialism and from domination of the economy by foreigners. Something that many members of these generations do not know is that when the 23 July revolution began, the British Ambassador's word was law in Egypt. British soldiers marched in uniform in the streets of Cairo and major cities as soldiers of an army of occupation, not as visiting soldiers.

The 23 July revolution successfully ended this occupation and freed the land of Egypt from the British presence. As the revolution defeated the occupation inside Egypt's territory, so it defeated the occupation outside Egypt's territory. The revolution was clearly influential in liberating many Arab and African countries from foreign colonialism and helping them establish national government.

However, the revolution that achieved all these victories faced a terrible, horrible defeat on 5 June 1967, which caused the loss of Sinai and its occupation by the Israelis.

No one denies the social reforms that the 23 July revolution achieved. The most important of them was to end agricultural feudalism and redistribute land to small peasants and the poverty-stricken.

When the revolution arose, foreigners and naturalized Egyptians owned the corporations and banks. The revolution succeeded in ending this domination completely. The revolution tried to establish social justice in Egypt by increasing growth rates and redistributing income, but it lost its way when it rejected the method of a free economy and imposed the method of central planning used by the socialist countries. The failure of this system later became clear and led to its collapse.

The revolution also made a horrible mistake when it annulled democracy, denied the freedom of the individual, and sowed fear and terror in the mind. This led the revolution to rule the country in totalitarian, dictatorial fashion, causing the revolution to fall into errors and defeats.

Unfortunately, after the revolution there was a deliberate obscuring of all the leaders and great men who were prominent in prerevolutionary Egypt. After the revolution itself lost its vigor, many people adopted the same attitude, maligning the July revolution and its leaders, as the latter had maligned previous revolutions and their leaders and had even attempted to delete previous revolutions and uprisings from history. As Christ said [Mark 4:24], "With what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you"—and even more!

Role of Political Parties Called Incomplete

94LD0078B Cairo AL-AKHBAR 20 Jul 94 p 3

[Column by Sa'id Sinbil under rubric: "Good Morning"]

[Text] Political parties are a school to educate politicians and graduate new leaders.

In democratic countries, the political parties form governments called shadow governments from among their members—governments that observe and monitor, but do not govern.

The best known of the shadow governments is in Britain, where two large parties take turns ruling: Conservative, which governs now, and Labour, which sits on the opposition benches.

The Conservative Party has its government which rules. It has its ministers who manage the affairs of the various ministries. Correspondingly, the opposition Labour Party has formed a shadow government for which it has chosen a group of shadow ministers, charging each of them with responsibility for a particular ministry: to monitor its actions and to observe its activity and problems. If the party ever comes to power, it will find in

its ranks dozens of men, each fit to govern and to take responsibility for a ministry.

Currently, a young man named Tony Blair (age 41) holds the position of shadow interior minister in the British Labour Party. This man has become the topic of everyone's conversation and the focus of interest of politicians inside and outside Britain. He is expected to be elected leader of the Labour Party tomorrow, Thursday.

If Tony Blair wins this office—and all predictions are that he is likely to win—he will become Britain's prime minister and ruler when the Labour Party returns to government. Blair enjoys great attractiveness, or, to use the politicians' term, he has special charisma. This has caused Labour's leaders to become attached to him and enthusiastically nominate him to lead the party, despite his youth and the existence of many Labour leaders older and perhaps more experienced than he.

Tony Blair's star lit up after the death of the Labour Party's previous leader, John Smith, this April. He became one of the leading candidates. Although he lacks the experience of older men, he has the advantages of young men, who are more able to adapt to changes in the world and to understand the rhythm of the age in which we live and absorb its pace.

In the opinion of political observers, the choice of a young man to lead the Labour Party constitutes a turning point in British politics no less exciting than the political circumstances surrounding the emergence in the mid-seventies of Margaret Thatcher, Britain's most famous prime minister.

Political parties abroad are schools from which great leaders graduate every day. However, in our country these schools have shut their doors and windows to the principal and teachers and have expelled the students!

Political Party Crisis Observed

94LD0078C Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI 22 Jul 94
p 6

[Article by Halah Mustafa: "The Crisis of the Political Parties and Democratic Development in Egypt"]

[Text] Although more than 17 years have passed since the approval of a multiparty system and establishment of many political parties, practical experience continues to reveal many shortcomings and weaknesses affecting party life in Egypt and undoubtedly affecting chances for democratic development. Democracy is not realized by reforming and developing the system of rule—the government, with its different branches; it is also realized by reforming and developing all other elements of the political system, especially the parties and other effective political forces.

In fact, the narrowness of the present experiment with political parties is attributable to a significant extent to the circumstances in which the political parties that

emerged between 1976 and the present were born and developed. The trend toward a plurality of parties in Egypt during the seventies came in the wake of an experiment that rejected a plurality of parties and replaced it with a single political organization as part of the authoritarian system that Egypt knew during the Nasir decade.

This historical fact played an important role in defining the course of the experiment with political parties. Most of the political parties involved in the experiment emerged initially from within the single political organization. The first three parties with which political pluralism began were born from the so-called forums that were formed at that time within the Socialist Union by presidential decree to represent the main political currents: right (the Socialist Liberal Party), center (the Arab Socialist Egypt Party, which became the National Democratic Party), and left (the Democratic Unionist Grouping). The leaders of these parties came from the same political elite (the Free Officers) as the July 1952 revolution. They all took middle positions in relation to all the intellectual and political currents and trends. Furthermore, all adhered to the legitimacy of affiliation with the July revolution. Their political and economic programs therefore resembled each other and blended into each other in many ways. They lacked the existence of homogeneous social forces to which they gave expression or a clear intellectual ideology that they defended. The Socialist Labor Party, which arose later by decree of the political authority in 1978, was no better off than its predecessors: it was the heir of the Young Egypt movement of the thirties, with its well-known totalitarian character and its inclusion of many contradictory currents: socialist, Islamic, and Egyptian nationalist.

The manner in which the opposition parties originated and were formed reflects two things. First, they were mostly an expression and extension of the past and had no innovative character. Second, they were formed by decree from the top—a decree from the government. From the beginning they lacked popular bases on which to rest. Although these parties have existed for a decade and a half, they have been unable to reorganize their internal structures or develop their political action and performance so as to create for themselves popular bases that would enable them to overcome these deficiencies rooted in the manner in which they originated and were formed.

Their confused intellectual and ideological attitudes and their adoption of positions in the middle of all the political currents effectively deprived them of the most important mark of political pluralism—political and social distinctiveness. The latter constitutes a fundamental requirement for the establishment of party life based on competition between a variety of political forces that enrich the process of democratic development. In other words, these parties, given the way in which they were formed, were closer to popular front organizations which, based on the idea of unity, ignore

political and social differences or contradictions. They were based on the idea that a party can represent and express all intellectual currents and attitudes and all political and social forces at once, from extreme right to extreme left: hence the absurdity that the party that was supposed to represent the right in the party experiment born in the seventies was named "Socialist Liberals." Not only did the party's name contain an obvious contradiction, but the party itself included all hues of the political spectrum, thus depriving it of any distinctive identity. It was the same with the Grouping, which lumped together all the leftist currents—Marxist, Nasirists, nationalists, and independent leftist figures, thus making it more like a front than like a party in the modern sense.

As for the Socialist Labor Party, its historical background as Young Egypt has remained an important axis of its attitudes and current practices, carrying with it a totalitarian character.

These factors have made the current parties loose organizations lacking consistent intellectual attitudes and therefore lacking a political and social vision to express. They also lack modern methods of organization.

The ruling National Democratic Party is no exception. The party's problem is not traceable to its close connection to the government as embodied in the presidential institution, a feature that it inherited from the single political organization. Rather, the problem can be traced to the party's dominant bureaucratic character that has greatly affected its political performance. Furthermore, from its inception it has lacked a clear political direction. It has wanted to preserve the traditional attitudes of the July revolution as one of its sources of political legitimacy, although its practical positions have taken a different direction throughout the period of its existence until the present. This has made the party weak ideologically and lacking in the necessary element of political thought. A strong urge toward preservation has prevented it from developing itself as a new party suited to the period of change it has announced since the seventies.

There remains the New Wafd Party, which has a somewhat special character as the heir of the majority party of the pre-1952 liberal decade and thus did not share the same method of formation as the other parties. However, this party too has suffered from many negative aspects that have affected its role and performance in current party life. Perhaps the most important factor has been its inability to overcome the factors of historic conflict that governed its relation to the 1952 revolution's elite and regime. These factors once caused the party to dissolve itself less than a year after its return to political life in 1979. In 1984, it turned to an alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood. Both groups carried with them elements of old competition and a sense of having to take vengeance on the system established after 1952.

This recent step contributed to weakening the Wafd's credibility as a liberal force. The conservative urge has

also prevailed in it, fed by the factors of internal flabbiness that attacked the party after it was cut off from political action for over a quarter of a century. All were factors that led to the party's inability to renew itself intellectually and politically—not to mention its inability to rebuild the organizational bases that would enable it to regain its lost popularity in the current experiment. The party has therefore been dominated by negative and default stands or by recourse to short-term maneuvers that have drawn from the Wafd's historic fund of capital and added little to it. One of the basic problems from which the party now suffers is its fundamental reliance on its past, despite the tremendous changes that have affected Egyptian political and social life over more than four decades.

In contrast to this political weakness and ineffectiveness characterizing party life—objective results of the dominance of an authoritarian regime for a long period after independence—the Islamic political movements that have grown up outside this political party framework have emerged as an effective political force, especially after the seventies. Because of their popular character and reliance on a highly traditional political discourse that uses religion to create rapid mass mobilization, these movements have been able to establish a noteworthy presence on the political scene without the need for official or legal recognition. They have bet on the traditional components in the prevailing general culture, as well as the weakness of the existing parties. The phenomenal rise of the political Islamic movements has enticed many of the parties to ride their wave either by alliance with them or by using the same traditional religion-based discourse to gain a certain popularity, although each party has had differing logic and reasons for turning to such methods. Some parties entered such alliances as a kind of political maneuver to manage their political conflict with the governing system. Such was the case of the Wafd. Some went beyond alliance by raising the same Islamic slogans. Such was the case of the weakest parties, such as Labor and Liberal. Whatever logic and reasons led these parties to race each other to court the Islamic forces or use the religious factor in their political slogans and discourse, the objective facts indicate that these methods did not have the effect of strengthening any of these parties. On the contrary, they remained a deposit added to the Islamic forces and parties themselves, strengthening their position in the confrontation with the parties as the genuine forces expressing the Islamic political direction—forces that under no circumstances or terms would agree to be represented or spoken for by any of these parties, forces whose entry into party alliances remained dependent only on the achievement of certain transitory interests.

Thus the development of party life in Egypt will remain dependent on the strength of the parties in themselves and the extent to which they are able to rid themselves of the "gelatinous" character of the ideas and ideologies they express. Furthermore, they must develop their

organizational structures and bases to enable them to build real popular bases on which they can rely.

Reliance on certain traditional slogans, temporary alliances, or exploitation of religion for political mobilization will only weaken the experiment of a multiparty system and rob it of credibility. The parties' continued deterioration and ineffectiveness will only contribute to entrenching the phenomenon of backwardness from which we suffer, rather than eliminating it.

The connection between political parties and the political modernization needed for the establishment of real democratic life remains close. One can see the political party as one of the most important organizations in the political modernization process—indeed, one of the symbols of that process. Therefore, if parties are marked by a highly traditional character; if they distance themselves from modern institutional traditions and contribute to entrenching a tightly closed *salafi* cultural atmosphere, one cannot imagine how they can contribute to furthering the process of democratic development or modernizing the political system. In that case, they could lose their justification for existence in political life: for the concept of a system of political parties is a modern concept basically connected to systems of democratic governance and to the existence of a modern, civil, secular culture.

The performance of the parties is the basic criterion for measuring the extent of their political effectiveness. Hence the crisis of most of the existing parties in Egypt; for instead of raising the level of their performance and effectiveness, they have turned to traditional methods—most important, the use of religious slogans for partisan political purposes. Even if one grants that there are many political and legal restrictions on the activity of parties, this does not absolve them from their own shortcomings from which they suffer—shortcomings that make them modern organizations in name only, while in content and performance they are highly traditional.

Search for Theory of Democracy Discussed

94LD0078D Cairo AL-AHRAM 18 Jul 94 p 8

[Article by al-Sayyid Yasin under rubric "Cultural Papers": "Arab Democracy in Search of a Theory"]

[Text] When I received an invitation from the International Affairs Association in Amman headed by Jordan's prime minister, Dr. 'Abd-al-Salam al-Majali, and whose general secretary is the well-known political science professor and former prime minister, Dr. Kamil Abu-Jabir, to participate in the association's conference on "Democracy in the Arab World," I asked myself how I might approach the subject for discussion that was proposed to me: Arab democracy between theory and application. I had already dealt with many aspects of this complex subject in previous papers. Not wishing to reproduce what I had already written, what could I add that was new? These questions were at work in my mind

when a book edited by the well-known Lebanese political scientist and professor at the Sorbonne, Ghassan Salamah, appeared in Paris under the title *Democracy Without Democrats*. It was a collection of studies by distinguished foreign specialists on the Arab world. They reviewed their information and diagnosed the illnesses of Arab democracy; some even ventured to predict its future.

Thus, interest in the problem of democracy in the Arab world is increasing inside and outside the Arab world. We used to think that there were essential differences between the view from inside and the view from outside—between analysis presented by an Arab scholar who lives and deals with Arab life and the view from outside given to us by a foreign scholar whose view, however long he visits us in our homes or dwells with us, remains external.

However, one of the participants in the Amman conference, which was held on 9 and 10 July, Rex [Bernin], a professor at McGill University, drew our attention to how the distinction between an internal and an external view has almost disappeared. In most foreign reference works on democracy in the Arab world one inevitably finds chapters written by scholars from inside the Arab world or by Arab scholars living abroad.

In other words, the issue is not the scholar's nationality, but the theoretical framework from which he emerges and the method he applies. Sometimes we find an Arab scholar closer to a foreign scholar than to another Arab scholar, because he agrees in framework and method with the foreign scholar.

Search for Method

In light of all this, I first had to raise in my mind the question of method. How, I mean, should I approach discussing the subject of "Arab democracy between theory and application"? I arrived at "rules of method" for studying the subject through following the debate between past, present, and future, and I laid down a series of rules that indicate the dimensions and levels of the analysis.

1. First, one must concentrate on the historical dimension of democratic practice in the Arab world. We do not mean mere traditional historical study that is satisfied with narrating events; rather, we mean the importance of diving into their significances, so that in the end we can evaluate this teeming odyssey, seeking to determine the reasons for its failure and downfall.

During the conference, an Iraqi scholar who works in one of the UN agencies drew our attention to the fact that some foreign scholars think that we discovered democracy recently, because all their studies are based on the modest contemporary exercise of democracy in the Arab world, ignoring, for some reason or other, the democratic practices of the past. These had deeply

rooted traditions in such pioneering countries as Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Tunisia.

The importance of such historical study is that it can identify for us the factors of continuity and discontinuity in Arab democratic practice. The discontinuity was caused by Arab armed forces when they engaged in their notorious coups and invaded the field of politics, changing Arab history since that time. Egypt's 1952 July revolution constituted a prominent example of military interference in politics. According to one widespread interpretation, it resulted from the failure of the ruling Arab liberal elites to deal with the forces of occupation, tutelage, and mandate, on the one hand, and their failure to solve the social problems of the broad masses, on the other hand.

This historical dimension will serve to raise many problems and will provoke profound study of the debate raging between historians and politicians over evaluating the Arab past.

2. The importance of theorizing that deals directly with actuality:

In an article we published in [the column] "Cultural Papers" on 21 March 1994 under the title, "Political Legitimacy, Arab Method," we applied this method in studying the crisis of Arab political legitimacy. Our justification was very simple: abstract talk about the Arab World tends to hide the enormous differences between one Arab country and another in kind of political system, nature of the elite, cultural identity, degree of social development, or the nature of regional or international alliances. We therefore proposed that in studying the crisis of political legitimacy we should not start from abstractions, but should direct our gaze at the living Arab actuality. We should classify current political regimes on the basis of their actual practices, not by their written constitutions or by their rulers' public political discourse. In light of such a classification, we can begin our critical study of Arab democracy in theory and application.

We concluded in our article about legitimacy that there are three basic models prevailing in the Arab World: absolutely autocratic regimes where the system of government has swallowed up civil society with all its organizations, so that the voice of the regime has become the loudest voice, this being accompanied by severe oppression and systematic repression of both masses and elite. At least four Arab political regimes fall into this category.

Second, we have another model that we can call restricted political pluralism. Egypt, Jordan, and Tunisia represent prominent examples of this orientation. In all these countries, civil society is trying to reawaken its forces. There are numerous nongovernmental organizations, and they carry on activity in the fields of development and human rights.

Finally, we find a third model, that of regimes that implement Islamic consultation (*shura*). There are many forms of such consultation. What they all have in common is that they are an attempt to broaden the area of political participation in decision making. The extent of their seriousness depends on many factors.

Such a method—we mean theorizing that deals directly with actuality—ought to be followed in studying the subject of democracy, whether one is analyzing the nature of the political regime, the positions of the political and intellectual elite, or the theoretical premises and actual practices of political parties, be they parties of the regime or of the opposition.

3. The third of these rules is the importance of analyzing Arab political discourse in all its forms and types and studying the complex interactions between these forms and types. First we have the authoritarian discourse whose legitimacy erodes the more it fails to satisfy the basic needs of the broad masses. By "needs," we mean not only physical needs but also spiritual needs. There is no doubt that freedom is also a basic need—democracy, too—despite the opinion of some researchers that the poor citizen thinks only of earning his living. In many cases the poor citizen can earn his living only in a social framework that provides a minimal amount of freedom that allows him, if he wishes, to raise his voice and complain of bad conditions or organize in a workers, professional, or mass movement to express his just and legitimate demands by the strongest peaceful means.

Next we have the liberal discourse that calls for the state to withdraw from the area of the economy. This discourse concentrates on political reform and general freedoms and pays no attention to the subject of social justice, despite its extreme importance to the success or failure of the current democratic exercises in the Arab World. For democracy is closely connected to development. The call to separate the two, which some scholars at the conference espoused on the basis that each has its field, is impractical. It is ahistorical as well, in the sense that it has not learned from the lessons of contemporary Arab history, lessons that clearly indicate that one of the reasons for the failure of liberalism in the Arab World was that the liberal political elite in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq came from the large proprietors. They ignored the issue of just distribution and refused to listen to the voice of wisdom that called for implementing agricultural reform to close the gap between rich and poor. The military coups, with the popular welcome they received initially, were merely the translation of this fierce class conflict.

Next we have the Marxist discourse that concentrates on the issue of national independence and preventing social exploitation. Then there is the Islamic discourse whose voice has risen in recent years without espousing a integrated project with clear features. Nor should we forget the nationalist discourse that is passing through a severe crisis these days because of the dramatic developments on the Arab-Israeli scene.

Analysis of the premises and practices of each political discourse separately and study of the complex interactions between each one and the authoritarian discourse, on the one hand, and the other political discourses, on the other hand, is an initial necessity for the study of Arab democracy.

4. However, can we be content to study these political discourses either in their theoretical premises or in their actual practices without analyzing in depth the social structure of the community—especially the class structure?

Politics cannot be separated from the nature of the ruling social classes with all their complex layers. The prevalent trend among scholars of discussing the problems of Arab democracy in isolation from this necessary class analysis, whatever the theoretical and methodological difficulties of such analysis, is a fruitless effort.

One may note in this regard that in the current period of economic open-door policy with its loudly proclaimed slogan of privatization, the hidden alliances between rulers and the wealthy must be exposed, for these alliances in fact influence the nature of democratic practice.

5. Finally, we come to the importance of analyzing contemporary cosmic discourse. In its political aspect—namely, a focus on political pluralism and human rights which the powers with hegemony in the international system have espoused—this discourse represents a kind of pressure on many political systems to move from authoritarianism to pluralism. We should not close our eyes to the fact that when such pressures are applied by the United States they are applied selectively according to American interests with each individual country.

However, the importance of this cosmic discourse is that it is one of the impulses for the transformation to political pluralism. Some Arab scholars make the mistake of thinking that it is the sole motive that has made some authoritarian regimes open the door of political participation, even if it was half open. As we have stressed previously, Arab democratic practices have a long history. When a transformation to political pluralism takes place today in some Arab countries, it should be seen as the continuation—after interruption—of an Arab heritage with its own historical roots. It is also the fulfillment of popular demands and the translation of national struggles by various social classes away from tyrannical authoritarianism, with all the political repression and social oppression it implies.

From Method to Practice

That is how I made up my mind about the methodological rules that I would follow in studying the subject of "democracy in the Arab world between theory and application." However, scarcely had I settled on the method than I realized after beginning to deal with the subject that the method, despite its importance, almost

becomes insignificant in the face of the enormity of the problems that must be treated.

From analyzing the discourse of Arab intellectuals in their conferences filled with creative disagreement, I discovered that their attitudes to democracy are diverse and that there is no agreement on what democratic model we want. The only agreement is on the necessity of escaping from the grip of the state, which has become brutal and has swallowed up civil society, and the importance of getting rid of authoritarianism and making the transition to political pluralism. But on what dimension should one concentrate: political freedom, social justice, or cultural authenticity?

That is the question—the challenge that faces Arab intellectuals at the present time.

IRAQ

Decision on Closing Nightclubs Praised

94LH0088A Baghdad AL-JUMHURIYAH in Arabic
13 Jul 94 p 6

[Article by Narmin al-Mufti: "Wise Decision To Prevent Source of Evils From Spreading Its Poisons"]

[Text] Under cover of night some people clothe themselves in Satan, so that their souls seduce them into committing offenses while they reel without consciousness from one step to another with sin as their companion. They use foul words and engage in shameful behavior that can steal peace from the hearts of their families. Based on a belief in the need to purify the community and put a definitive end to perversion, the Revolution Command Council's Resolution 82 of 7 July 1994 orders the closure of discos, night clubs, and dance halls and prohibits the sale and circulation of alcoholic beverages except in designated places of sale in order to stop this negative phenomenon.

Pioneering Step

Fellow reporter Asma' Muhammad Mustafa prepared the part of this article that focuses on the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs, and the clergy to follow up the extent to which this resolution has been implemented. Interior Minister Watban Ibrahim al-Hasan indicates that the relevant agencies have taken the required steps to punish offenders who fall under the resolution. He also affirms that the people's assemblies and other relevant agencies are monitoring implementation of the resolution.

Dr. 'Abd-al-Mun'im Ahmad Salih, the minister of Awqaf and Religious Affairs, thinks the decision will encourage frequenters of discos and night clubs to devote their time to acceptable positive activities. This represents a pioneering step to stop undesirable negative phenomena in the community and protect the family from fragmentation and collapse.

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Shaykh Subhi al-Hiti, president of the League of Ulema of Iraq, states that the decision clearly reflects the pioneering role of President and Leader Saddam Husayn—may God watch over him and protect him—in leading Iraq's campaign of faith that aims at protecting young people from folly, distraction, and drink.

Shaykh al-Hiti commends the importance of the decision in economic terms, since it will help us resist the unjust economic blockade imposed on our resurgent Iraq.

Dr. Hamd al-Kabisi, dean of the Higher Islamic Institute for Preparing Imams and Preachers, praises the extensive role of a wise political leadership in applying the principles of Islamic law in Iraq, thereby blocking the way against aggressors who aim to corrupt our community with the consumption of intoxicants that can sow vice in the souls of their consumers.

Alcohol the Foundation of Crime

Accompanied by fellow reporter Ibtisam Karim, we listened to the judiciary's opinion. She met Dr. 'Ali al-Najidi, counselor on the State Consultative Council. He stressed that the decision has a comprehensive character in its social, economic, and political effects and in its positive yields for Iraqi society. It has closed a pit of corruption that was attracting youths eager for amusement and wantonness, which made discos and nightclubs places that caused the commission of crimes. When we examine the records of the penal courts, we find enormous crimes committed from a desire to obtain money to spend in dance halls and night clubs.

For example, in 1991 the al-Karadah Criminal Court sentenced a four-member gang for committing five armed thefts in one month. The gang selected customers of Iraqi banks, knowing that the take from each crime would be no less than 50,000 dinars. The court was amazed when it asked the fate of the sums stolen in one month and was told by the criminals that they had spent them in dance halls and drinking alcoholic beverages. It is sad for us to lose a group of young people because they commit thefts arising from their desire to obtain money to spend in places of amusement.

The wise decision therefore includes preventative social measures aimed at improving the community and protecting it from negative influences that lead to crime. The drafter of Iraq's criminal law also perceived the danger of intoxicants. For example, he punished anyone who drives a vehicle under the influence of an intoxicant. He did not consider the fact of the criminal's voluntary consumption of an intoxicant an extenuating excuse calling for leniency toward him.

Mr. Qasim Ahmad al-'Ayyash, head of the al-Rusafah Criminal Court, stated that crimes originate from discos and night clubs, which have become a fertile field encouraging crime. Most of their patrons are people who steal to cover their expenses in such places. The Revolution Command Council's decision came to abolish dens of crime.

Mr. Nash'at Hasan Tahir, public prosecutor at the Baghdad Appeals Court, said:

The decision can be considered a giant step toward achieving family, social, and economic stability, and thus toward combatting the unjust economic blockade. The decision guarantees that some frivolous and lawless people will be protected against themselves and against their wasting their own energies in murder, theft, bribery, and morals crimes.

Mr. Muslim Tawfiq Hasan, a member of the al-Karkh Criminal Court, stated that most thefts and other crimes originate because some youths and juveniles steal to obtain money and spend it on their personal pleasures. Therefore, the decision will have positive judicial and social effects. On the one hand it will prevent thefts; on the other hand it will deepen citizens' social awareness.

Stopping Moral Corruption

Accompanied by fellow reporter Nadiyah Shakarah, we listened to the view of science and faith and became acquainted with the views of university professors about the psychological, cultural, and religious dimensions of the decision for today's and coming generations. Dr. Muhyi Hilal al-Rahhal, dean of the Faculty of Islamic Studies at Baghdad University, said:

The great historic decision to forbid spirituous drinks in night clubs comes to fulfill a need that we have felt for a long time because of the negative effects that these clubs leave on youths due to the various kinds of diversion, dissoluteness, and drinking to which they seduce them. These things harm young people morally, physically, and psychologically. The seeds of evil, cheating, and corruption take root in their souls, pushing them toward murder, robbery, stealing, and fraud to cover their expenditures wasted in bars and discos, not to mention the transgression of God's ordinances. For God, who is praised and exalted, says (Koran 5:90): "Wine and arrow-shuffling, idols and divining-arrows are an abomination, some of Satan's work; so avoid it." God guided the leadership's steps to their bold decision and granted them success because of the good that it would bring the country.

Kamil 'Alwan Ahmad al-Zabidi, head of the psychology department, expressed his great joy at the issuance of this decision, which has come to put an end to the moral corruption that comes from the pit of evil and vice.

Dr. al-Zabidi indicated that when societies are subjected to dangers and difficulties, they are moved to take precautionary measures to alleviate the effects and results of such crises. Iraq has been subjected to a base and evil aggression. Perhaps the most prominent thing targeted has been the structure of the Iraqi personality. An attempt therefore has been made to undermine values and social customs. Through their psychological war and economic blockade, the aggressors are trying to shake first the citizen's confidence in his leadership and

then his faith in his country. Second, they are trying to undermine his social values. The leadership of the party and revolution has taken upon itself responsibility for building a new Iraqi man since the outbreak of the Glorious July Revolution. Resolution 82 is one of the most prominent decisions issued by the Revolution Command Council. Its positive effects will be reflected in society. These effects include protecting young people, an important sector, from perversion. Also, the decision is in step with the faith campaign that President and Leader Saddam Husayn—may God protect him—is leading. It will protect the community from the crimes that arise from frequenting these places. It will cause the individual to utilize his resources in areas more beneficial to him. Thus it will summon youths to productive work and to frequenting athletic clubs, thus preventing crimes in our community. The decision will help lighten citizens' economic burdens, for they will be able to spend their money to buy important needs, rather than spending it in night clubs. That will increase their self-confidence, endurance, and patience.

Dr. 'Abd-al-Jalil al-Tamimi, professor of social psychology in the Faculty of Letters, Baghdad University, said:

Drugs negatively affect an individual's behavior, mentality, and emotions, thereby affecting his relations with others. Scientific studies confirm the effect of drugs on youths, particularly because of the importance and sensitivity of the stage of intellectual, emotional, and psychic growth through which they are passing. They ought to be strengthening their personalities by experience, study, and carrying out beneficial work and hobbies. The recent decision therefore restricts opportunities for using intoxicants and drugs. It will reduce the cases of perversion and crime, since, in most cases, an individual does not dare to commit a crime unless he is in a state of drunkenness. However, another problem may appear after the night clubs are closed, and it should be dealt with: the drinking of intoxicating beverages at home.

Dr. Salamah Husayn Kazim, professor of Islamic systems in the College of Islamic Studies, pointed to the greatness of the wise decision and its human, social, and ethical dimensions. Science and reality have proved that alcohol is a deadly poison that causes people to lose themselves to vice. The Messenger of God spoke truly when he described wine as the "mother of evils."

Students, Citizens Praise Decision

Fellow reporter Madihah 'Abd-al-Rahman met with students and citizens to become acquainted with the positive results of the decision and citizens' reactions to it. Citizen Fatimah Muhsin said: The decision brought joy to my heart because of the problems I have suffered from the addiction of one of my sons to wine and his spending all we had on drink, not to mention the problems he caused when he returned home drunk every night.

Khalaf Nujayl praised the decision for its wisdom and timeliness. He said: When I heard about the decision, I

turned to God Almighty to praise Him for stopping my children from drinking alcohol.

Muthanna, a student in the Engineering Faculty, praised the courageousness of the decision and its moral, social, and economic dimensions, because it has saved many families from the ruin and destruction that affect them because of fathers who drink.

Signs of joy were visible on Lamya' Khalid, a student in the Science Faculty, because of the issuance of the decision, which has saved citizens from the unwholesome problems and consequences that have appeared recently because youths frequent night clubs and dance halls and drink alcoholic beverages, so that their morals and values decline.

Her colleague, Maysun Khalid, stated that the issuance of the decision came at a time when we were in the most pressing need for it, because some of our young people and sons have fallen into moral decadence. Had they known how alcohol deteriorates the health and brings premature death, they would have abstained from it.

Citizen Afrah 'Abbas said: I became very happy when the decision was issued. It will save our woman neighbor, whose household has been ruined because of her husband's addiction to alcohol, since he has sold everything in the house.

Khadijah Hasan, a student in the Education Faculty, said: The decision is in step with the faith campaign that the Great Leader has directed to be implemented. It will help educate, straighten out, and guide students.

We shall return again to this subject. We shall listen to the view of the police and learn about crimes committed under the power of drunkenness and drink. We shall also visit the districts whose residents have been plagued with discos, bars, and night clubs. We end the first part of the article with a hadith transmitted on the authority of the rightly guided caliph 'Uthman ibn 'Affan (may God be pleased with him). He rose to preach and said, "Beware of wine, for it is the mother of evils."

'Uthman also said, "Avoid it, for it is the mother of evils. By God, faith and wine cannot be together in a man's heart without one soon causing the other to depart."

ISRAEL

Hamas Tape of "Arafat's Crimes" Distributed

94AA0099B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
12 Jul 94 p B1

[Article by 'A. Sivan: "'Arafat's Secret File'"]

[Text] After the Cairo accord and before the anticipated arrival of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman, Hamas [Islamic Resistance Movement] sent "'Arafat's secret file." This refers to a tape bearing this title that was distributed in the territories, including orations characterized by its harsh style, their topic being

the Chairman's actions. The conclusions attest to the severity: Yasir 'Arafat is like "the Egyptian pharaoh, Sadat, who was responsible for the Camp David crimes and deserved his punishment."

Together with 'Arafat, stinging attacks are made on Abu Mazan "who became Shim'on Peres' soul mate," Faysal al-Husayni, "who met warmly with the daughter of mass-murderer Moshe Dayan," and Hanan 'Ashrawi, who did the same with Shulamit Aloni. It is easy to guess their punishment.

What are 'Arafat's deeds? First, he conceded the rights of the Palestinian people for "territories conquered in 1948" after a strategic conclusion that dividing the country between the two peoples is the only solution to the conflict. "Thus, he gave a prize to the Israeli robber and legitimacy to his retention of these territories." The formal expression of this is accepting the Security Council decisions (242, 338), which are no more than an instrument in the hands of the United States. Israel's superpower protector

'Arafat continued to decline and accepted a second strategic decision to agree to apply the "step-by-step" principle to the territories occupied in 1967—a series of intermediate agreements on autonomy, leaving their final status open for negotiations, despite the difficult questions of Jerusalem and the settlements.

'Arafat, therefore, entered a trap: Continued negotiations, instead of a violent, continued struggle with Israel. And, as such, Israel has the preferred capability, as they proved in dragging negotiations in the Taba episode. Furthermore, as long as 'Arafat views himself, according to Hamas expounders, as obligated to uphold that which he signed, Israel will no doubt try to circumvent its obligations and argue about them. Is this not a traditional, Jewish characteristic from the days of this people's travels in the Sinai? Then, according to the Koran, the children of Israel tried to shirk from carrying out God's commandments.

'Arafat is guilty of treason, not only against the Palestinian people, but, and more so, against the sacrifices of the struggle, the widows, and the orphans. Here, Hamas takes the PLO's central claim for hegemony—the fact that it led the struggle for 30 years, while "the Muslim brothers" sat opposite—and turns it against him: You conducted a struggle, and now your strength has failed and you agreed to submit.

Thus was realized in 'Arafat, according to Hamas, the prophecy of Sayid Qutab, the distinguished philosopher of revolutionary Islam (who was put to death in 1966). As the story goes, the Egyptian speaker said at the time of the founding meeting of the PLO in 1964 that the organization "would be the final nail in the coffin of the Palestinian problem."

The PLO chairman raises the ire of the expounders especially when he fights in their arena and needs

religious argumentation. They completely reject his claim that an agreement to the solution by peaceful means is nothing more than "Islamic jihad" (a religious war by peaceful means), and thus he falls into line with Islam. It is the opposite, shout the expounders, really a distortion of the written record. It is permissible to use nonviolent means, but only when there is no choice: It is forbidden, at any time, to concede the capability of relying on violence, which is the means from which there is no escape in one phase or another in a struggle with ransomers.

In "'Arafat's secret file," there are no stunning revelations, and anyone anticipating "yellow" [as published]" stories about sexual deviations and embezzlement of funds will be disappointed. That which is on Hamas' mind about 'Arafat—and the reason for which it has decreed death—are his political decisions in the matter of a solution by peaceful means, territorial (and functional) concessions in phases. Hamas believes that these decisions are serious and that 'Arafat will no doubt sincerely honor the obligations derived from them (i.e., the Oslo and Cairo accords). The Islamic zealots only uncover plots by Israeli leaders.

Will this and other tapes convince the extreme right in Israel that "'Arafat can be believed" or, in less personal language, that the PLO, whose internal debates are exposed for all to see, has made a mighty turn-around since 1988? Clearly not.

The extreme right uses the question of sincerity of intentions as a smoke screen to hide its own intentions: To hold, in any case and at any price, the entire territory of Judaea and Samaria, which is the patrimony and the basis for bringing near the coming of the Messiah. Any excuse that is likely to convince public opinion, which is driven primarily by security rather than messianic considerations, will be mobilized for this purpose. They even used the rise of [Barloskoni] to power in Italy as a vision. And what is the wonder that they should bring up the subject of intentions? It is natural that, after a long struggle, mutual suspicion would run deep.

And if it was said: After all, the Hamas people live within their nation, know its mentality, and know 'Arafat well; how strange that all that they have against him is that he, indeed, accepted the accords in the spirits of things mentioned above and that he intends to uphold them? Would 'Arafat risk an attempt on his life just for the sake of cunning strategy against Israel?

The right would respond, of course, with scorn: 'Arafat is in hot water and Rabin is naive. This is the exact opposite of the argument by Islamic zealots: The PLO chairman, weakened by the struggle, is falling innocently into the net of exceedingly cunning Israel.

That which we spoke of, Hamas and our messianic right, are birds of a feather.

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Peace Process Said Harming Jordanian Economy*94A40100A Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
24 Jul 94 p B1*

[Article by Z'ev Schiff: "No Euphoria in Jordan"]

[Text] Amman—The euphoria in Israel over the approaching peace with Jordan is sweeping all before it. With it, the perception has become rooted that the peace process has already done much good for Jordan. It is important for the Israeli public, and especially the politicians and economists connected to the peace process, to know that at the summit in the Jordanian regime, the feeling is the opposite. The assessment there is that the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians has caused a serious monetary crisis in Jordan. Their view is that Israel is not taking Jordan into account in all this. Israel talks in fine phrases, but has not bothered at all to consult with the Jordanian Government on topics that directly concern Jordan and are liable to do her harm.

Two main things happened after the signing of the economic supplement between Israel and the Palestinians. One important clause in this agreement speaks of establishing a Palestinian monetary authority in the territories. The Jordanians say that they have nothing against the Palestinians achieving this, but that it will be worthwhile to keep an eye on what happens afterwards. The Jordanian economic advisors I spoke with explained that as a result of this decision and the way it was made, a process of dollarization has begun in the territories. Israel and the PLO have decided, in effect, to throw out the Jordanian dinar without really understanding what this will mean.

The Jordanian economists say that, according to the estimate of the IMF, there are between \$500-800 million worth of dinars in the territories. They tend to accept the higher figure. Because the residents think that this is a currency whose prospects in the new political reality are not good, a mass sale of dinars and a conversion to dollars has begun. At the crossing points on the bridges, people have been caught trying to smuggle hundreds of thousands of dollars into the territories. They smuggle dinars into Jordan, exchange them there for dollars, and then smuggle [the dollars] back into the territories. The result is that the Central Bank of Jordan's foreign currency reserve in dollars is being drained. From a net reserve of about \$600 million the total has gone down within a few months to about \$200 million.

The Jordanians hurried to the Americans with the problem, and the Americans accepted their complaints. The economic adviser, Dr. Ahmad Mango, said to me: "It is doubtful that Israel wants to harm us, but the truth is, you are harming us." Clearly, if the harm goes on, inflation in Jordan will increase, and along with it, instability.

A second complaint concerns the trade clause in the economic agreement between Israel and the PLO. Jordan's opportunities to export to the territories are narrowed in the extreme by the agreement. The list of

products that Jordan may export to the territories has been put into a little "special list." When the Jordanians complained to Israel, they were told that we are worried about smuggling; but the key question is, why did Israel not trouble to consult the Jordanians before signing an important agreement that would greatly affect Jordan. This Jordanian complaint is justified.

In Israel, they are playing with the idea that writing off the Jordanian debt to the United States, about a billion dollars, will solve the problem. This is between Washington and Jordan, and both the administration and Congress will tie this to the continuation of the peace process. It is true that erasing the debts is important, but this is not the answer to what the agreements between the PLO and us have caused. The total Jordanian debt, by the way, including the military debt of 1.5 billion, reaches about 7 billion dollars. Jordan owes about a billion of this to Japan and about a billion to European countries. The rest of the debts are divided between international institutions, including Arab ones, and small countries. The feeling of economic pressure is tremendous in Jordan, both because of the results of the Gulf War, in the wake of which they were forced to absorb 300,000-400,000 returnees from Kuwait ("About the same number as the Russian immigration to Israel, except that you received help from all sides"), and because of the cutoff in aid from the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia.

All this explains why the Jordanians are not overcome by euphoria, and do not share the feeling of achievement that those on the Israeli and Arab sides who formulated the agreements, and especially the economic supplement, have. This is one example of what Crown Prince Hasan told me: that the agreements between Israel and the Palestinians may have many details, but they lack conception and overall vision. I might add that this is also an example of how Israel could lose control of the peace process in the field. It is not enough to leave everything up to clerks and experts. They are responsible for the details, for the professional approach to each separate field, but the prime minister and foreign minister are the ones who must set the strategy, overall approach, and principles. Without this, we will find ourselves harming those we do not wish to weaken. Also correct was that senior Jordanian official who said to me that Jordan does not want to ask for handouts in order to reach peace. We must remember that instability in Jordan is liable to harm the peace process in the end.

Outlook on Trade With Jordan Reported*94A40097A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Financial Supplement) in Hebrew 18 Jul 94 p 3*

[Article by Sever Plotzker]

[Text] The extent of future trade between Israel and Jordan will be limited. Professor Nadav Halevi, of Tel Aviv University, Professor Efrayim Kleimann of Hebrew University, Dr. Arye Arnon, of Bank Yisrael,

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and Dr. Jimmy Weinblatt, of Ben-Gurion University, recently researched the trade potential between Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan and reached fairly similar conclusions.

After there is peace, there will be preferred mutual trade accords between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian economy. The extent of annual trade is likely to reach \$100 million, on average, in every direction. For Israel, imports from Jordan and exports to Jordan will not be particularly significant. For Jordan, trade with Israel will be significant, very significant.

The point of origin for any examination of mutual economic relations is a comparison of the sizes of the two economies. Israel's economy is more than 12 times that of Jordan's. The vast difference between the two economies, the total severance between them, the gaps in standard of living and wages, do not guarantee that mutual trade will flourish. We refer, therefore, to possible economic relations, for example, between General Motors and a neighborhood garage, which were, are still remain, in a state of war.

Arye Arnon and Jimmy Weinblatt were the first to make a number of forecasts on trade potential.

According to a "simplistic" evaluation, in their words, which compares the composition of imports and exports from both countries, Israel is likely to import about \$40 million per year in fruit, vegetables, and textiles from Jordan—this, only if the Jordanian farmers and manufacturers successfully compete with the Palestinians, who have marketing preference and free access to the Israeli market.

Israel's exports to Jordan will also be considerably limited. At most, it is likely to reach \$150 million, and this is in the best of circumstances—that is, when Jordan opens its market to Israeli products as indiscriminately as to other countries.

What will we be able to export? Medicine, plastic products, paper, textiles, iron, and steel.

Another evaluation model used by economists, based on the mutual pull of the two economies, differentiates between a state of free trade among Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinian autonomy and a state of trade subject to a rigid regime of duties and quotas.

In the second case, the Israeli-Jordanian trade potential is almost nil—some tens of millions of dollars per year. In the first case, which would be difficult to implement politically, Israel is likely to export about \$150 million in goods to Jordan and import about \$75 million in goods. Again, the amounts are small.

And another test: Let us look at trade between Israel and Cyprus (with which we do not have a free-trade agreement, and whose domestic product is similar to Jordan). Israel exports \$30 million to Cyprus and imports \$20 million. That is all.

Two other types of mutual trade between Israel and Jordan could exist: Tourism and what is termed "border trade," that is, trade, between neighbors, of heavy goods that cannot be imported or exported to great distances.

Professor Nadav Halevi, of Tel Aviv University, and Efrayim Kleimann, of the Safir Center for Development, researched the potential for Israeli-Jordanian trade with slightly different approaches and achieved similar results.

First, the professors asked, what portion of imports and exports would one shift to the other. The answer: A small portion. Afterward, they asked, could further international trade between Israel and Jordan develop in new products and services. The answer: Yes, perhaps in the distant future.

The main impetus for shifting trade would be geopolitical. It is worthwhile for Israel to give Jordan preference in the Israeli market, albeit less than to the Palestinians and Egypt. It is worthwhile for Jordan to open the border to Israeli tourism and products that have an Israeli component of intermediate technology—not too high or expensive, like Japan, nor too cheap or inferior, like Eastern Europe.

The creation of new, mutual trade of significant proportions is dependent upon the existence of the opportunity for competition. Prof. Nadav Halevi discovered that neither country has a special opportunity to compete in the other's market. Therefore, trade between them will deepen and expand only on the condition that mutual preferences would be given to Israeli products in Jordan and Jordanian products in Israel. "Jordanian industry," writes Prof. Nadav Halevi, "has more of a reason to fear preferential agreements with Israel. Most of the new Jordanian industry does not have the capability to compete."

Such preference does not go against the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), in the case of Israel and Jordan (which Israel has joined, but not Jordan). The reason is surprising. Israel and Jordan are considered countries that were once part of the Ottoman Empire, and, therefore, are permitted, in accordance with the GATT law, to give preference to one another in trade.

A historic advantage that we had not considered.

What is the structure of preferred trade in the Israel-Palestinian-Jordanian triangle? Prof. Halevi and Kleimann, as well as Drs. Arnon and Weinblatt, do not see the possibility of tariff consolidation or a region of full free trade between the three economies. Too many economic difficulties stand in the way for such encompassing accords as those, too many political fears. The alternative is detailed accords of mutual preferences that expand with time.

Arnon and Weinblatt say: "A 'small circle' of mutual Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian openness must be formed,

with the big, strong Israeli economy leading the convergence. Just as the European Common Market agreed, at the end of the 1960's, to grant tariff and quota concessions to Israeli exports without requesting a parallel cancellation of the protection that existed in Israel for domestic products. The Israel protection was gradually canceled, but, when they were canceled, the European Community benefited from it."

Halevy and Kleimann say: "The list of goods that the Jordanians are allowed to sell in the Autonomy and Israel must be expanded; at the same time, we must demand that the Jordanian market accept an agreed list of Israeli products and Palestinian products that have Israeli components. The goods will benefit from mutual tariff preferences. In this way, a triangular, Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian "book region" will be created benefiting all sides. [sentence as published]

This is an asymmetrical situation. An economic agreement with Jordan will only marginally influence the Israeli market. It is likely to strongly influence, for better or for worse, Jordan's economy, and is likely to be critical for the Palestinians.

And, in summary, one thought. On the eve of the peace accords with Egypt, many economic research papers were published in Israel, in which, in a professional manner, the trade potential between Israel and Egypt was evaluated. I remember well that the estimates referred to billions of dollars. In actuality, only a few million have resulted from this; the economic ties between Israel and Egypt have never rose.

And, perhaps the economists, that is, we, are also mistaken this time, but in the other direction?

Israel and Jordan: Basic Economic Data for 1992

	Jordan	Israel	Jordan as a Percentage of Israel
Domestic product in billions of dollars	4.8	66.5	7.0
Domestic product per person, in dollars	1,300	13,000	10.0
Export of goods in billions of dollars	1.0	13.1	7.5
Import of goods in billions of dollars	3.3	19.0	17.5
Defense expenditures in billions of dollars	400	7,600	5.0
External debt in billions of dollars	7.5	15.0	50.0
Relationship between debt and product (percent)	160	22	
Current account, billions of dollars	-1.1	+0.1	
Annual rate of inflation (percent)	4.0	9.5	
Annual growth rate, domestic product (percent)	11.2	6.5	
Budget deficit as a percent of the product	3.8	2.4	

Haifa Office for Trade With Jordan Opens

94A40104A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (Financial Supplement) in Hebrew 1 Aug 94 p 3

[Article by Yuval Peleg: "Haifa Has Set Up a Liaison Office for the Development of Trade With Jordan"]

[Text] The municipality of Haifa, in coordination with the Foreign Ministry and the participation of the northern Chamber of Commerce, has set up a liaison office for active commercial development between Haifa, Jordan, and the Gulf principalities. The office is intended to serve as the address for governmental and private groups from Jordan who display an interest in commercial ties to Haifa, which constitutes, in the view of the city's mayor 'Amram Matzne'a, "a maritime exit point for goods from Jordan," and sits on the artery planned to connect Haifa with northern Jordan.

The secretary of the League of Chambers of Commerce in Haifa, Shmuel Gantz, said that in the special department established in the Chamber of Commerce in Haifa there is a storehouse of information on businesses in Jordan, a list of business owners in all sectors, and

liaison has already been established with one of the largest land transport companies in the area.

Qatzav Views Likud Stance on Oslo Agreement

94A40104C Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (24-Hour Supplement) in Hebrew 4 Aug 94 p 5

[Commentary by Likud Knesset faction chairman Moshe Qatzav: "So Long As It Does Not Result in a Palestinian State"]

[Text] The question really to be decided in the upcoming elections is whether a Palestinian state will come into being in Judea and Samaria, or not. If Labor wins the elections, it is safe to say that it definitely will, despite the declarations of the prime minister that he opposes a Palestinian state. If Likud wins, it can be said with certainty that it will not come into being. In order to reduce the damage caused by the government's policy, Likud is working to unseat it, to have early elections and to win in the upcoming elections. Given last year's dramatic political developments, Likud must redeploy and examine the need for necessary changes.

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Immediately after the signing of the Oslo agreements, discussions began in Likud central and its office on this issue. I then opposed any attempt to talk about it. But now, after some of the sections of the Oslo agreement have been implemented, a new situation has been created and the Likud must supply answers to the public as to what its stance will be if it wins the elections. The people will not agree, and rightly so, to express confidence in Likud if it is not given answers to changing political situations. Hundreds of thousands of perplexed voters will determine who will win the upcoming elections. They must have answers to questions like: Will Likud abrogate the international agreements and obligations that were made; will it support the return of the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] to the inner precincts of Jericho and the Gaza Strip?

In my opinion, the Likud must consolidate a new line of action that will work to accept those sections of the Oslo agreement that have already been implemented. For example, there is no changing what has already been done in Gaza and Jericho. This is not recognition of the Oslo agreements; I am against recognition of the Oslo agreements and I continue to view them as a most serious historic blunder on the part of the government. However, what has been handed over to the Palestinian authorities cannot be taken back except by force. The government has succeeded during its short term in office in establishing irreversible facts—facts the creation of which the Likud could not prevent during the 15 years of its rule.

We can and must oppose the government's policy and view it as a dangerous policy, but we must reconcile ourselves to what cannot be changed and redeploy properly with a view to the future. By the way, I have not heard of anyone in the top Likud leadership who is prepared to request the abrogation of international agreements that Israel has entered into should Likud win the elections.

It is impossible not to live up to Israel's international commitments. That is a basic principle of every sound democratic regime. But I believe that Israel's respect for those international obligations must be conditioned on mutuality and on the cancellation of those aspects that would lead to Palestinian sovereignty in Judea and Samaria. If the PLO, for example, does not meet its commitments, including the annulment of Palestinian charter, or does not take steps against terror, then Israel is free of the obligations she undertook. Likewise, we must not grant the Palestinians significant sovereign authorities such as in the areas of legislation, territorial autonomy, flag, passport, currency, etc. and we must not allow what has been agreed to and implemented with regard to Jericho and Gaza to be implemented in the remaining territories of Judea and Samaria.

The Likud is a great national movement. Given the political developments, there is a need for clarifications, for an exchange of opinions and ideas among all of its

parts in order to redeploy. This in no way implies support for the government's policy, which we reject entirely. The Likud must redeploy in order to win the elections, in order to prevent the rise of a Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria and in so doing, reconcile itself to what cannot be changed.

Likud Disagreements on Peace Process Detailed

94A40104D Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (24-Hour Supplement) in Hebrew 1 Aug 94 p 2

[Article by Bina Barzel: "Likud Is in a Trap"]

[Text] Likud is at the boiling point: The political bombshell dropped by the faction's chairman, MK [member of Knesset] Moshe Qatzav, when he declared in an interview with YEDI'OT AHARONOT that the Oslo agreement must be accepted, has angered many.

In fact, as is clear even to Likud members, Qatzav has revealed secret discussions that have been going on behind closed doors in the party. The discussions are being held by a panel established by party chairman Binyamin Netanyahu, a panel known as the "Seniors". Its goal: to coordinate positions following the dramatic developments in the area.

Among other things, Qatzav said in his declaration that Likud must negotiate with any body that represented the Palestinians. That was also understood to mean Yasir 'Arafat. And the Likud had a fit.

"Why is he jumping so quickly," was the reaction of MK Yitzhaq Shamir, "and what is he babbling. If he has suggestions or ideas he should bring them to the proper forums for discussions."

Shamir claims that Qatzav damaged the movement. The Likud position is unified, he asserts, and dismisses Qatzav's opinion.

Shamir: "The Likud will never accept the Oslo agreement and will never support it. After all, they are trying to use that framework to give away parts of the Land of Israel. Qatzav is signing on to the issue of a Palestinian state, but what about the Golan? Will he agree to turn it over to Syria? What about Gaza? Is it not a part of the Land of Israel?"

But that did not end the internal disagreements. It turns out that at least on one question, the question of Gaza, Likud leader Binyamin Netanyahu disagrees with Shamir's reaction, believe it or not.

"As far as I can tell," he says, "the Likud is entirely opposed to the Oslo agreement. Certainly it is a bad agreement and it is still bad. But Gaza is a done deal.

We do not recognize Oslo and believe that we must prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state. Everyone is against it, and no one intends to change his

stance. Therefore, they still have not implemented 96 percent of the agreement, and we will fight it with all our strength.

But what has already been implemented from the agreement is fact, and that is behind us. I told Rabin that if they try to do in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza [sic] what they did in Gaza, we will oppose it."

These arguments and subarguments have revealed a bit of the secret discussions being held by the "panel of seniors." It turns out that in those discussions Yitzhaq Shamir and Beni Begin have opposed any change in the Likud's traditional positions. Shamir is also upset that Netanyahu, occasionally, "takes pleasure" from various government courses of action. Why does he give them his stamp of approval. Shamir grumbles. Does he know what the agreements say?

"Qatzav pulled radically to the left," one of the members of the seniors panel said yesterday. "But what is considered left among the seniors panel finds expression in the internal discussions of many elements in Likud: Without hurting the ideological platform of Likud, we need to sit down and coordinate the movement's positions in the light of facts in the field. The facts that Rabin creates are irreversible."

One of the Likud seniors adds: "It is not the platform that is important. It is a practical matter. We have a historic right to Jordan, but so what! Does anyone take that seriously today?"

There is no doubt that Likud is at a crossroads. There has been no discussion in the Likud central, and no broad forum has discussed practical questions.

For example, on the matter of the Golan. There are those in Likud who believe that there is no way out of giving up those territories to Syria. At this stage, they prefer to keep their views to themselves. The Qatzav bombshell, at any rate, points to the need to begin public discussions on "hot" topics.

There are already some initial signs of that: MK Limor Livnat yesterday called for the convocation of the Likud institutions to discuss the Qatzav declaration. Shlomo Qor, a member of the secretariat of the veterans brigade, intends to raise the issue at a Likud office session next Thursday. Both Livnat and Qor, who are loyal to the Likud platform, intend to "roast" Qatzav.

Limor: "It has become fashionable to give only a side-ways glance in the direction of the party central. There are consultations within the political panel, but the MK's are left out. Apparently there is factionalization of the MK's.

All kinds of consultations are going on in closed forums, but the institutions have not been formally convened to make decisions and take a position. I am calling for a session of the party central. Former ministers were not given a mandate to make pronouncements on issues of Likud policy."

Qor: "The Oslo agreement is a disaster, and the people will therefore return Likud to power. Good leadership does not have to look for ways to curry favor in the eyes of the public, but to tell it the truth. On Thursday we will have a Likud office session, and I will ask that we draw the proper conclusions with regard to Qatzav."

And Qatzav? He is not upset: "The members do not like calling a spade a spade. Why do they not understand that we have to redeploy in light of the changes? When you say that when the Likud takes power, it will honor Rabin's international obligations, what exactly do you mean?

Commentary Describes 'Optimistic' Reaction to Agreements

93AA0104B Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (24-Hour Supplement) in Hebrew 2 Aug 94 p 3

[Commentary by Sever Plotzker: "And in This Optimistic Atmosphere"]

[Text] A couple returning from Italy this week told me: How nice things are here. People are so content. No nerves, no pushing and shoving, in the morning a cool breeze from the sea and in the evening you sit in open coffee houses. Not like us in Europe where the heat pours out of the sky and there is no air conditioning, people are always tense and pushy, the streets are gloomy, the pressure at work is tremendous and people are at each other's throats.

Yusuf Ibrahim, a senior writer for THE NEW YORK TIMES, published a long article over the weekend in his paper, on Israel, on our national mood. He found Israel enjoying itself, flourishing, confident, open and mainly calm. Calm and at peace with herself.

Is this us? We Israelis, who see ourselves as a nervous and noisy society, torn apart and injured? We, where the oscillations in the graph of national mood can only be matched by those of our stock market?

That cannot be, and yet maybe it can. Maybe the quiet self-confidence that visitors from abroad are beginning to point at as a new Israeli characteristic has ripened within us without our being aware of it. Many events could have contributed to it. The Gulf war, for example. The first reaction to the Iraqi missile strikes was hysteria, both from the public and from the government. But after 10 days had passed, life began to return to normal. The government chose not to react and the citizenry elected to go back to work. In retrospect, the Gulf war forged Israel's ability to stand firm. It proved that the rear is not exactly a soft underbelly.

Afterward many other very historic events took place that could have strengthened the Israelis' feeling of quiet self-confidence. The Madrid conference. Immigration and its absorption. Renewed growth. Suppression of inflation. The Oslo agreement. Establishing autonomy. 'Arafat in Gaza. The Washington declaration. Here and

there the pessimists were right. In the main, it would seem, the optimists were right. After all, even the stock market has settled down.

At the end of the 1980's Israel became a developed country, with a per capita product of \$10,000. When I first wrote about that in 1989, reader reaction was one of disbelief, even anger. In letters to the editor they pointed to areas of poverty and underdevelopment, ignoring the big picture. Black is always more salient than white. Today the per capita product in Israel is approaching \$14,000 and for the beginning of the next decade, we can already forecast a per capita product of \$20,000.

As the national product has changed, so is the national mood changing. Our old angry, suspicious, nervous character still jumps out of us on occasion, like the clown's head in a jack-in-the-box. But this happens less and less. The demand for court jesters is diminishing; the demand for bookkeepers is increasing.

This is, apparently, the reaction to the continuing peace process. Israel is in the full force of the transition from a state of continuous war with its surrounding to a situation of living in peace with those same surroundings. This is a new society, much more confident of itself and therefore a more charitable society. Israeli aid to Rwanda will cost 100 million shekels, and no Israeli objects. After the peace with the Jordanians, Israel will be the only midwife of the Palestinian entity, and there is no strong protest about that either.

When Rabin embraced Husayn, we did not see huge demonstrations of joy in the plazas. The people gathered in their homes and smiled to themselves. Like a person who has a heavy weight lifted from his chest, we felt only enormous ease.

How nice and pleasant to stroll among you in the shopping centers in the evening, to shop and enjoy, the tourists told me. This summer is suddenly bringing us unexpected contentment.

Settler Attempts To Contain Extremist Elements

94AA0093B Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew
15 Jul 94 p B5

[Article by Nadav Shragay: "The Black Sheep of the Family"]

[Text] On the right it is understood that their struggle against the government's intent to evacuate is really a struggle for public opinion. They will not gain support by attacking IDF officers and rioting in the streets. Therefore there is a growing willingness to distance themselves from the camp of the deviants and the radicals.

One bad lamb tore a wolf to pieces and aroused the anger of the jungle animals, who blamed all the lambs for the terrible deed—that is the essence of "A Jungle Story" written by Uri Orbakh and Hagay Segel. The cover blurb of the thin booklet brought out recently by Bet El

publishers stated that it was "a story in verse for children and adults, for anyone who makes generalizations and for all those caught up in them."

The story of the bad lamb who tore a wolf to pieces is more relevant than ever, especially these days, since many of the settlers in Judea, Samaria and Gaza [Yesha'] are beginning to understand that something has to be done about the radical black sheep who are giving the right and the settlers in general a bad name—perhaps even get rid of them. This understanding derives from the struggle the right is waging against the agreement with the PLO, which in many ways is a struggle for public opinion. Thus Rabin's attacks on the settlers and the comparisons he draws between the right and Hamas, plus 'Arafat's Johannesburg speech or the increase in terror—all of these add up to points for the right. On the other hand, the slaughter by Barukh Goldstein in the Cave of the Patriarchs and the scorn and abuse heaped on the General of the Central Command Ilan Biran at the end of last week, or the violent rioting by right wing radicals in the Shekhem Gate area after the demonstration by tens of thousands two weeks ago Saturday night in Jerusalem—all of these are pushing the right into a corner and painting it as fringe, eccentric and violent.

The story by Segel and Orbakh is basically a satire against the attacks, the stereotyping and the generalizations launched by the left against the right following the slaughter in the Cave of the Patriarchs. This week, too, after the curses and abuse heaped by the radicals on the head of the Central Command and IDF [Israel Defense Forces] officers, there was a great storm of controversy about the heavy publicity and prominence given these things by the media, but there is also the understanding that even if the large majority of the settler and right wing population objects to those things, something has to be done, beyond condemnation, to eliminate the problem. An editorial in NEQUDA, the settler journal, wrote this week about "harsh words that do not belong within the community of the faithful of the Land of Israel, that were said in the latest demonstrations about commanders in the IDF and the police."

"With all the pain (and it is great) that we feel about what is happening around us," said NEQUDA, "we absolutely must not lose our senses and curse people in uniform, even if they are carrying out a totally mistaken policy dictated to them by a wicked government. People who shout 'traitor' or 'Nazi' at IDF and police officers have apparently reached the highest level of mental anguish possible and have lost all sense of proportion and judgment. Beyond that, they are bringing about irreparable damage to the cause for which they are demonstrating and that they want to save. Even though the organizers are not responsible for them and their shouts, or the acts of destruction that some of them caused during the demonstration in Jerusalem, the supporters of the community must locate those who cannot control themselves and remove them from our protest activities and demonstrations."

Anyone who saw the general secretary of the Yesha' Council, Uri Ari'el, and council spokesman Aharon Domb Sunday 10 days ago before dawn at the New Gate, understands well what this is about. The two of them stood at the entrance to the gate, only a few hundred meters distant from Shekhem Gate, and blocked the entrance to the Old City with their bodies against a handful of thugs and "Kakh" radicals who tried to break through, in violation of the agreement with the police. Police, for some reason, were not stationed there during those minutes, and the blockage battles waged by the two of them against those who would break through were only partially successful. Ari'el and Domb, among the leaders of the Jewish community in the territories, seemed in those few minutes like a pair of perplexed ushers.

A similar scene occurred Thursday night in Qiryat Arba' when Council head Tzvi Qatzover and some of his friends interposed their own bodies to protect the head of the Central Command, who was spat upon, vilified and shoved by hard core "Kakh" people, whose relative proportion among the residents of Qiryat Arba' is higher than their proportion relative to the settler population in general.

The radicals also came to Jericho, where last week one of the settler roadblocks was set up, against the background of 'Arafat's visit to Jericho, and hurled accusations of treason at an officer in a knitted skullcap who participated in removing the roadblock. Letters of apology by supporters of Yesha' and Mitzpe Yeriho to Gen. Biran and to the officer accused of treason on the Jerusalem-Jericho highway, muted the bad impression only a little. But the generalizations and the stereotyping of the entire settler community created once again the process that occurred after the slaughter in the Cave of the Patriarchs: from almost total condemnation and the expression of disgust at the outrageous deeds, to defense against collective guilt, and at the end of the process, general fisticuffs with the left, which is portrayed in such instances as lending legitimacy to the deviant.

In "A Lamb Tore a Wolf to Pieces", written after the slaughter in the Cave of the Patriarchs, Segel and Orbakh describe, in their own language, many aspects of this process:

"In one of the horribly tangled jungles Something unprecedented happened. As we said above, A lamb tore a wailing wolf to pieces.

With first light, at the time of the dawn dew The lamb set out to kill the wolf. It was an innocent wolf, we must emphasize, That the lamb chose to punish. She attacked it mercilessly And tore him apart from head to tail, no less.

Sadness and astonishment descended upon the jungle, The trees of the forest actually trembled. Everyone was seized with fear and dread. No such thing had been heard

of before. That a lamb would suddenly dare to do such a thing? Every wolf asked: What am I, a kid?

The matter was so shocking That neither flora nor fauna could suppress their rage. And after the shock, the entire forest From the lowly scorpion to the lion himself Started taking urgent steps. For all, as we said, were distressed..."

And it continues:

"They all were afraid From man to monkey That if even the lambs had started to prey There would be no end to it.

Lo, tomorrow enormous damage would be caused When all the ewes break out of the fold And bite both man and beast. This is very dangerous and a real problem...

In short, the order of world and nation will be changed Because of that violent lamb, That one morning, nervous and hungry, Got upset and took down the wolf.

And really?! What foolishness! Clearly this could not be. Because lambs, as every small child knows Are a nation that suffer without getting angry or complaining.

They do not bite; They do not injure; They do not ask why. The silence of the lambs is a well-known concept.

...And the lambs were castigated from all sides. Why do you try to make excuses? Why the mourning? This lamb, after all, did not grow up in a vacuum; She was born, grazed and learned among you. And therefore that proves your guilt.

Wolfie was slain, an innocent wolf. You are guilty, you are guilty... The lambs stuttered, got entangled in their wool. They could not get a full sentence out...

...Then a world conference was convened to investigate Of representatives of the animals from all over the world... Again the lambs apologized together. They were all atremble, full of fear and regret. It really was a matter of a perverted lamb. Every flock has one weirdo...

We cross her out. We are ashamed. We condemn her and ask forgiveness. She is the black sheep of the family...

For their part, the wolves made demands. They asked for compensation and that the necessary conclusions be drawn. They set up memorial evenings and group congresses. They described how a lamb once ripped apart grandma...

The animals held their sessions and drafted conclusions. The crow and the snake drew up conclusions. The hyena, the pig, the donkey and fox, The rhinoceros and skunk looked on from above And set down laws of the jungle for beast and fowl That would prevent lambs in the future from attacking their prey.

Every lamb would have a muzzle placed on her snout So that they would always be fasting. Every lamb would be paired with a wolf That would watch her to make sure she did not draw close.

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And one final thing, But this is only rumor, The lambs there were denied the right to bleat. So if some day you should happen into the jungle And hear maa, maa, maa—that is the wolf."

Orbach and Segel wrote their story "for everyone who makes generalizations." Today the right continues to attack those who stereotype, but display greater readiness than in the past to distance themselves from the deviant, radical camp. Uri Heitner, a spokesman for the Golan settlements, who works shoulder to shoulder with the people of the Yesha' Council, did not say much that was new when he asserted that: "Kahanism is a cancer that Israeli society must fight to the bitter end." Heitner believes that "leading those fighters must be those who are the immediate sufferers of this cancer—the settlements of Yesha' that must uproot it and vomit the Kahanists from their midst. The settlements in general, and in Yesha' in particular, are today engaged in a most difficult war against the post-Zionist approach, the practical expression of which is the willingness to uproot settlements and destroy them. The most important weapon in this struggle is public opinion."

Tzvi Qatzover estimated this week that the focusing of the anger after the murder of Sarit Pri-Gal on taking over the houses in Ashmura Yitzhaq "an act of construction and development," as he defined it, prevented that anger from spilling over into attacks on Arabs. Qatzover painted the situation as follows: "An abnormal government created an abnormal situation in which, unfortunately, some behave abnormally." At the funeral of Sarit Pri-Gal, Qatzover lifted his eyes to the heavens and asked Sarit to plead on behalf of the residents of Qiryat Arba' and the people of Israel and that God remove the kingdom of evil from the earth. Those gathered round responded "Amen."

Palestinian Industrial Prospects, Problems Viewed *94AA0101C DAVAR in Hebrew 22 Jul 94 p 17, 18*

[Article by Mikhal Sel'a]

[Text] Palestinian industrialists are way ahead of the people leading the national caravan. Their readiness to invest, develop, and get the Palestinian economy moving is far greater than circumstances permit. That is how it was in the past, when Israel alone ruled the territories with the assistance of the military administration system and the restraining pressures of Israeli industrialists. That is how it is today, now that part of the area has been transferred to the Palestinian Authority.

"The problem is that we are competing in the market on highly inferior terms compared to the Israeli industrialists," says Muhammad Masroji, who owns the Al-Quds medicine factory and sits on the board of a Palestinian investment corporation. "We have no government support system like the Israeli industrialists." Nasir Nasir, owner of a large stone and marble cutting works in Bethlehem, also emphasizes the encouragement that the

Jordanian Government provides Jordanian industry, which is no longer available to Palestinians.

The woes of Palestinian industrialists, and the means for turning them in an economic factor in a Palestinian system that aspires to independence, were discussed the past two days at a conference of Palestinian industrialists in Jerusalem.

The organization of the conference indicates a good start. Everything has been organized on a private basis by Amwog (Wavelengths), a communications and public relations company, with sponsorship from six successful factories. Some 500 people were invited and, according to the organizers, more than 300 showed up, all dressed in elegant suits, as is expected in gatherings of business executives, and sporting identification tags on the lapels of their jackets and on the briefcases containing the program literature, factory advertisements and note paper. The papers were contributed by the Samko company, which is in the communications and computer business. The design work on the papers was worth noticing: a voucher framed in black, a drawing of a clip at the top, the company logo in the center and, in the margin, an inscription in English: Your Wish is Our Command. The company's business card displays only its telephone number and a statement that the company will accept the charges when called.

The perpetual din of ringing phones hovers over the smoke-filled room. From time to time, someone pulls out a small black box, the portable phone that managers can fold up and put in their jacket pockets. Against the background of heated discussions can be heard shop talk and orders to factory workers.

There are about 400 factories of 15 or more employees registered in the Palestinian territories. A few factories employ more than 100 workers. Hundreds of shops employ fewer than 15 workers. This picture of industry does not suit a society seeking to stand on its own economic feet as far as possible. And that is no accident.

Palestinian industry has existed side by side with Israeli industry for at least the past 27 years. It operates according to similar standards and regulations, is supplied in general by raw material from Israel and is run through the Israeli financial system by Israeli officials. Only the conditions of support are different.

"We do not have a system of support and assistance such as the Israeli industrialists have, even though our products do not fall below theirs in either quality or value," says Masroji. Grants, easy loans, organizational and industrial infrastructure, state boards for opening markets around the world and a legal system for protecting local production—none of these exists for Palestinian industry.

The Palestinian industrialist in the territories works when engaged by Israelis, on terms set by Israeli banks

and at the prices paid for Israeli raw materials, but is unable to enjoy comparable sales terms in the market.

Even worse, the Israeli Government has always pursued a policy designed to limit development of Palestinian industry in order to protect Israel's own. In economic affairs, Israel treats the territories as a "foreign nation," speaking in terms of import to and export from the territories, while she acts in political affairs as though the territories had been annexed. The result is that while Israel cannot intervene in sectors of a foreign nation's economy, or in its monetary and marketing policies, she maintains close oversight and imposes limits on the territories' economy as she deems necessary. This approach also prevails in the Israeli-Palestinian economic agreement governing Gaza, say Palestinian economists.

No industrial zone suitable for modern industry has ever been built in the Gaza Strip, despite requests and recommendations, including those made by the economist Professor 'Ezra Sadan. Areas have been set aside for industrial plants on city outskirts in the West Bank, but they are small and limited in their infrastructure.

The permission that Israel has given in recent years to Palestinians outside the territories to invest there has not born fruit. "So long as the political situation does not change, so long as the investor lacks political security, people with money will not invest in Palestinian factories," Abu Al-'Ala told DAVAR in an interview held more than two years ago during the first session of the multilateral committee on economic development.

The Palestinian Authority is now operating in the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho, but as the institutional system for a state umbrella organization, it still is at the starting line. The Treasury and the Ministry of Industry and Commerce are still in the early stages of organization and have not set their modes of operation, not to mention methods of encouraging industrialists that require a fixed state budget.

The Palestinian Authority, however, is far from independent. The first indication of that was the opening of the Palestinian industrialists' conference on Wednesday. The Israeli Government prohibited the Palestinian Minister of Industry and Commerce, Abu Al-'Ala, from attending and delivering the opening address. The pretext: the conference was held in Jerusalem, and Israel prohibits Palestinians from conducting any activity in Jerusalem related to the independent Palestinian Authority. Aside from the anger felt by Abu Al-'Ala and the Palestinian industrialists over the ban, Israel's behavior contradicts the statements often made by Israeli officials that without economic development, the interim agreement with the Palestinians will not succeed. Besides the tough negotiating expected over Jerusalem's permanent status, the Israeli Government knows that Jerusalem is the most convenient site for conferences and activities of that sort, both because of its location and because of the conditions that prevail there.

The discussions at the conference revealed that everyone involved in the Palestinian economy maintains regular contacts with the Israeli economy, each in his own sphere: economists with economists, industrialists with industrialists, financiers with financiers. Moreover, the fundamental premise is that economic connections must continue, although they have to be founded on a basis of equality in relations and conditions.

The connection starts right with ideas for economic studies. "The Manufacturers' Association in Israel has done a study of the implications of the peace process for Israel's economy," the economist Samir Hezbon of Bir Zeit University told the conference. "We thought we also need to do a similar study on the Palestinian economy."

The survey that Samir Hezbon has done is not comprehensive and he has not yet completed his analysis, but the preliminary findings and earlier data available to the researchers show that about 52 percent of the Palestinian factories that employ more than 15 workers are privately owned, 31 percent are owned by partnerships and 17 percent of these factories are owned by corporations. Three-quarters of the factories are fully automated and only 2 percent are based on manual labor.

Most of the factories' raw materials come from Israel or as imports through Israel, most of their sales are in Israel or the territories. Exports to the Arab states and other countries are negligible in all industrial sectors. There is no heavy industry in the full sense of the word. There still are no high-tech or science-based industries apart from some nascent computer companies that are selling and developing programs to meet market demands. They operate with extensive assistance from Israeli or foreign companies. Recently, Nabil Sha'at's company, which deals in computers and economic consulting, began business.

Relations with Israel are so basic that many factories are nothing but offshoots of Israeli plants. Fifty-three percent of the factories surveyed are based on subcontracts with Israeli factories and companies. Since only about half of the 400 factories employing 15 or more workers participated in the survey, the true rate may be lower, but even so, this figure provides Palestinian economic planners food for thought. Most of them prefer to break free of these ties and establish independent factories or partnerships based on equality. Another important and interesting result of the survey is that only 12 percent of the factories operate at full capacity.

Is there really a desire to collaborate with Israeli companies? It seems that there is. Seventy-five percent of factory owners are willing to cooperate. It is interesting that in the survey conducted by the Israeli Manufacturers' Association, 85 percent of factory owners queried expressed a willingness for joint ventures with Palestinians. The figure was higher in Gaza than on the West Bank. This readiness to cooperate is explained by the fact that entrepreneurs usually act according to economic calculations. Palestinian businessmen know the

Israeli market, are involved in Israel's economic life and are familiar with its advantages. Their desire to collaborate is still lower than that of their Israeli counterparts because of the economic relationship in which the two nations operate. The Palestinians are now at the stage at which they are seeking first to organize themselves independently and only after that, on the basis of equality, to form ties to Israel.

At the top of their list of expectations, Palestinian businessmen, according to the survey and participants at the conference, are looking for rapid development of systems of industrial infrastructure, introduction of modern means of production and creation of well-established systems for supporting and promoting the various industrial sectors. State programs for encouraging investors and manufacturers, such as those in Israel and Jordan, are the oxygen tanks of industry, stresses Nasir Nasir, the stone quarry owner. Encouragement of exports and institution of regulations to protect Palestinian products are less essential, according to one industrialist. Abu Al-'Ala emphasized this point during his inaugural address at the conference. Hezbon called the participants' attention to a Dutch company that is helping the Palestinians with their exports. Nonetheless, a private company operating under the auspices of the European Economic Community is not the long-run solution to a society trying to stand on its own feet as an independent state unit.

Advertising and publicity are another area in which the Palestinians have a lot of work to do, remarked an industrialist from Bethlehem. He says that there is not enough advertising of the few products manufactured by Palestinians, and that the consumer does not know enough about what is available on the market.

Product quality is another important factor in competition, they heard at the conference. Not only must the products themselves be improved but their packaging and marketing in order to meet competition from Israeli products.

The mood at the industrialists' conference was optimistic. One goal stood out from the speeches and discussions: to pull together and hammer out recommendations for development. Among the participants were some who sought practical economic surveys that would serve as the basis for mapping out worthwhile fields of activity for the Palestinian economy.

The businessmen are hungry for more work. Their success depends on two factors. The first is the ability of the Palestinian Autonomy council to establish itself quickly in modern economic frameworks. All the work relating to central planning, negotiations for opening markets around the world and creating investment incentive funds must be done quickly in accordance with accepted international norms in order to replace as soon as possible the assistance now obtained from international organizations working in the territories, particularly the diplomatic representation that the European Community has provided the Palestinians.

The second factor is Israel. The success of the Palestinian industrialists depends to a great extent on Israel's ability to overcome her occupation mentality and remove all the restrictions that she has imposed on Palestinian businessmen. The prohibition imposed by the government on Abu Al-'Ala's participation in the conference does not auger well. Jerusalem would not have fallen into enemy hands if Abu Al-'Ala had come to the conference and heard firsthand of all the problems and what needs to be done.

Israeli Administration of Holy Places Reviewed

94AA0101B HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 28 Jul 94 p B1

[Article by Meron Benvenisti]

[Text] Early in the 1950's, when Israel was eager to gain free access to the holy places that remained under Jordan's control, a number of Israeli legal minds asked themselves the question, "By what legal right does the Israeli Government demand a say in the status of the Jewish holy sites held by Jordan?"

One of the experts pronounced that "the same precedent by which a catholic or orthodox state held or holds the status of guardian over the holy places for its faithful also applies to Israel as defender and guardian of the sites that are holy to the Jewish faith." In other words, just as France and Russia demanded and received guardianship of the Church of the Holy Sepulcher from the Ottomans, so the secular Jewish authority is entitled to fill the religious role of protector of the holy places.

This tradition is anchored in the annals of Jerusalem, for which bitter struggles, and even a bloody war (the Crimean), were fought in the 19th century. Forty years have passed and the old legal opinion has won approval. It even was included in a binding international agreement, albeit in reverse: it is not Jordan that is granting status to Israel, but Israel that is according "high priority to Jordan's historic role in the holy places—and respects the present special role of the Hashemite Kingdom."

Wondrous are the ways of history and serpentine the deeds and words of leaders who rewrite history as a way of making history. On 28 December 1949, Israeli [text missing] representatives met at the Mandelbaum Gate to coordinate a common struggle against internationalization of Jerusalem. That was one of dozens of meetings in which they worked to block application of the principle that universal religious interests take precedence over national ones—which underlay the plan to make Jerusalem an international city.

Two nation-states, which were founded after liberation from foreign occupation, came to an agreement on dividing the city and on common action to frustrate the attempt of Christian states (although in partnership with other parties, including the Arabs) to impose on the holy city a territorial religious-international patron. They

sought to satisfy religious interests through ad hoc "functional internationalization" of the holy places on the basis of the old Ottoman-British model.

The Israeli-Jordanian collaboration was successful, and Jordan's contribution was decisive. If King 'Abdallah had agreed to internationalization of the part of Jerusalem under his control, Israel would not have been able to hold her position in the struggle against internationalization of the city as a whole. Jordan thus helped Israel strengthen her control of the western part of the city, which afforded Israel good starting conditions in 1967.

When 'Abdallah's grandson made a strategic mistake and upset the equilibrium in the city, he lost his share and yesterday's partner held control of the entire city. That is the historic role that King Husayn played. Because of that, he now must be content with "guardianship of the holy places"—a role that he assigned in the past to foreign parties—to the extent that these does not impinge on secular sovereignty over his patrimony.

The old-new partner was happy to let him keep the shirt on his back. After all, she owed her control of all of Jerusalem to his historic mistake in June, 1967, and could even smugly gloat that she had warned him not to violate the status quo.

History is written by the victors, who enjoy the privilege of squaring their principles with a changing reality. When Jordan's "historic role" annoyed Israel, she instructed government ministries and city hall to send back every document printed on stationery bearing the logo "the Jordanian Hashemite Monarchy, the Ministry of the Waqf," which was used by Temple Mount officials. The Supreme Muslim Council also did not always obtain recognition of its "special role," and many of its leaders found themselves on the other side of the gate.

Israel can pat itself on the back for always standing for separation of the sacred from the profane (when talking about others, of course); thus, her position regarding the holy places has remained consistent from 1949 to the present day. But it is worth recalling that her common struggle with Jordan against internationalization was based on the principle of national self-determination, and that is a claim that can be established only upon recognition of a symmetry in claims on the city and in its division.

Jordan's "special role" is not comparable to those of France and Russia, and not even to the one that Israel claimed for itself in 1949. It is an emergency substitute for the national demands of the Palestinians, a substitute that can be accepted alongside full Israeli sovereignty. What we have here is not separation of sacred from profane but, on the contrary, their union—and that, apparently, is the privilege of the victors.

The Jordanians are getting what they deserve, and much more than that. En route to the ceremony at the White House, Rabin explained why. "This time we are dealing

with a state"—and not with a downtrodden community of Palestinian refugees. The Jordanians are getting priority in Jerusalem, while the Palestinians are getting a rewriting of their "historic role." Yitzhaq Rabin says that he commanded his first war against the Jordanians and recalls the "blackened steel hulks" that "thousands of flowers will adorn with love."

But those who fell at Bab el-Wad died in battle not against the Jordanians but against the Palestinians. The real battle in Jerusalem was fought between two peoples for which it was home to both, and not with the Arab Legion, which was called in to rescue the collapsing Palestinian community—and after its arrival, the front lines were frozen for 19 years.

He who writes history this way consciously denies the Palestinians' historic rights in Jerusalem. History is written by the victors, but when it comes to the eternal city, the Minister of History adheres to different rules—for otherwise, the historic accounts will not be closed.

Palestinian Currency, Economic Viability Discussed

94AA0100C Tel Aviv DAVAR in Hebrew 25 Jul 94 p 11

[Article by Esther Alexander: "Only Palestinian Currency"]

[Text] Nobody wants to see hungry workers demonstrating for bread and jobs, yet that is what happened at the Erez checkpoint. If we do not want these terrible scenes repeated at the transit stations where Palestinian workers cross over into Israel, we need to clarify what lies at the root of these riots.

If we see the problem as one of security alone, we will never reach a solution. We have to ask why the Palestinians come to work in Israel; and the answer to that question is economic, with no connection to the security situation. The answer lies in the economic agreement between Israel and the Autonomy, which was signed in Paris. This agreement is responsible for the difficult situation in the Autonomy and for all that has resulted from it, and it does not leave much hope that economic conditions in the Autonomy—the economic retardation, lack of investment, and shortage of jobs—will change in the near future.

The main problem with the agreement is that it keeps the residents of the Autonomy from achieving monetary independence: from having a central bank or their own local currency. We, in our great foolishness, demanded that they give up all these things, arguing that local currency is just a symbol of independence and superfluous from an economic point of view. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres explained on television in this context that the Palestinians must understand: "that we are speaking of economics here, not national symbols." But the foreign minister is very wrong. In the British colonies, for example, in India as in Israel, the coin passed to the merchant was local currency, not the pound sterling.

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The Palestinians, on their own part, made a serious mistake when they gave in to Israel's demand, for by doing so, they gave up control of their own cash flow. The legal tender in the Autonomy today is the Israeli shekel and the Jordanian dinar, whose quantities are controlled by the Bank of Israel and the Central Bank of Jordan, which will decide whether the [quantity in circulation] will rise or fall. This makes the Autonomy economically dependent on Israel and Jordan, something fraught with danger for the Autonomy's economy, especially for its development prospects and its chances to create employment opportunities within its own territory.

The independent Palestinian entity suffers from serious economic retardation. The building and manning of a network of infrastructures, factories, and public institutions in the Autonomy cries out for working hands. The statistics showing a drop in unemployment in Israel since the closure was imposed on the territories demonstrate that Israel, too, is better off without Palestinian labor. Since the closure, there has been a drop of 2 percent in the number of Israelis unemployed: i.e., the places of 40,000-50,000 Palestinians who have stopped working in construction and agriculture in Israel have been filled by Israeli workers.

The best solution, for both the Autonomy and Israel, is for the Palestinian workers to remain in their country and build it, but this simple, logical solution has not been applied because the Autonomy authorities have no money. They have no money for projects, and none to pay the wages of teachers, doctors, clerks, and policemen, despite the fact that for all these goals, only local, not foreign, currency is needed.

Every normal government can provide for its needs with local currency, using its own central bank, and strictly according to its own decisions, policy, and discretion. But the local currencies of the Autonomy, the shekel and the dinar, are actually foreign currency for it, which it can only obtain by exporting goods and labor to Israel or Jordan. Exports require investment of real resources, which are always in short supply, and therefore, so expensive.

In addition, due to the serious shortage of local currency, the Autonomy will be forced to sell every dollar of foreign aid to the Bank of Israel or the Central Bank of Jordan in exchange for shekels and dinars. Thus, it will be deprived of the funding for the dollar import component, which will be needed for investments in its projects, while Israel and Jordan enjoy an income of dollars that are not theirs.

The Israelis, aware of the serious shortage of funds within the Autonomy, suggest to the Palestinians that they collect taxes. But with such poverty, who exactly can you collect taxes from? And how? Even in Israel, taxes finance only half the budget. In order to supply "local" currency—the shekel—we offer them work in Israel "to the greatest extent possible." We are not very

excited about their exports to us. For development and investment in projects we suggest that they rely on foreign investors and outside aid, including projects that do not require dollars at all. We "protect" them from the possibility of issuing their own local currency, claiming that they will bring great inflation on themselves, God forbid.

All the "solutions" Israel suggests are not really solutions at all: they are very costly for the national economy, and the funds that can be mobilized through them do not answer the Autonomy's needs. These "solutions" will just prolong the existing situation indefinitely.

The Autonomy needs sources of funding that will put its abundant labor force to work developing services, manufacturing, and infrastructure. The only way to do this is to issue its own currency and be able to control the amount of it in circulation. There is no other way. The Palestinians must rely on themselves and we must supply them with the means to do so.

When Israel was founded in 1948, it was no richer than the Palestinian Autonomy is today. But, one day after independence was declared, she saw to it that the Anglo-Palestine Bank was given all the powers of a central bank, and the Israeli lira was issued immediately. Half the budget in those years was deficit funded solely through the issuing of local currency. This budget activated the economy and absorbed immigration that doubled the population within four years, and all this with levels of unemployment and inflation lower than we have today. It would be worthwhile for the Palestinians to study the economic history of Israel. And by the way, not only the Palestinians would benefit; those in charge of our own economic policy today could pick up a few things, too.

LIBYA

Foreign Minister 'Umar al-Muntasir Interviewed

94AF0238A London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic
1 Jul 94 pp 34-35

[Umar al-Muntasir interviewed in Cairo by Usamah 'Ajaj; date not given: "We Have Not Succeeded in Opening a Dialogue With America—Nor Have I Secretly Visited France!"]

[Text] The Lockerbie crisis continues, with unending debate. There is a mid-August date for the review of limiting sanctions, or easing them, and many parties are involved. The Arab League has joined in to try and find a solution to the crisis, through a proposal to try the suspects under Scottish law in the International Court of Justice [ICJ] in the Hague, and is actively promoting its proposal through serious contacts being undertaken by the League's Secretary-General, Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid. This is in addition to what is being done by the Libyan Jamahiriyyah, which is suffering acutely from the economic sanctions. AL-HAWADITH met with Libyan

Foreign Minister 'Umar al-Muntasir in Cairo, where he was taking part in a ministerial meeting of the non-aligned states, and asked him about the latest developments in the case, relations with Washington, and the facts about his secret visit to France.

[AL-HAWADITH] We ask first about your secret visit to France. What happened? And who did you meet?

[al-Muntasir] This is a tempest in a teacup. There was no visit, only a transit stop, a change of planes. I saw no French person whatsoever with the exception of the hotel employees. I never left my hotel room.

[AL-HAWADITH] There was no prior coordination or agreement?

[al-Muntasir] No, and I saw no one at all. It was the second visit in the space of a week—I passed through Paris on my way to and from the South African capital, Johannesburg, to take part in the festivities of President Mandela's inauguration.

[AL-HAWADITH] So the story is completely false?

[al-Muntasir] In my view, there are conflicts among various parties in France, and these conflicts are behind the emergence of this fabricated story.

[AL-HAWADITH] You mean the statement of the French interior minister, who said he was never consulted about anything, and that he had no prior knowledge of the visit?

[al-Muntasir] I had an entry visa to France for my passing in and out of France; this is their procedure. In any case, I met no one, and never left my hotel room. I repeat that I never saw any French official.

[AL-HAWADITH] What about the talk of 'Adnan Khashuqi's having had a role in arranging the visit and meetings with officials?

[al-Muntasir] That is absolutely untrue. There was no role for 'Adnan Khashuqi, because there was no arrangement for any visit, there was only a transit stop, and as I have said, I met with no French officials.

[AL-HAWADITH] This does not mean that there have not been attempts to conduct a dialogue with France.

[al-Muntasir] Contacts are ongoing with the French, but not through me; through the mediation of officials in the Libyan Foreign Ministry, and their own officials. They have met several times, before and after my recent visit. There have been contacts, and dialogue; our dialogue has not been cut off, because France has a diplomatic presence. But as to me, I have not met any French official—with the exception of their ambassador in Libya—since I took up my Foreign Affairs post.

[AL-HAWADITH] I recall that you once told us that France's position on the Lockerbie crisis may be more progressive than that of others. Do you still think so?

[al-Muntasir] Do not forget that we have discussions with them. There is consultation about some of the information they request, and there are contacts between the Libyan and French judges on an ongoing basis.

[AL-HAWADITH] When were the contacts between the two judges? Was there a crisis when the Frenchman wanted to visit Libya?

[al-Muntasir] I met with him three times before; the last time, there was no meeting, when the French judge wanted to come to Tripoli on a warship. Contacts between the two judges took place before that incident.

[AL-HAWADITH] But the progressive French position is never voiced when there are discussions on sanctions in the Security Council. Is their progressive position limited solely to the existence of contacts?

[al-Muntasir] My view is that the French position on the extension of sanctions was adopted because of American pressure.

[AL-HAWADITH] American pressure prevented them from changing their position?

[al-Muntasir] Yes, and I also think that this latest fuss, about my visit to France, was also the result of American pressure, which exploited the existence of struggling alliances and factions, and which found, in my transiting through France, a pretext for a new attack.

[AL-HAWADITH] The Security Council must discuss the Libyan sanctions situation in mid-August. Do you think the Council has the justifications needed to lift the sanctions?

[al-Muntasir] We are hoping and acting on the expectation that the Council will not renew the sanctions, and absolutely will not increase them, due to the Arab League's proposal. Our action is focused on an effort to reach some understanding—we do not say a total understanding—before August 15th.

[AL-HAWADITH] What has Libya done to prevent the renewal of sanctions?

[al-Muntasir] We are engaging in contacts and in dialogues with numerous parties. With France, there are contacts with the judiciary, and there are Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid's contacts regarding the League's resolution. And there is the resolution of the nonaligned ministerial meeting, and of the African summit. These contacts are continuing, and could open some doors.

[AL-HAWADITH] To what extent has the Arab League initiative to solve the crisis achieved results?

[al-Muntasir] The Arab League's resolution is excellent, and the efforts of Dr. 'Ismat 'Abd-al-Majid and the League secretariat deserve praise and appreciation, as do the efforts of the undersecretaries. Now there is a state of calm on the other side, and a lack of negativity. I do not say a positive attitude, even on their reaction to the

League resolution. They spoke of the difficulties of implementation, and did not reject the resolution. This may give a strong excuse for redoubling efforts this month and next month, and we hope there will be results in this context, especially as those we have contacted can give us some sign—I mean the other, nonpermanent members of the Security Council.

[AL-HAWADITH] You mentioned difficulties the Western parties were talking about regarding the implementation of the League's resolution. What difficulties?

[al-Muntasir] They said they were legal difficulties, and this is what we are trying to discuss with English and Scottish jurists and judges, to establish the chances of enforcing the League's proposal, and conducting the trial at the ICJ in the Hague.

[AL-HAWADITH] Don't you think the renewal of Libya on the list of countries sponsoring terrorism can be seen as a bad sign, on the part of the American administration?

[al-Muntasir] It is basically a negative factor, but it has no significance. It is not a new development or a trend to something worse. It is the summation of America's policy on Libya. There are countries who, although they go along with America's policies, have remained on the list of countries sponsoring terrorism.

[AL-HAWADITH] What about the Libyan Foreign Ministry's future moves?

[al-Muntasir] We have contacts ongoing with all the countries involved, and the members of the Security Council, and we will have direct contacts with France through ambassadors, as well as with Britain. Many of these took place in Cairo. We have managed to settle many issues. Contacts are continuing and we are working on intensifying them.

[AL-HAWADITH] What about contacts with Greece, which now holds the presidency of the European Union? Do you have Athens on your travel itinerary?

[al-Muntasir] I have visited Greece, as it is president of the European Union, and even Germany, which will take over the presidency at the end of this June, and with the rest of the European countries involved, which have any close tie to Libya, and that have weight. At least, we assume that they are America's allies and can influence it.

[AL-HAWADITH] Given your presence in the Libyan Foreign Ministry, to exploit your contacts in opening a dialogue with Washington—has anything been accomplished?

[al-Muntasir] Nothing has been accomplished, and this proves that this was not the reason for my taking on the job in the Foreign Ministry. It was an erroneous interpretation, when they alleged I was given the Foreign Ministry because I had a certain connection to the American administration.

[AL-HAWADITH] But that does not mean that these connections with the oil companies do not actually exist.

[al-Muntasir] Yes, I did work in oil, and this is my only connection to the United States.

[AL-HAWADITH] The oil companies are a powerful lobby, with its own interests and aims in opening a dialogue between Washington and Tripoli.

[al-Muntasir] I do not doubt that.

[AL-HAWADITH] How do you explain this lobby's lack of success in this task?

[al-Muntasir] Because the American administration has burned all the bridges to dialogue, and put up a wall that no one can get over. That is the reason.

[AL-HAWADITH] One notes that the Libyan media occasionally attack the American administration, despite the fact that Libyan officials praise the American leadership. How do you explain that?

[al-Muntasir] First of all, the Libyan media are free, and write whatever they want, but from the official point of view there are reservations, and a rejection of some American positions. But we do not attack individuals, though we have criticized policies. Perhaps, in the past there were mutual attacks at the official level, between Libyan and American officials. With President Clinton, however, there have been no such attacks.

[AL-HAWADITH] How do you regard the completion of Libya's withdrawal from the Aozou Strip, and the implementation of the ICJ's decision?

[al-Muntasir] This is further proof that Libya respects peaceable international laws and resolutions, especially a decision from the ICJ. We must commit ourselves to it, and put it into effect, and this was not the first time Libya has implemented the Court's decisions. We have implemented previous decisions in the continental shelf with Malta and Tunisia, as well as the ruling on the Aozou Strip. This is absolute proof of Libya's commitment to international law. At the same time we find that it is America, which claims to respect and comply with the enforcement of international resolutions, that opposes so many of the ICJ's verdicts, most recently the verdict regarding Nicaragua.

INDIA

Analyst Sees New Era in Ties To U.S.

94AS0410A Madras *THE HINDU* in English
6 Jul 94 p 13

[Article by K.K. Katyal: "A New Era in Indo-U.S. Ties"]

[Text] New Delhi, July 5—The U.S. Energy Secretary, Ms. Hazel R. O'Leary, who is due here on July 8 for an eight-day stay, will be accompanied by, perhaps, the largest-ever delegation brought by any visiting dignitary. According to present indications, there will be some 40 officials in the delegation and an equal number of non-officials, all hard-headed businessmen.

This may not only be good economics but also good politics. She, a black in the Clinton Administration, will mark, through her visit, the beginning of a new era of senior-level contacts, which were conspicuous by their absence in the past. The Commerce Secretary, Mr. Ron Brown, is scheduled to come in November, while two of his colleagues, the Secretaries of Defence and Treasury, may make it early next year. This adds up to a tangible follow-up of the decisions, taken during the recent visit of the Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, to the United States.

The decision on a series of ministerial visits from the United States, beginning with that of Ms. Leary, was taken in official-level discussions during Mr. Rao's trip to Washington. But the size of the accompanying delegation is a pleasant surprise and reflects the extent of interest in the United States for investment in the power sector.

That the potential for foreign investment in this area was the biggest in the United States had been evident for some time. In the first instance, the number of power companies in the United States is larger than anywhere else and, secondly, they had been keen on investing in India. Among the factors that weighed with them are the attractive incentives like 16 percent return on the capital and the magnitude of India's requirements. Last year, the Minister for Power, Mr. N.K.P. Salve, went to the United States, apart from other countries, for preliminary survey. He visited the places where major power companies were located and received inquiries for investment involving about \$2 billions.

As Secretary (equivalent to the rank of a Minister in India) of Energy, her charge includes nuclear power, coal, petroleum and environment. That explains the composition of the round-table, being planned for her, with participants including four Ministers—Mr. Salve (Power), Mr. Satish Sharma (Petroleum), Mr. Kamal Nath (Environment) and Mr. Ajit Panja (Coal). The Confederation of Indian Industries (C.I.I.) has planned an "Indo-U.S. Summit on cooperation in sustainable energy development."

If all goes well, specific agreements may emerge out of her discussions at various levels. A meeting with the Finance Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, and a call on the Prime Minister may also form part of her schedule. In Bombay, where she will go after her stay here, another round-table has been planned, with representatives of financial institutions to discuss the problems of financing in the privatised segment of the power sector.

As significant as the visit and other related exchanges is what is not being done. There is no hurry in Washington on resuming the bilateral dialogue on nuclear non-proliferation and security in South Asia, which began in the first half of 1992 in terms of the decisions taken by Mr. Rao and the then U.S. President, Mr. George Bush, at their meeting in New York.

Three rounds were since gone through while the "secret" London meeting on the eve of Mr. Rao's departure for the United States was labelled, as an after-thought, as the fourth round. In his talks with Mr. Rao, the U.S. President, Mr. Bill Clinton, was forthright in re-stating his administration's stand but, otherwise, care was taken not to let the differences on these issues cloud the positive content of the bilateral relationship.

Cooperation With PRC Against U.S. Urged

94AS0395A Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 5 Jul 94 p 7

[Text] New Delhi, July 4—India and China, the two most populous nations, must co-operate to limit the damage arising out of U.S. attempts to treat the world as unipolar, with itself as the sole superpower, according to top defence analysts.

Since the United States continues to lay emphasis on military power and has made explicit in its national security guidelines that it will not permit any other nation to develop adequate power to challenge it, China and India cannot expect a benign attitude towards the development of their power, the analysts said.

While U.S. attitude towards India is somewhat less hostile, "both countries—China and India—face a common problem of limiting the damage of U.S. attempts to treat the world as a unipolar system with itself as the sole superpower, the noted defence analyst, Mr K. Subrahmanyam, said at a recent seminar on "Panchsheel in the 21st Century" here.

He said, "Each country can act on its own to carry out the damage limitation."

Disappointments in Rao Russian Visit Noted**Appointments Missed**

94AS0415A Madras *THE HINDU* in English
6 Jul 94 p 1

[Article by Anand K. Sahay: "Confusing Signals From Russian Minister"—all quotation marks, names as published]

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[Text] New Delhi, July 5—When the state of renewed India-Russia ties are considered, it is worth remembering that two heavyweights of Mr. Boris Yeltsin's Cabinet did not keep their appointment with the Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, making last-minute cancellations. Both are intimately connected with defence.

Indeed, the Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Andrey Kozyrev, also cancelled his engagement with the Indian Prime Minister. Mr. Kozyrev is known to be strongly pro-West, and to that extent said to be not keen on warming ties with this country. But the saving grace in his case was that it was made known to the Indian delegation before Mr. Rao arrived in Moscow that the Foreign Minister had to fly to a CIS state urgently on the day of the scheduled appointment.

This was plausible, for the Russian Foreign Minister's job entails frequent foreign travel given the tensions in the CIS, and the need for Russia to win allies in order to deal with the situation in Tajikistan, besides many other responsibilities.

Also, Mr. Kozyrev was present to welcome the visiting Indian dignitary, and to participate in the delegation-level talks. Later, he also had one-to-one talks with the Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. R.L. Bhatia.

Thus, by contrast, the eleventh hour cancellation of appointments by Mr. Oleg Soskovets, Russia's influential first Deputy Prime Minister and the man who oversees the functioning of the country's military industrial complex (defence production), and Mr. Marshal Grachev, the Defence Minister, is curious. The Indian side certainly did not expect it.

Hours before their respective scheduled meetings, Mr. Soskovets decided it was more important for him to fly out to Balkanour from which Russian rockets are launched. Mr. Marshal Grachev decided to rush to Abkhazia to deal with the situation there.

The exact reasons for the last-minute change in programmes are not known, though in the case of Marshal Grachev one factor is believed to be related to status and turf battles. In general, the speculation in Moscow, however, is that the two senior Ministers connected with defence and defence production wanted to register their unhappiness over India not yet committing itself to buying new defence systems from Russia, and for the present confining itself to purchase and co-production of spares. Available indications tend to back this theory.

The Russian economy is critically dependent on oil sales abroad, and defence exports, even though the latter has become less profitable than before on account of rising internal costs of production.

Before the signing of the 11 agreements in Moscow, Russian media speculations indicated that Moscow might desire purchase by India of MiG-29 and SU-27 fighter aircraft. The latter would be a new system.

The General Director of ROSVOOVRUZHENIYE, the public sector company dealing with defence sales, Mr. Victor Samoylov, has been quoted as saying, 'We suggest to India that we should substitute the blocked navy-oriented credit deliveries for the delivery of already assembled aircrafts (MiG-29s and SU-27s).' Of course, the official is also cited as saying that this would be 'an individual decision'.

From the Russian side the naval deliveries may not be on immediately because of localised internal dislocation in units that make equipment for the Indian Navy. This, for instance, has held up the building of Indian naval ships of the 'Alpha' series, and is a reason why Russia may want India to pick up equipment already available on the shelf.

The agreements concluded the day after the Russian official was quoted did not include one on immediate direct purchase of Russian military ware, but only of extending by two more years the existing Russian credit line of \$830 millions as yet unrealised by India, which so far has been utilised only to the extent of \$500 millions.

The Russian media have also suggested that India would like to start the production of 'missile-artillery version of the T-72s that bears the name T-72C', but the programme to build tanks is not (yet) under way.

The Russian emphasis on Indian purchase of whole and new systems is quite strong, as evidenced from Mr. Yeltsin's own observation at the delegation-level talks in Moscow that none of India's defence needs would go unmet.

If the sudden pulling out of appointments of key Russian Ministers dealing with defence is not explained by India not making outright new defence purchases straightway, then a host of explanations can be offered. These may relate to an unstable centre in Moscow where Ministers do not defer to the President and his broad foreign policy scheme of winning new friends through path-breaking political accords, or that they genuinely do have to make unscheduled dashes outside the capital to deal with unpleasant situations concerning the Russian military's relationships with other CIS states.

'Insubstantial Nature'

94AS0415B Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 8 Jul 94 p 12

[Article by T.V. Kunhi Krishnan: "India-Russia Ties After Rao's Visit"]

[Text] The visit of the Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, to Russia had more symbolism than substance. Before the visit, the officials of both India and Russia had underplayed the expectations of a breakthrough in any area. As a measure of its insubstantial nature, the visit has already become a forgotten event. In spite of the initial reservations, the visit did have marginal significance. The relationship had remained

neglected since the last days of Mr Mikhail Gorbachav. They were derailed after the fragmentation of the Soviet Union. Mr Rao's visit has now put the relations back on the track.

The talks between Mr Rao and Mr Yeltsin, according to official Russian sources, were focussed on bilateral military and technical co-operation. Defence was an important issue. And yet the Russian defence minister, Gen Pavel Grachev, did not, as scheduled in the official programme, call on Mr. Rao who is also the defence minister of India. (Gen Grachev had a meeting in Beijing last month with the Chinese Premier, Mr. Li Peng, on Sino-Soviet military co-operation.)

Not in Picture

Another senior Russian leader, the first deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Oleg Soskovets, who was officially scheduled to meet Mr. Rao, did not do so. The Russian foreign minister, Mr. Andrei Kozyrev, was not in the picture when the deputy foreign minister reiterated Russia's position on Kashmir. These absences could not have been by design, but were nevertheless noticed. Such a development would not have taken place under the old Soviet system.

Mr Rao's visit gave an opportunity to both the countries to realign their relationship in the changed circumstances. There is no superior partner any more. India is smaller than Russia in size and in many other respects, but it is today in a more stable situation than Russia in the political, economic and social spheres. Russia did not want to lose the Indian market. Russian sources have said that after a period of stalemate in the relations, Moscow accepted India as a country of importance. Moscow's effort to get close to India is also linked with Russia's disappointment with the West. The West, through the IMF and the World Bank, was to give Russia a loan of \$18 billion in 1993 but gave only \$2 billion.

The Russian warmth towards India is not surprising. A total of 11 agreements on various subjects, nine of them on economic issues and defence-related subjects, were signed by the two countries. During Mr. Yeltsin's visit to India in January 1993, agreements were signed on a large number of subjects. Some of them have remained inoperative for the last 18 months. To avoid this, a monitoring committee is to be set up this time.

Moscow Declaration

The Moscow declaration, the show-piece of Mr Rao's visit, is an agenda for the future of all multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-linguistic countries like Russia and India. Even before the declaration was issued, Russia was embroiled in an inter-religious tussle with the fundamentalists of the neighbouring republic of Tajikistan. India did not find a place in this dispute. Russia was forced to take the help of Pakistan where the next round of talks to resolve the dispute is to be held. The

validity of what Mr Rao called "the path-breaking document" will have to wait for its evaluation in the future.

The discussions were not uniformly smooth. One area where the Indian side gave up hope related to India's rupee debt. The amount of debt totals Rs 30 billion and is with the Reserve Bank of India for repayment. India failed to persuade Russia to drop the proposal to auction a part of this debt. Indian officials tried to soften the blow by getting Russia to agree to limit the commodities that Russian exporters can buy with rupee funds. But there is no guarantee that this arrangement will be adhered to.

Another noticeable failure was about the aviation agreement between Moscow and Delhi. India's hopes to reach a comprehensive agreement on civil aviation with Russia were frustrated. Talks between the civil aviation and tourism minister, Mr Ghulam Nabi Azad, and his Russian counterpart did not reach any conclusion after being lost in technicalities.

Rao Opens Indira Gandhi Regional Conference

94AS04094 Madras THE HINDU in English
6 Jul 94 p 13

[Text] Shimla, July 5—The Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, today called for active participation of people in the democratic process for establishing a relatively just and equitable society with a will to fight corruption and discrimination.

In his inaugural address to the first regional Indira Gandhi conference here, he said freedom from foreign rule would have little meaning if it did not accompany freedom from social exploitation and from the endemic cycle of poverty.

The address, read by the Finance Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, said "We must go beyond the indirect and passive democracy in which people's participation was confined to the elections and their role during the long interregnums of elections was largely that of a spectator, interrupted on the odd occasions by agitations for redressal of grievances."

Doctors Advised Against Visit

The Prime Minister has put off his visits to Bhopal and Shimla following doctors' advice that air travel might aggravate his spondylitis problem, official sources said in New Delhi. Mr. Rao, who has been attending to his daily engagements in the capital, had also felt tired and exhausted after his recent hectic official visit to Moscow, the sources added.

Describing corruption as "anti-thetical" to a good society, he said it was a worst form of discrimination which led to denial of opportunity to the deserving.

He said the revival of panchayat raj institutions was aimed at making democracy a participative process which afforded an opportunity to people to deal with their problems and needs.

It had become a cliché to say "self-Government is better than a good Government but in fact self-Government is the only form of good Government," Mr. Rao said.

The conference was organised by the Indira Gandhi Memorial Trust at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study.

Dilemma of Excessive Control

Mr. Rao said in the present dilemma of excessive Government control at the expense of liberty, inequality and fall in production and the unfettered market economy, the middle path of India's mixed economy offered the way out, but the "mix of the mixed economy" was variable and had to be constantly adjusted at the right level.

He said both the systems were grossly unjust and encouraged individual self-interests and exploitation and if proper balance was not struck, the underlying violence of the system was bound to manifest itself.

Underlining the need for modernisation, he said "Technology should not be acquired for its own sake and it should offer a solution rather than creating a want."

Admitting that the advancement of technology was an irreversible process, he said it should be ensured that social developments did not lag behind in the progress of science and technology in the world and the political changes taking place around the world. He said the end of the Cold War, rise in ethnic conflicts, spurt in religious fundamentalism, rapid globalisation and the new GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] agreement were bound to have a bearing on India and society had to keep pace with them to maintain a two-way flow of influence to ensure that tomorrow came as an improvement on today.

Mr. Rao cautioned against the growing tendencies in societies towards religious intolerance and fundamentalism and decried the leaders who played upon the sentiments of the people to maintain a hold [on] them.—PTI

Papers Report, Comment on Border Talks With PRC

Talks Detailed

94AS0394A Madras *THE HINDU* in English
9 Jul 94 p 1

[Article by K.K. Katyal: "More Meeting Points on Border With China"—names as published]

[Text] New Delhi, July 8—While reiterating the resolve to strengthen confidence-building measures along their border, India and China have not been able to give a final shape to steps to end the eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation of their troops. Differences continue.

This was evident at the end of the two-day meeting of the Joint Working Group (JWG) on the boundary question yesterday in Beijing. The Indian delegation was led by the Foreign Secretary, Mr. K. Srinivasan, while the Chinese team was headed by the Vice-Foreign Minister, Mr. Tang Jiaxuan. The two sides were satisfied with the situation on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and agreed to establish additional points for meeting of the border personnel from the two sides. But when it came to working out details under the Agreement on Peace and Tranquillity in the border area, signed in September last year during the Beijing visit of the Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, there was little advance. This much was implied by the press release, issued in the two capitals today, on the JWG's discussions.

The Beijing agreement laid down the "framework" for maintaining peace along the LAC, but vital details such as its alignment and the extent, depth, timing and nature of the reduction of troops were to be finalised by an expert group of military and diplomatic personnel. That panel had since met twice—in February in New Delhi and in April in Beijing—but the hope that its report would help the JWG to settle the relevant issues did not come true. This was how the press release dealt with this aspect: "They (the two sides) reviewed with satisfaction the considerable progress made at the first two sessions of the India-China expert group, set up to assist the JWG. Noting that the expert group has already reached agreement on its work regulations, Mr. Tang Jiaxuan and Mr. Srinivasan directed the group to continue to adopt a constructive and positive approach in its future work."

In another reference, the press release said that "the two sides held detailed discussions on priority questions relating to the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the India-China border areas." It did not elaborate the point. (According to a PTI [Press Trust of India] report from Beijing, quoting sources from the two sides, disagreements remained on new measures to avoid "close confrontation" on the border. A smaller group which sat yesterday failed to reconcile the formulae of the two sides.)

As regards the substantive boundary question, now being examined by the JWG for the sixth year, the standard formulation of the past was repeated—that "the two sides continued discussions aimed at arriving at a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement." This, however, was not unexpected.

On the positive side was the continued peace and stability in the border areas—as a result of steps worked out in the last five or six years because of which there had been no tension, at any point. The JWG was "pleased to note that the situation along the LAC was peaceful and that the confidence-building measures already in place were working well." Recognising the importance of effective confidence-building measures, the two delegations "exchanged views on furthering such measures."

They agreed in principle that additional points for meetings between the border personnel of the two countries be established but specific details were left to be worked out by the expert group.

The press release made the following other points about the JWG discussions.

There was an exchange of views on all aspects of India-China relations. Both sides expressed happiness at the steady and perceptible improvement in bilateral ties, and reiterated a commitment to maintain this positive trend. They noted with satisfaction that India and China had been able to finalise the text of the agreement on avoidance of double taxation. The memorandum of understanding on the establishment of banking relations and the agreement on cooperation in the area of health and medicine were also being finalised. These agreements would be signed shortly.

The two sides noted with satisfaction that trade via the Shipkila route on the Himachal Pradesh-Tibet border would be opened around mid-July.

It was agreed to carry out a joint study on enhancing the existing facilities for pilgrims to Kailash and Manasarovar and the opening of additional routes.

Views were also exchanged on regional and global issues of mutual interest. A close convergence of positions on several topics was noted.

The next JWG meeting will be held in New Delhi at a mutually convenient date in 1995, preceded by a meeting of the Expert Group in early 1995.

Mr. Srinivasan called on the Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr. Qian Qichen, who is due to visit India from July 17 to 19. Mr. Qian said he was looking forward to his trip and Mr. Srinivasan told him that he could be sure of a warm welcome during the visit—regarded by the Indian authorities as a factor which would considerably enhance bilateral ties. According to Mr. Qian, differences and problems remained but if discussed in a spirit of frankness and friendship, they could be resolved.

No Progress Reported

94AS0394B Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 12 Jul 94 p 15

[Names as published]

[Text] Beijing, July 11—China today failed to report progress at the just-ended India-China joint working group (JWG) meeting here, but chose to harp on the issue of what it calls "close confrontation in some areas along the border."

Meanwhile, the Chinese state councillor and defence minister, General Chi Haotian, left today on an official goodwill visit to Russia and Pakistan.

Commenting on the outcome of the JWG meeting, a Chinese foreign ministry spokeswoman said on telephone that during the talks held here on July 6 and 7, "both sides frankly exchanged in-depth views on how to settle the issue of close confrontation in some areas along the border."

The JWG session, the seventh since it has set up in December 1988, was co-chaired by the foreign secretary, Mr K. Srinivasan and the vice-foreign minister, Mr Tang Jiaxuan.

Today's statement by the Chinese spokeswoman carefully avoided saying that the session had made progress.

Indian official sources said that during the just-ended round, both sides put forward their respective suggestions on ending 'close confrontation' but that a timetable is needed and that currently progress is being made.

In the past, following the meetings of the JWG and its component part, namely the diplomatic and military expert group, China had reported progress.

However, the spokeswoman said today, "they have promoted mutual understanding" and that "both sides decided to continue their talks on relevant issues in the third round meeting of the expert group."

The next meeting of the expert group is slated for early 1994, followed by that of the JWG in the middle of the year.

Sino-Indian ties will come in for sharper focus once again shortly when a series of high level visits take place.

They are those of the Chinese vice-premier and the foreign minister, Mr Qian Qichen, to India from July 17-19 and that of the chief of staff of the Indian army, General B.C. Joshi to China later this month. The vice-president, Mr K.R. Narayanan, is also due here later this year.

However, in order to keep Islamabad happy, the defence minister, Gen. Chi, will make a short trip to Pakistan.

Mr Qian had visited Pakistan in late February and there are extensive and frequent exchanges of visits of the top military brass of Pakistan and China to each other's countries. The defence minister, Mr Aftab Shaban Mirani, has already visited China twice since taking office.

Slow Progress Predicted

94AS0394C Madras *THE HINDU* in English 13 Jul 94 p 1

[Article by K.K. Katyal: "India, China Moving Close—Slowly"]

[Text] New Delhi, July 12—The progress in sorting out thorny border issues between India and China is slow, as shown by the recent Beijing talks. It will continue to be slow. But that will not come in the way of moves for

increased political understanding through high-level contacts. This is the meaning of the talks being held here next Monday by the Chinese Vice Premier and Foreign Minister, Mr. Qian Qichen with Indian leaders.

The political process will go on, though the Joint Working Group could not give a final shape to steps to deal with what China called "closed confrontation" and India described as the "close proximity" situation on the border, with differences persisting in regard to the Line of Actual Control and reduction of forces.

When in Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in February-March, Mr. Qian was noticeably scrupulous in his comments on India-related subjects. At his press conference at Dhaka, for instance, he, in reply to questions on Kashmir and Ganga waters, left little doubt about China's preference for bilateral settlement of these issues and its disinclination to take sides. His New Delhi visit, it seems, is intended to provide the balance to the earlier trips.

His will be essentially a political interaction, the economic matters having been discussed at length by the Commerce Minister, Madam Wu Yu, in June. She had then made a significant point: "We want you in APEC [Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation]. You support our entry into GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]." The shared interest in the opening of new markets and opposition to protectionism, it was clear, outweighed the fears of economic conflict. The political contacts level, in the recent past, included Mr. Qian's meeting with the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Dinesh Singh, in Teheran and consultations between the delegations of India and China at Geneva, when Pakistan sought to use the U.N. Human Rights Commission for an anti-India move. China finds convergence of views with India on several sensitive issues like human rights and the intrusive international agenda of the United States. There is no intention on the part of China and India to be seen as ganging up against any other power, but they would like to make known their like-mindedness on issues of equal concern to them. There had been situations when both India and China had to reckon with pressures, and, therefore, the significance of their discussions is not to be minimised. China has of late given a higher priority to South Asia—obviously because of the region's political importance and economic dynamism.

The visiting Foreign Minister's engagements include a call on the Prime Minister, Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao, talks with the Commerce Minister, Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, who, in the absence of the Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. Dinesh Singh, will host a formal dinner, and the delegation-level discussions, with the Indian side, headed by the Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. R.L. Bhatia, Mr. Qian and the Finance Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, will sign the agreement on avoidance of double taxation.

Tibet and Kashmir are certain to figure in the discussions. China, from time to time, had drawn attention to

the activities of the Dalai Lama only to be told that he confined to cultural and religious matters and was not concerning himself with political issues and that India regarded Tibet as an autonomous part of China.

On Kashmir, China stood for a settlement through bilateral discussions under the Simla agreement. It stuck to this view, though the Pakistan Prime Minister, Ms Benazir Bhutto, during her visit to Beijing last year, sought to secure Chinese support to her Government's stand. There was no ambiguity about China's opposition to moves to internationalise the Kashmir issue.

Taiwan is unlikely to be a contentious matter, because India does not intend to take any step that would imply its recognition. The trade mission, proposed to be set up in Taiwan, will be non-official—for economic contacts. China, itself, has accepted investments from Taiwan to the tune of \$7 billions.

Another highlight of the bilateral contacts is the visit of the Chief of Army Staff, Gen. Joshi, to China from July 22. This will be the first high-level military contact. Mr. Sharad Pawar, as Defence Minister, visited China in July 1992.

Fundamentalist Threat Said Affecting West Bengal

Threat From Bangladesh

94AS0345A Calcutta ANANDA BAZAR PATRIKA
in Bengali 29 Jun 94 p 4

[Article by Basav Sarkar: "The Worry Created by Fundamentalism in Bangladesh Is Not Limited to That Country"]

[Text] The conspiracy of fundamentalists in Bangladesh is at the verge of completing its circle. It began with the assassination of the whole family of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in his own home August 15, 1975, and the course of it might be completed with the call for a nationwide strike on June 30 in support of the demand for hanging Taslima Nasreen. If the strike is successful, the fate or the political ruin of Bengalis will be completed and the long struggle to establish a separate Bengali identity will be halted, at least for the time being. This apprehension increased to a large extent when the special bench of Supreme Court unanimously upheld the Bangladeshi citizenship of Golam Azam. In today's Bangladesh, Golam Azam is not only the leader of the fundamentalist Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) party, he also is the symbol of a force, the main objective of which is to Pakistanize the Bengalis. This would mean returning to the condition that existed before 1971. It does not mean the unification of Bangladesh with Pakistan. The followers of JI may want this in their hearts, but the national and international reality will not allow Bangladesh to become East Pakistan again. The JI wants to manipulate this reality by saying that they are not against the state of Bangladesh. But what they want is the full

Islamization of the life style and social consciousness of Bengalis, so that the Pakistani mentality of the pre-Bangladesh period could get a solid ground over there. Their task had been made easier by the late president Ziaur Rahman who had established Islamic Bangladesh by rejecting secularism, the basic identity of the Bengalis, through the amendment of the constitution of Bangladesh. Prime Minister Begam Khaleda Zia perhaps wants to finish the incomplete task of her late husband. Golam Azam is leading the forces which think it fruitless to live without the bond of Islamic mentality. Many important personalities have identified this as a bad sign and since the 1980s they, within the framework of the Islamic constitution of Bangladesh, had been trying to keep alive the spirit of the Liberation War by carrying on propaganda and organizing the 71 Ghatk Dalal Nirmul Committee [The Committee to identify and prosecute the agents and killers of 71]. At the time of Bangabandhu in 1973 the citizenship of Golam Azam had been revoked due to the charge of working as a leader of such infamous groups like Al-Badr which had worked as a helping hand to the Pakistani army to carry on genocide at the closing months of the liberation war. During the period of Ziaur Rahman, Golam Azam returned to Bangladesh as a Pakistani citizen to lead the JI and to speed up the process of Islamization. His confrontation with the Ghatk Dalal Nirmul Committee began then. After ten years of effort, that committee finally organized a people's court in Dhaka in March 25, 1992, and demanded his death sentence with the charge of mass killing. Memorable names and personalities such as [The late] Jahanara Imam, Begam Sufia Kamal, Major Jaman, Ahmed Sharif, Saukat Usman Shamsur Rahman, Kabir Chaudhuri, Anisuzzaman etc... were in the leadership of this committee. Shahrier Kabir, the secretary of this committee, wrote a documentary history where many foreign observers were quoted as having compared this people's court with the Vietnam tribunal by philosopher Bertrand Russell. Taslima Nasreen was one of the workers of this committee. No evidence has been found yet that the government of Begam Khaleda Zia had shown minimum respect to the verdict of the people's court. After that the High Court restored the Bangladeshi citizenship of Golam Azam by a 2-1 majority decision. Then an appeal was made against the decision and the case went to Supreme Court which later on unanimously upheld the decision of the High Court. The question may be asked as to what the connection is between the decision of the court and the views of the government? Political science shows court systems as one of the institutions of the political system. Its impartiality and independence cannot go beyond the political system itself. Therefore, when the court of the Islamic state of Bangladesh [as published] conducts a trial of the chief leader of the forces of Islamization, nothing is possible but to recognize his position respectfully. In this background, the case of Taslima should be judged today. Firstly, Taslima wanted to remain a Bengali. In her novel *Lajja*, she intimately portrayed in a tone of a protest the ruin of Bengali identity as an effect of the incident of

[Destruction of former] Babri Masjid. So many years after the birth of Bangladesh, Suranjan, representing the minority community, wanted to leave the country with a devastated heart and this shocked Taslima as a defeat of her Bengali identity. Those who are more interested in finding the literary value of *Lajja* should be reminded that the novel is an indictment against one of the tendencies in the contemporary socio-cultural sphere of Bangladesh which novelist Amitava Ghosh characterized as a polemic type of writing. Taslima wanted to create a political debate by her novel, she definitely did not want to write a novel of eternal literary value. Whether a more powerful writer could have done the job in a better way or not, is a different issue. In her novel *Phera*, Taslima brought up the same issue portraying the nostalgic feeling of Kalyani who left Bangladesh and was living at Salt Lake [Calcutta]. In the novel *Lajja*, the crisis was shown as within Bangladesh, and in *Phera*, the same crisis was shown from outside. No wonder JI devotees are angry with her.

Secondly, in her recent newspaper interview, she asked for reform of Sharia, which due to some misconception was printed as the reform of the Quran. The next day a correction came out in the newspaper. But if the matter was simply about the seriousness of a comment, there should not have been such an uproar in Bangladesh. In fact, the matter was a strike against Islamic fundamentalism. Asking for change in Sharia means to reform it according to the need of the present day world when the ideas of socio-economic and cultural consciousness will uphold human values by rejecting fundamentalism. This definitely has a close relation to secularism. For this reason, JI and other fundamentalist groups are not the only ones against this statement of Taslima, those who have power in Bangladesh are also against it. Whenever lawsuits were brought against Taslima in different places, the government immediately issued arrest warrants against her. Denying laws and regulations, processions are organized in many different places demanding the hanging of Taslima. Badias [a caste] were brought from the Bhati area of Mymensingh district to the cities where they took part in the procession with venomous snakes encircling their necks and demanded the death of Taslima. They threatened that if the anti-Taslima strike were opposed, they would let loose thousands of poisonous snakes in the cities. The battle of self-interest is going to get started in Bangladesh on June 30. The country will either complete the process of Islamization on that day, or, the Bengali consciousness will emerge again after passing through a brief period of temporary disaster. Today, Taslima has become a symbol of this Bengali consciousness and Bengali identity. The time has come for the numberless well-intentioned people of Bangladesh, institutions, leftist and nationalist powers to reestablish the consciousness of the liberation war and to start a fresh war for social and cultural liberation after two decades of failure. The fundamentalists are trying to finish the Islamization of the state through the government of Khaleda Zia and want the enactment of a

blasphemy act. The anti-Taslima cry is an only a part of this process. If this act is made, any free-minded person could be arrested in future. All well-intentioned citizens have to fight to stop this. It's a matter of shame that in Bangladesh the voices of some people were heard who are known to be radical leftists. They stamped Taslima as a greater enemy than the fundamentalists themselves. They say that Taslima is, in fact, an agent provocateur working for the fundamentalists. It is also argued that all these leftists and radicals have been fighting against the fundamentalists and Taslima has destroyed their strategy. There is no doubt that the allegation is serious. But the question mark concerns those who achieved the victory of democracy over tyranny in Bangladesh before the assassination of Mujibur Rahman. They have failed to organize a movement to check the growth of fundamentalism throughout the country since the end of the rule of Rahman. Those who have accepted the political rehabilitation of the killers of '71 including Dalim and Farooq, assassins of Mujib, raise the question of the soundness of their political senses. It is not Taslima as person, but her courageous voice and uncompromising attitude and confidence in her beliefs that have created a revolution in the political life of Bangladesh. This is especially so in the matter of upholding the Bengali identity, rare during the contemporary period. After Bangabandhu, no one but Taslima was able to create such a sensation over the issue of Bengali identity. This struggle in Bangladesh could become a matter of concern to the people of the other part of Bengal [Indian Bengal]. If the victory of Golam Azam after 30th June inspires the repeat of the story of *Lajja*, the problem might become grave one.

CPM Silence Appalling

94AS0345B Calcutta BARTAMAN in Bengali
30 Jun 94 p 4

[Article by Pabitra Kumar Ghosh: "Fundamentalism: Why Is CPM Silent?"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] The Communist Party of India-Marxist [CPM] is of the big gang leaders of the criminal world. A charge has been submitted to the central home ministry by the Punjab police. The Director General of Punjab police, Mr K.P.S Gill personally went to New Delhi and handed over a report to Mr Padmanavia, Secretary Central Home Ministry. It was stated in that report that extremists took shelter in some of the districts of West Bengal. The Akali extremists are living in large numbers in Uluberia in Howrah district and in the Bhabanipur and Dunlop areas of Calcutta. After killing hundreds of people in Punjab, those terrorists have taken shelter in West Bengal. The state police are doing nothing against them. Kornel Singh had been living in West Bengal for a long time before he was killed in Uluberia recently. Much more dangerous terrorists like Balbir Singh Habara also took shelter in West Bengal. When the officers of Punjab police came to investigate the matter, they found that

Balbir Singh had already left the state with the help of the local authorities. The prize amount for any information leading to his arrest is some lakhs of rupees. If the left-front government fails to clear it-self from this accusation, it will lose credibility in the whole nation. Some doubts have already arisen. On the basis of the information of central intelligence sources, Arif Reza Khan, commander of the Islamic Commando Forces, and his associate Irshad Shahid were arrested in Calcutta. Irshad is a student of Islamic history of Calcutta University and Arif was his classmate at Maulana Azad college. Both of them are inspired with the ideals of Jamat-i-Islami. The nature of Islamic commando activities is more important. They made a conspiracy for dangerous explosions in important centers of Calcutta including the stock exchange building. Another notorious Kashmiri extremist, Saifuddin Lone, was arrested from Kalyani just after the arrests of Arif-Irshad. He had taken training from Pakistani Military Intelligence [ISI]. On behalf of ISI, a large underground chain is at work in the districts of Nadia, Murshidabad, Hooghly and 24 Parganas. This information was supplied by the officials of West Bengal police. It means that Jyoti Basu's government knows about the conspiracy of the agents of Pakistan in this state, but have closed their eyes. The central home ministry tried to wake them up but failed. They said that during last one year 235 Pakistani agents took underground shelter in Calcutta. Besides, after the expiration of visas, 175 Pakistani did not leave Calcutta. Without any passport or visa, 10 Pakistanis are hiding in Calcutta and 49 others are hiding in different places in the state. The central home ministry was surprised as to how was that possible. Some other agents and militant fundamentalists sent by the ISI were arrested. After interrogating them and from the documents seized from them, the Central Intelligence Bureau [CBI] came to know that the ISI chalked out a plan to found an 'Islamistan' consisting of the districts of Maldah, Murshidabad, Jalpaiguri, West Dinajpur of the state of West Bengal, and Chhapra, Katihar, Purnia and Bhagalpur districts of Bihar! CBI also got the map of 'Islamistan'. Arif Reza Khan and Irshad Shahid confessed that their program has been proceeding according to plan. The central home ministry informed that the ISI trained militant young people who are scattered around the cities of Bhagalpur, Lucknow, Hyderabad and Calcutta. What happened? Why did not the government of Jyoti Basu notice in time? The left-front government does not even take the task seriously of stopping the infiltration of illegals from Bangladesh. The central home ministry thinks that the ISI, on the basis of their strong hold in Calcutta, is expanding their network through out Eastern India. For all of these reasons, the government of Jyoti Basu finds itself in a very embarrassed situation when Taslima Nasreen attacks the fundamentalists. It remains silent! The CPM Politbureau is always ready to make forceful statements on any event throughout the world. But they are keeping silence on the courageous battle of Taslima Nasreen. A large number of Muslims in Bangladesh came forward in support of Taslima Nasreen.

They came to streets to confront the fundamentalists. But in the Muslim society of West Bengal, no condemnation was heard against the fundamentalists. So, fundamentalists of this part of Bengal are loud in their criticism of Taslima. Fundamentalists are encouraged by the silence of CPM. As the militants know that West Bengal is a safe haven for them, the fundamentalists also know that they have nothing to fear from the left-front government and the CPM party.

Amnesty Scores Human Rights Violations

Chapter on India Summarized

94AS0413A Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 7 Jul 94 p 5

[Text] New Delhi, July 6—The Amnesty International today alleged in its annual report that "tens of thousands of political prisoners," including prisoners, of conscience, were held without charge or trial under special or preventive detention laws last year throughout the country.

In the chapter on India in its annual report detailing Human Rights violations in 151 countries which was formally released today, the Amnesty International alleged that torture of detainees was routine and scores of people had died in police and military custody as a result of this. Not only that, scores of political detainees just disappeared, it alleged.

The report, however, added that armed opposition and separatist groups committed numerous abuses, including deliberate killings of civilians. The two pages devoted to India (out of a total of 326 pages) lists a number of incidents of mysterious disappearance of suspects in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, Andhra Pradesh and Assam.

There was no immediate reaction from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Senior officers, when contacted, said they would need time to study the report before they could react to it.

In Delhi alone, the Amnesty report claimed, there were a total of nine custodial deaths last year which was an increase over similar incidents of the previous year.

The report, while welcoming the setting up of the National Human Rights Commission in September last year claimed that the Commission's mandate was restricted as it had no jurisdiction to investigate violations committed by army and para-military forces in Jammu and Kashmir.

The report also lamented the fact that no legal reforms were implemented to safeguard detainees or to limit arbitrary powers granted to the security forces under special legislation such as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act and the Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act (TADA).

It called on the government to release prisoners of conscience and to ensure that all other political prisoners were brought to trial promptly.

More Details Given

94AS0413B Calcutta *THE STATESMAN* in English
7 Jul 94 p 1

[All quotation marks as published]

[Text] In a searing indictment of India's record on human rights, Amnesty International has singled out the States of Punjab and J&K [Jammu and Kashmir] for torture and illegal detention by security forces there.

In its annual report—covering human rights abuses across the world in 1993—due to be released on Thursday, Amnesty has expressed concern over the scores of 'disappearances' in the Kashmir Valley and torture by the Army.

Welcoming the Government's decision to set up the National Human Rights Commission, Amnesty has criticized the "severe limitations" placed on its powers, mandate and methodology. For example, Amnesty has pointed out that for investigating some alleged violations, the NHRC [National Human Rights Commission] has to rely on State investigative agencies which "may have a vested interest in covering up human rights violations."

Among the salient findings in the report are:

- Tens of thousands of political prisoners were held without charge or trial under special legislation such as the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act and TADA.
- Several "prisoners of conscience" including newspaper editors and journalists were among those detained in 1993 under TADA.
- Torture of detainees in police and military custody was routine in every State. The most common methods: beating with canes; suspension by the wrists or ankles; electric shocks and rape. Most victims of police torture were from the underprivileged and vulnerable sections of society.
- There were 484 deaths identified in custody allegedly resulting from torture between January 1985 and June 1993. In only six of these cases were police officers known to have been convicted.

Jammu and Kashmir

- Police records show 132 custody deaths in only 33 days during March and April last year in Jammu and Kashmir. Torture is routine. Case in point: a farmer, Manzoor Ahmed Ganai. He had to have both his legs amputated after prolonged torture by the Army's Bahir Regiment. He died in February.
- At least 53 people were killed in Sopore in Kashmir by the BSF [Border Security Forces] in January last year apparently in retaliation for the death of a BSF member in a clash with separatists. The dead included

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a 70-year-old shopkeeper, Ghulam Mohammed Sheikh; a woman and her two children, burnt alive in their car; a bus driver and at least 15 passengers who were forced off the bus and shot.

- Scores of political detainees "disappeared" during the year. Most were young men suspected of having links with armed secessionist groups. Many were taken into custody solely because they lived in areas where armed separatist groups were active.

Punjab

- Officials continued to falsely attribute death under torture to "encounters" between armed militants and the police or to "escapes."
- No prosecutions for human rights violations took place in Punjab and most of the disappearances were carried out by the police.
- The Punjab Chief Minister is quoted saying that the police in the State would not be "screened or cleaned up" as it would hamper "anti-terrorist operations."

Armed militants:

The report criticizes the armed opposition groups for their "grave human rights abuses" including hostage-taking, torture and deliberate and arbitrary killings.

- The victims include officials, politicians, relatives of security personnel and suspected informers. The killing of former Assistant Commissioner Ghulam Nabi Baba by Kashmiri militants.
- The victimization of Hindus in Punjab.
- Torture and killings by the People's War Group in Andhra Pradesh.
- Reports of people being taken as hostages by armed groups in Assam, Andhra Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir.

Amnesty has urged the Government to:

- Release prisoners of conscience.
- Ensure that all political prisoners were brought to trial promptly and fairly, or released
- Investigate impartially all allegations of torture and deaths in custody.
- Bring to justice those responsible for torturing or ill-treating prisoners.

Government Response

94AS0413C Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 8 Jul 94 p 13

[Names as published]

[Text] New Delhi, July 7—The defence ministry has termed Amnesty International's allegations of human rights excesses in Kashmir as grossly exaggerated. "The names of the aggrieved persons as given in the report appears to have been planted by anti-national elements," a defence ministry spokesman said here today.

"It is somewhat disconcerting to note that Amnesty International has made no mention of the recent initiatives undertaken by the army in the field of human rights," the spokesman said while expressing satisfaction that the international human rights organisation had correctly highlighted the issue of human rights abuses committed by militants against officials, politicians, relatives of security forces and other innocent persons.

The spokesman pointed out that recent measures initiated by the army to prevent abuse of power include setting up of human rights cells at various headquarters, educating all ranks on legal norms and issuing of the Ten Commandments by the Chief of Army Staff. The commandments stress in particular on the need for army officers and men posted in internal security duties to respect principles of human rights and the rule of law and public order.

In fact, in its response to an earlier Amnesty Report titled "An unnatural fate: Disappearances and Impunity in the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab," the Government of India has provided complete details and statistics of the action taken against the security forces for alleged excesses in Kashmir. The earlier Amnesty report overlaps with its report issued yesterday.

Until May 1994, 70 army, BSF [Border Security Force] and CRPF [Central Reserve Police Force] officers and men have been imprisoned for committing alleged excesses. The break up comprises 15 army men, including three officers, and 40 and 15 men each from the BSF and CRPF.

Of this figure of 70, 20 security force personnel including 11 army men have been dismissed from service. A further 15 security force personnel, mostly from the CRPF, have been dismissed without imprisonment. Seven more personnel, including an officer and three jawans of the army, have either been demoted or suffered a loss of seniority. Other Departmental penalties have been awarded to 42 more security force personnel. The total number of personnel punished in various forms are 174 which includes 34 from the army, 79 from the BSF and 61 from the CRPF.

"What is strange is that the Amnesty report ignores the presence of foreign mercenaries operating in the Valley. It does not take into account the basic fact that the army and the security forces are in the Valley primarily because of armed militancy," observed a senior serving army officer.

Although six months old, the 44-page comprehensive report prepared by the government of India has rebutted most of Amnesty International's earlier report. It has appended statistical details on terrorist violence in the state including figures of killings of innocents, kidnappings, criminal extortions, destruction of property by militants and also recovery of weaponry from them.

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The government report has also profiled some of the prominent persons killed by the militants in targetted attacks and provided factual position in respect of persons who had allegedly disappeared since 1990.

For example, in an inquiry conducted in response to an allegation that the army had raped 20 women in a raid conducted in Poshpora village on the night of February 24, 1991, the former divisional commissioner (Kashmir division), Mr. Wajahat Habibullah, has observed "While the veracity of the complaint is thus highly doubtful, it still needs to be determined why such a complaint was made at all.

"It is possible that the people of the village have acted under militant pressure. That elements wishing to discredit the army as brutal, the civilian administration as ineffective and the Government of India as uncaring have orchestrated a campaign on the issue, is also evident. This comes in the face of growing goodwill for the army among the public and improved civil-military liaison."

"It is indeed strange that in its report on India, Amnesty International has made sweeping allegations by including expressions such as tens of thousands, hundreds, scores, numerous, etc. Whereas when it comes to reporting on the United Kingdom and the United States this international body has chosen to be conservative and more specific with figures," noted a senior defence ministry official.

'Unfair Indictment'

94AS0413D Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 8 Jul 94 p 12

[Editorial: "Unfair Indictment"—all quotation marks as published]

[Text] Amnesty International's charge that 'tens of thousands' of political prisoners, including prisoners of conscience, are languishing in Indian jails and that prisoners are routinely tortured in this country has to be seen in a much wider context than the organisation's annual report cares to do. In its overall appraisal of 151 countries, Amnesty has accused 112 of torturing prisoners, 63 of harbouring prisoners of conscience, 61 of resorting to political killings and 53 of detaining people without a trial. Of these apparently overlapping categories, India seems to have been excluded from the list of the 61 which undertake political killings. The report has, however, pointed out that scores of people in India die of torture in police and military custody and that many also simply disappear. Clearly, only a thin line separates the 61 charged with political murder from the rest. Before coming to such conclusions, however, it may also be necessary to classify the various countries according to their political systems. Torture by the security forces and killings at the behest of the government make no difference to the victims whether they are in a democratic country or a totalitarian one. It is also nobody's case that

a democratic country is less culpable than a dictatorship in the event of human rights violations. But the point perhaps still needs to be made that torture or 'disappearances' represent a failure of the system in a democracy in contrast to being an integral part of state policy in a country ruled by an autocrat who is answerable to no one.

India may be guilty of keeping 'tens of thousands' behind bars and of the other human rights abuses mentioned by Amnesty, but it still remains a qualitatively different place from a totalitarian country. It is in this respect that Amnesty has been less than fair. It has chosen to ignore the distinctions between the good, the bad and the ugly. The openness of Indian society will be evident to anyone who spends half an hour in one of its chaotic market-places or visits the law courts or watches a political rally or reads a newspaper or strikes up a conversation with any person on the roads. There is no sense of fear in India, as in a dictatorship. There is also scope for securing relief from the heavy-handed behaviour of the authorities, even if the human rights commission has not yet lived up to expectations. Unless such points are recognised, Amnesty's assessment will seem to be a dry recital of statistics which may pillory India simply because of its larger population. Mercifully, Amnesty nowadays at least notes that the terrorists also indulge in human rights violations and that India has to cope with several insurgencies fomented by a country where the military does not always seem to be under the control of the elected government. True, there is much that is wrong in India's prison system and with the way the terrorist challenge is sometimes met, but the stress should be on activating the self-correcting mechanism within a democracy and not merely on painting a grim, even biased, picture.

SROSS-C2 Satellite Successfully Placed in Orbit

94AS041A2 Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 11 Jul 94 p 9

[Text] Bangalore, July 10—The SROSS-C2 satellite, on board the ASLV-D4, launched on May 4 this year, has been successfully manoeuvred using the satellite propulsion system.

The orbit manoeuvre operations, began from July 1 for a week, according to the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) here. All systems on board SROSS-C2 are functioning normally, and before initiating orbit manoeuvres, even in initial orbit, scientific data was collected from both the payloads, ISRO has said.

The satellite has been put in the final intended orbit with a perigee of 429 km and an apogee of 628 km at the same inclination. This was done after the manoeuvre the Gamma-Ray Burst experiment (GRB) payload and the Retarding Potential Analyser (RPA) were functioning satisfactorily.

So far, 191 triggers were recorded at different threshold settings corresponding to increased radiation intensity levels, ISRO said.

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Of these, seven triggers are identified to be very interesting events and are being analysed further for their possible cosmic origin. Measurements of densities of hydrogen and helium ions have been made using RPA, which will help in understanding the upper ionospheric phenomena, particularly the effects of solar radiation heating and dynamics, it added.

The unique feature of the 113-kg satellite is that among this class of satellites in the world, it carries its own propulsion system for orbit manoeuvre operations. The satellite will complete 1,000 orbits on July 11.

The satellite has still about 1.3 kg fuel left out of the five-kg at the start of the mission and the remaining fuel would be used for routine orientation control manoeuvres for the rest of its mission life. The satellite would be completing 1,000 orbits on July 11, according to ISRO.

Home Minister Opens Police Chiefs' Conference

94AS0396A Madras *THE HINDU* in English
7 Jul 94 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, July 6—The threat from Pakistan to India's internal security in its various ramifications was the subject of discussion on the inaugural day of the annual conference of State Directors-General of Police.

Inaugurating the conference, a three-day affair, the Home Minister, Mr. S.B. Chavan, stressed the need for timely intelligence to allow action by the security forces. The Home Minister said the conference was being held in the backdrop of improvement in the law and order situation in Punjab and the North-Eastern States.

According to Mr. Chavan, slow progress in the Kashmir Valley was a direct consequence of Pakistan's clandestine role there and warned against any slackening in efforts to counter the forces of destabilisation.

Internally, caste and communalism, ethnic conflicts such as between Nagas and Kukis, and violence by separatist elements and Left-wing extremists in some States, continued to cause concern, he maintained.

Maintenance of internal security, he said, should not divert attention from other serious crimes, particularly atrocities against the weaker sections of society.

Earlier, Mr. V.G. Vaidya, outgoing Director of the Intelligence Bureau (IB), welcomed the Home Minister and apprised him of the security scenario prevailing in the country.

Mr. D.C. Pathak, who will take over from Mr. Vaidya as IB Director shortly, gave a presentation on the law and order situation prevailing in the country.

An interesting feature of the conference was a briefing on drug trafficking and terrorism by the Revenue Secretary, Mr. M.R. Sivaraman, considered to be an expert on the subject.

Though the focus of the conference thus far was on the issue of Pakistan's tactics of attempting to balkanise India, other issues like left-wing extremism or naxalism, also came up for discussion.

While some favoured a responsible administration and development as inputs to end the problem of naxalism others felt that the law and order method alone could end violence generated by extremists.

Approach to Islamic Nations Changes, OIC Meet Deferred

94AS0406 Madras *THE HINDU* in English
7 Jul 94 p 13

[Article by K.K. Katyal: "OIC Meet Deferred"]

[Text] New Delhi, July 6—After repeated postponements in the past, the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), due to be held in Tunis around the middle of July, has been deferred again. There is no indication of the new dates—it may be in September or even later.

The postponements would have gone unnoticed but for the fact that the decisions on the timing of such meetings are linked with the calculations of Pakistan, its current chairman. Pakistan has made ample use of the Islamic forum in achieving political objectives, especially in pushing its line on Kashmir and against India. The OIC has come handy to it to "internationalise" the Kashmir issue and, relatively speaking, it had had a better luck here than at the United Nations and other fora. Is Islamabad not sure of the total support of this organisation, as has been the case in the past? And is this the meaning of the postponements?

Till now India had kept aloof from the OIC, seeing no role for itself in a grouping, consisting exclusively of Islamic countries. This helped Pakistan to propagate its version, without fear of contradiction or counter-arguments. One-sided accounts, thus prevailed—to the discomfiture of India.

New Delhi, of late changed its approach and decided to be in close contact with its members and office-bearers and to brief them on the situation in Kashmir, the meaning of the terrorist violence, sustained from across the border, and of Pakistan's role. Islamabad, therefore, may not have been in a hurry to convene the Foreign Ministers' meeting. This could be one explanation.

Or, Pakistan may be wanting the meet to be arranged close to the U.N. General Assembly session. After its humiliation at Geneva this year (when it was forced to withdraw the anti-India resolution in the U.N. Human Rights Commission), Pakistan pinned its hope on the world body for a new "internationalisation" bid. It may like to use the OIC ministerial meeting for building up pressure on Kashmir, on the eve of the General Assembly session.

Because of the Geneva experience, Pakistan proposes to take all possible precautions, while mobilising support for its case at the world body. The earlier confidence and the tendency to take for granted the backing of the Islamic world has given place to a realistic approach. It will keep a closer watch over India's interaction with the Muslim countries—for instance, the current trip of Mr. R.L. Bhatia, Minister of State for External Affairs, to Iran, Turkey and Qatar.

For Pakistan, Iran's role in Geneva was a major shock. Most members of the U.N. Commission were aware of Pakistan's real purpose in raising the Kashmir issue in the human rights' context but it was Iran's stand that proved decisive. Islamabad continues to see Iran—for that matter, any other Muslim country—through the Kashmir prism. It will continue to see the OIC, too, through this prism.

In the domestic context also the Pakistani establishment appears to be taking precautions, lest it should be blamed for miscalculations in regard to its international moves. The Government recently sought to involve the legislature and, through it, the Opposition parties in the conduct of its Kashmir policy.

RSS National Executive Council Meets

Resolutions Reported

94AS0397A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 7 Jul 94 p 8

[Names as published]

[Text] Jaipur, July 6—Describing the situation in the north-east as explosive, the executive committee of the RSS [Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (organization of service to the nation)] today urged the Centre to "plug the direct supply of foreign funds to church organisations."

The sangh at its meeting, chaired by Mr Rajendra Singh alias Rajju Bhaiya, passed a resolution recommending all the money meant for churches' activities to be routed through the Centre and only used for the purpose for which they have been sanctioned.

The five-day annual meeting of the executive committee concluded here today. It was attended by 200 members of the committee, including three senior leaders of the Bharatiya Janata Party and heads of different frontal organisations of the sangh.

The sangh claimed in all the seven north-eastern states secessionist elements were actively engaged in terrorist activities. The entire north-eastern region has become a hot-bed of anti-national and secessionist forces.

The Meghalaya student organisations are agitating for expulsion of people from other parts of the country settled there, branding them as foreigners. In Tripura, terrorist murders have become the center of the day.

Discontent among the Maiteyis of Manipur regarding the absence of job-reservations for them is being given an anti-Hindu turn. In Arunachal Pradesh, demands are being raised for the expulsion of Chakma refugees settled there since long.

According to the RSS resolution, in Mizoram, discontent is being fomented against the security forces and the police by making a research paper written by a police officer as a pretext. In Assam, conflicts between tribals and the residents of hills and the plains are being engineered. The Nagaland students federation has threatened the ONGC [Oil and Natural Gas Commission] to stop the flow of petrol out of the state. A campaign of Christianisation of Arunachal Pradesh, with education and medical services as tools, is being vigorously pursued by encircling it with such institutions. Lakhs of Muslims of the north-east congregated in Assam for the world Islamic conference.

The RSS executive committee regretted the Centre did not take any step to stop the activities of the churches and the Islamic organisations in the north-east, though the home minister, Mr S.B. Chavan has accepted the reality of the interference of foreign forces in the north-east. The missionaries are engaged in their conversion activities, the resolution alleged.

By another resolution, the RSS national executive strongly opposed any move to initiate a political dialogue in Jammu and Kashmir. "So long as terrorism in J & K [Jammu and Kashmir] is not completely wiped out and the uprooted Hindu population does not return with security and honour, any talk of initiating the political process is not only meaningless but also fraught with danger. Such loose talks will only give wrong signals to the enemies of the country," the RSS felt.

The RSS also took strong objection to the statement of the J & K governor that the worsening situation in Doda district had been caused by the resistance put up by the Hindus and described it as rubbing salt into the wounds of the hapless people. The RSS demanded removal of Gen K.V. Krishna Rao as governor and a complete overhaul of the administrative machinery in Jammu and Kashmir.

Referring to the charges levelled by the suspended Bombay deputy municipal commissioner against the Maharashtra chief minister, Mr Sharad Pawar, the executive committee said the accusations have not been refuted in a confidence-inspiring manner resulting in the total collapse of government's credibility. The RSS demanded immediate removal of persons of dubious character from their high government offices and an honest inquiry into the allegations.

Content of Meeting Summarized

94AS0397B Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 8 Jul 94 p 4

[Article by Law Kumar Mishra: "Glasnost Evident at RSS Meet"—names as published]

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[Text] Jaipur, July 7—An impression of Glasnost was evident at the recent 5-day national executive council meeting at Jamdoli. The meet was no longer a closed door affair with the press and leading citizens being invited to attend the meet which was attended by over 200 senior RSS leaders.

The Swadeshi Jagran Manch formed by the sangh comprises experts who do not believe in the RSS philosophy, but they were also invited so that their expertise on the Indian economy could be utilised, according to the RSS chief.

The RSS is no longer a rigid organisation, its priorities can shift, the RSS chief, Prof Rajendra Singh alias Rajju Bhaiya confirmed. While winding up the proceedings, the RSS chief who succeeded Mr Bala Saheb Deoras in March said, "The RSS can become flexible in view of the changing situations."

The Jaipur national executive committee meeting was the first of the sangh after Prof Singh was nominated as the RSS chief at Nagpur by Mr Deoras, following the latter's heart attack. Prof Singh admitted that earlier the RSS chief used to take all decisions, but now a panel of five to six leaders decides on policy matters.

The "Pratinidhi sabha," the apex body of the sangh had resolved the identity crisis of the RSS and with the nomination of the nuclear physicist as successor to Mr Deoras, the impression that only a Nagpur based person or a Brahmin could become the RSS chief was demolished.

The sangh is trying to identify itself with the weaker sections of society and with this in mind, the executive council discussed and prepared programmes for "Samajik Samta"—social equality, if not social justice. The sangh at its Jaipur meeting decided to induct more Dalits and other weaker sections of society into the organisation.

The sangh will attempt to come closer to the Dalits by going to the slums and opening 5,000 schools there. The sangh will intensify its campaign to attract and uplift the scheduled castes, declared the RSS chief at Jaipur.

He attacked caste based politics and rejected reservations for backward castes on caste lines. Referring to an OBC [other backward classes]. Prof Singh said one may be educationally backward, but it is not certain that they are socially and economically backward too, and recommended a reduction in the percentage of reservations.

The RSS has changed its own priority and has also succeeded in getting the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] to shift its priority as well. Swadeshi and Suraksha (security) have become the focal themes of the BJP. For the full five days, the sangh deliberated on the two topics and the Doda situation also figured prominently.

At Nagpur in March, the sangh had resolved to highlight the swadeshi campaign and later the RSS leaders—Mr

H.V. Sheshadri, Mr. K.S. Sudershan and Mr Govindacharya "educated" the BJP leaders about the swadeshi campaign and its dividends to the party in the next few years. Swadeshi was also highlighted by all the speakers at the daily press briefings.

That the BJP leaders and the government are both under the influence of the RSS was obvious. The chief minister and his cabinet colleagues attended the RSS morning drill and Mr Bhairon Singh Shekhawat rushed to the railway station in the wee hours to receive the RSS chief and obliged him with government documents on a MNC [multinational corporation] shaving blade projects in one of the industrial estates owned by the government.

At Sariska two months ago, the RSS leaders had guided and educated the BJP leaders on the contemporary political and economic issues.

The sangh attempted to reach the target of urbanites by highlighting the cultural invasion through the electronic media, particularly Doordarshan and appealed for serials based on Mahabharat, Ramayana and other epics.

The temple issue did not figure at all on the RSS agenda, the RSS chief claimed that it was the Vishwa Hindu Parishad which was responsible for the temple construction programmes. Prof Singh said that the RSS merely extended its moral support. He referred to the temple only when questioned by newsmen.

The RSS has decided to grant regional autonomy to the states in their programmes. It is proposed to create regional decision making bodies consisting of the respective states and they will be free to exploit the local issues. Nagpur will no longer be the central decision making body of the sangh.

The sangh claiming to have 45,000 "shakhas" proposes to expand its activities in the South Indian and North-eastern states. A pro-Hindu organisation leader working in Tamil Nadu was one of the special invitees at the Jaipur meet. A special resolution to check donations to the Christian organisations in NE [Northeast region] states was also adopted.

Structural Changes Noted

94AS0397C Madras THE HINDU in English 13 Jul 94 p 13

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] New Delhi, July 12—Some major organisational and structural changes are being made in the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh [RSS] with a view to tighten the direct control of the central leadership over its different wings without suffocating growth. Moves are also being made to felicitate a greater degree of coordination among the different fronts of the RSS.

The Nagpur-centres RSS is to give way to an organisation which would have key leaders based in different

parts of the country reporting directly to the Sarsanghchalak, the 'friend, philosopher and guide' of the RSS, Mr. Rajendra Singh. This would mean that not only would the senior RSS leaders be able to make their own direct assessment of the situation, but they would also be available on the spot for consultations. Besides, the differences between 'sister' organisations could be sorted out more quickly, and the central leaders would be able to interact more frequently with the 'leaders' of the various fronts working in the area.

The decision to reorganise the RSS was taken at its meeting in Jaipur held in the first week of this month. It was decided, for example, that Mr. K.S. Sudershan, the RSS ideologue, would be based in Delhi, and that Mr. Vasant Rao Ketkar, currently working directly with the ailing Balasaheb Deoras, would be based in Uttar Pradesh, possibly Lucknow.

All-India Tour

Mr. Rajendra Singh himself is to undertake an all-India tour starting next month, spending a few days in each of the 29 'states' of the country—in the RSS map of the country there are 29 states, with each of these having its own 'pracharak'. While the BJP leaders will be embarking on a 'Bharat Parikrama' from July 15, the Sarsanghchalak of the RSS will be visiting each area of the country making direct contact with the Sangh workers in each district. Mr. Singh is expected to complete his tour of the country sometime next year.

Observers have said that besides the key organisational changes, the RSS leadership has identified 'swadeshi' and 'suraksha' (economic nationalism and national security) as the two key ideas around which its future socio-cultural and political programmes are to be built. Different wings of the RSS will be chalking out their own action programmes centred around these two concepts and at the individual level all Sangh men will be expected to further these ideas.

In this context, at the informal level, the question of reservations within the BJP on taking up any major agitation programme based on 'swadeshi' did come up. The BJP's doubts on whether or not such an agitation would yield rich political dividends by the time the next general elections are held in 1996 persist not at the ideological level but at the real level of electoral politics. Are Mr. Narasimha Rao's economic reforms heading in a direction which would cause widespread discontent and unrest that the Opposition party could encash as votes for itself? Or will the success of the reforms, and all that goes with it, make nonsense of any 'swadeshi' agitation?

One-teacher Schools

The Sangh is also expected to give a major thrust to the various 'sewa' organisations working in the field of health and education in the remote regions of the country. For example, in the tribal areas of Bihar already 900 one-teacher schools are being run by the RSS. And

the target is to more than double this number to 2,500 within the next year. The network of Vidya Bharati schools has also shown a tremendous growth and with a much larger network already in place the RSS is making ambitious plans to fan out to virtually every village in the country.

The leaders are also worried about reports of major differences between its key wings like the BJP and the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh. In this context the differences in the units of these organisations in Andhra Pradesh and Bihar were mentioned. It is expected that with key RSS leaders based in different regions in the country, there will be better coordination between the different wings to enable remedial action to be taken.

At the same time younger 'pracharaks' are being selected for more responsibilities and an effort is being made to spruce up the organisation and change its image. Perhaps the idea is to break away from the image of middle-aged men with paunches doing drill in parks, to create the image of a youthful and energetic Sangh man out to fight for economic nationalism against multinationals and ready to resist cultural invasion.

Samajwadi Party National Executive Meets

Report on Proceedings

94AS0407A Madras *THE HINDU* in English
7 Jul 94 p 15

[Article by V. Krishna Ananth: "SP Confused Over Ties With BSP"—quotation marks, names as published]

[Text] Nainital, July 6—The national executive meeting of the Samajwadi Party [SP], held for the first time in U.P. [Uttar Pradesh] after the SP-BSP [Bahujan Samaj Party] combine assumed office, revealed the confusion within the party, especially in the realm of its relationship with the Bahujan Samaj Party.

In fact, the only issue that appeared to be bothering the national executive was: how to keep the SP-BSP government floating. And the solution that seemed to have emerged is—leave everything to the party president, Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav.

Contrary to claims of providing a national alternative, there was hardly any indication to this effect. The three day 'jamboree' which found the State Government machinery in full display, virtually ended by 'strengthening the hands of Mr. Mulayam,' replicating the Congress (I)'s style of functioning.

While the professed agenda for the session was to deliberate on and evolve the party's strategy for the coming elections in ten States, there was nothing in this regard that came out in the meeting. A national conference of the party was proposed and a decision on the date and venue was left to Mr. Mulayam Singh.

In a sense, the flamboyant Mr. Yadav's overbearing presence ensured the eclipse of senior ideologue of the Samajwadi Party, Mr. Kapil Deo Singh and others like Mr. Prasad Verma and Mr. Janeshwar Mishra. Mr. Singh and Mr. Mishra were asked to convey to the press the party's proposal to hold a convention to float the idea of 'an India-Pakistan-Bangladesh confederation'.

Even on the question of the new economic policy, against which the Samajwadi Party had spat fire before November 1993, the session virtually endorsed 'foreign investment in the power sector' and Mr. Kapil Deo Singh did a bit of plainspeaking when he said that the national executive had 'authorised' the U.P. Chief Minister to invite multinationals to set up power plants in the State.

Interestingly, Mr. Singh equated his party's decision to 'provide electricity to the people' with Lenin's new economic policy immediately after the Russian Revolution and virtually turned a strong defender of the Congress(I) Government's opening up the core sector to MNCs [multinational corporations] and privatisation of public sector undertakings.

The erstwhile arch rival of MNCs, Mr. Raghu Thakur, general secretary of the party, quipped that the "climate did not permit any agitation," pointing to the onset of monsoon in many parts of Bihar and U.P. "How can you agitate in rains?" he asked reporters even while eloquently explaining the proposed idea of an Indo-Pak-Bangladesh confederation.

It was left to Mr. Mulayam Singh to paper over the cracks that have developed in the SP-BSP edifice. He ruled out the possibilities of his admitting any BSP MLA [member of Legislative Assembly] to his fold, 'even if some of them sought to cross over', suggesting that Ms. Mayawati's warning to 'announce something at her party's anti-defection rally at Lucknow', had its impact on the SP leader.

However, there was no way he could conceal the disaffection in his ranks. Consternation against the attitude shown by the BSP's stormy petrel, Ms. Mayawati and the allegation that the SP is engineering defections from among the BSP MLAs found expression in the session. Interestingly, the national executive members were 'disciplined' by the leader to the extent that most of the senior leaders were not available for the press.

Discussion on the political resolution, which was a prolonged affair indicated that all was not well in the fold. However, true to the character of the party, Mr. Yadav resorted to his status of 'supremo' and 'instructed' his colleagues to refrain from speaking out against the BSP.

Even while 'welcoming' the anti-defection rally called for by the BSP at Lucknow on July 10, Mr. Yadav appears to be preparing his party to face the 1996 general election on his own. A concerted drive towards party building,

beginning with membership campaign, was the only important resolution in the two-day session.

In an effort to consolidate the position, Mr. Yadav has hit upon a novel idea of enrolling his partymen as 'volunteers in the literacy campaign' that the State Government intends to carry out. The partymen have also been instructed to associate themselves with social work as tree plantation and environment protection with a view to building an 'organic link' with the people.

Mr. Yadav himself appeared unruffled with Ms. Mayawati's remarks and her 'anti-establishment' remarks. According to sources close to him, the SP president described the BSP general secretary's activities as a positive factor, since in his view as long as the BSP filled the anti-establishment political space, the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] would not be able to cash in on the discontentment that was bound to grow in the State.

Mr. Yadav, according to party sources, is now preparing himself for the general elections due in 1996. His calculations seem to be that with the Janata Dal having been virtually wiped out in Uttar Pradesh, he has emerged the sole claimant to the backward classes vote bank. Similarly, by roping in some of the Dal leaders from eastern and western U.P., Mr. Yadav seems to be looking forward to wresting a good number of seats in the State.

No Alignments Foreseen

94AS0407B Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English
7 Jul 94 p 4

[Names as published]

[Text] Mr. Mulayam Singh Yadav and his Samajwadi Party will have no truck with the splinter Janata Dal, headed by Mr George Fernandes. Neither will it align with any other party right now.

Mr Kiranmoy Nanda, one of the general secretaries of the Samajwadi Party and West Bengal Minister, who attended a meeting of his party's national executive committee, which ended in Nainital on Monday, said in Calcutta on Wednesday the party would not join any move to topple the Laloo Prasad Yadav Government in Bihar. Some leaders of the newly-formed Janata Dal might be interested in dislodging Mr Yadav, he added.

The Samajwadi Party will wait, till the Assembly elections in Bihar, before considering an electoral understanding there with any party. The task before it now was to develop it as an alternative force in Bihar.

Mr Nanda, who is looking after the party affairs in Bihar, has reorganized the set-up with the appointment of Mr Ram Deb Singh Yadav as the president of the State unit. Mr Yadav resigned as a Minister in the Laloo Prasad Yadav Government some time ago.

Gogoi's Claim of ULFA Breakdown Treated Lightly

94AS0408A Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English
7 Jul 94 p 6

[Names as published]

[Text] Guwahati, July 6—The claim by Pradeep Gogoi, ULFA [United Liberation Front of Assam] vice-chairman and second-in-command, that the Commander-in-Chief, Paresh Barua, had recently been divested of his power, is reportedly being taken with a pinch of salt by security agencies. Gogoi is alleged to have made this statement during interrogation by the police following his arrest last week.

According to Gogoi's statement, a meeting of the ULFA general council was held at its camp in Chakrashila hills in Dhubri district on May 20 at which the organizational responsibilities assigned to Paresh Barua were allotted to the general secretary, Golap Barua alias Anup Chetia. The reason is said to be Barua's "inability to perform his duties" since being assigned them in 1991.

Despite repeated attempts to clip his wings, however, Barua reportedly continues to exercise effective command in the organization. According to sources, Barua and Chetia, who come from the same village, have a strained relationship and in case of a difference of opinion, Barua's views are said to prevail.

Intelligence sources interpret the Chakrashila decision as being an interim arrangement to look after the day-to-day requirements of the armed wing in view of Barua's other assignments outside and not as a dilution of his powers. According to them, Barua's importance stems from the confidence he enjoys of the ISI [Information Service of India] as well as of regional insurgent outfits operating from across the border.

Gogoi, however, is reported to have painted a different picture during interrogation. He is said to have pointed out Barua's limitations—chiefly, his inability to act on his own as he is allegedly under the control of the ISI and the CIA [expansion not given]. He is reported to be under strict guard at his shelter in Bangladesh. Gogoi also spoke of how the ULFA chairman, Arabindra Rajkhowa, was reportedly under surveillance by NSCN [National Socialist Council of Nagaland (rebel group)] activists to prevent him from initiating talks with the Government.

According to sources, the reported loss of ULFA's credibility with insurgent groups in the north-east stems from the surrender of Kalpajyoti Neog, general secretary of the Indo-Burma Revolutionary Front. This reportedly resulted in retention of groups of ULFA trainees as de facto captives by both factions of the NSCN as security against any betrayal.

Gogoi's interrogation reportedly revealed a complete breakdown of the communication within ULFA following the security operation. He is said to have admitted that many activists had migrated to other States in the guise of students in private professional institutions after paying hefty capitation fees.

Sources said that Gogoi and Rajkhowa had been entrusted with the task of regrouping cadres on a "revolutionary political line." They were reportedly concerned over the fate of their cadres in different camps along the Indo-Myanmarese border as well as in Bangladesh and Pakistan.

Gogoi's arrest in Sibsagar last week was followed by reports of extortion from Government undertakings, who are said to have evolved a system of buying peace through their contractors. Incidentally, Gogoi was arrested reportedly on a mission to collect money from officials of the Gas Authority, as per prior arrangements. He said he had come to Sibsagar from a hideout in Nagaland close to the Myanmar border for medical treatment besides finalizing the deal.

It is not yet clear whether any payment was made—Rs 12 crores had been demanded—but a journalist associated with a Guwahati daily was arrested in Jorhat under the TADA [Terrorists and Disruptive Activities (Preventive) Act] on the basis of Pradeep's statement implicating him in the negotiations with the GAIL [Gas Authority of India Limited] on behalf of ULFA. A GAIL officer, Rajesh Sharma, was said to be conducting the parleys on behalf of the Government concern. Yesterday, Mr Ramen Dutta Barua, editor-proprietor of NEWS STAR, and Mr Deben Bora, a journalist with that paper, were arrested for their alleged involvement in the negotiation.

New Communist Front Forms in Maharashtra

94AS0401A Madras *THE HINDU* in English
9 Jul 94 p 15

[Article by Mahesh Vijapurkar: "New Communist Front in Maharashtra"]

[Text] Bombay, July 8—A new political front, designed to battle Congress(I), BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] and Shiv Sena in Maharashtra and the current economic policies both at the Centre and the State, is being put together by both the Communist Party of India, (Marxists) and the Communist Party of India.

Several other smaller Left parties, like the Lal Nishan, which is a Leninist outfit and the Satyashodak Communist Party, are part of the new line-up being organised while the Janata Dal may not find a place in it unless it stabilises itself first, according to sources.

The Left now feels that what Maharashtra needs now is a "front which is politically more active in organising the people and more cohesive in polls" which would be held in March next. The Progressive Democratic Party (PDF), led by the Janata Dal, a source said, "has out-lived its purpose and lost direction."

All constituents of the Janata Dal-led PDF, in which the Left parties were a part, have been informed of the present move. Only a couple of days ago, the Left parties at a meeting, found that the Prakash Ambedkar led

Bharatiya Republican Paksh [BRP] and Bahujan Maha Sangh, had decided to forge ahead with a new front.

This new BRP-Maha Sangh alliance, distinguishing itself from the Kanshi Ram led Bahujan Party, is seen as a crucial factor that is likely to grow in importance though Janata Dal feels to the contrary.

The BRP-Bahujan Maha Sangh and the Left parties have a common base, the "BRP-Bahujan Maha Sangh call it the rural jobless, we call it the proletariat."

Surjeet Reports on CPI-M Central Committee Meet

94AS0402A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 9 Jul 94 p 6

[Text] New Delhi, July 8—The Central Committee of the CPM [Communist Party of India-Marxist] has decided to strengthen its association with the CPI [Communist Party of India] and the parent Janata Dal in the forthcoming assembly elections.

The party general secretary, Mr Harkishen Singh Surjeet, after a three-day meeting of the committee, told journalists yesterday that despite its differences with the CPI on the electoral reforms bills and its unhappiness with the split in the JD [Janata Dal], the CPM will try to unite all democratic and secular forces in order to defeat the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] and the Congress in these elections.

Mr Surjeet stated that with the Congress going ahead with its "anti-people" economic policies and the BJP and RSS [Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (organisation of service to the nation)] resolving to whip up communal passions, the JD and the National Front have an important role to play. If there is to be any challenge to the Congress in the ensuing elections to the four states—Bihar, Orissa, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh—it will be by the NF-JD combine, he asserted.

The committee meeting which largely dealt with the political developments in the country, has thus noted that "left unity is of utmost importance." While regretting the split in the JD, which it felt would only favour the Congress and the BJP, the CPM proposes not to have any dealings with the defectors and will support the official JD.

At the same time, Mr Surjeet said that the crisis facing the JD, must make its leadership ponder over the need for an overall alternative policy framework for merely one slogan of social justice is not enough to strengthen the struggle against the Congress and the BJP.

The central committee also attacked the Narasimha Rao government for its "complete bungling" of the situation in Kashmir and reiterated its demand for greater autonomy to the troubled state. The party resolution regretted that the Rao government had been treating the Kashmir issue as a mere law and order problem and thereby, compounding the crisis.

The Kashmir problem is different to Punjab's said Mr Surjeet and added that it cannot be solved by sending the army. The people of Kashmir were fed up with the spate of killings in the Valley, which was evident from the fact that thousands of people demonstrated against the militants in protest against these killings, noted the resolution.

"Instead of utilising this situation and opportunities to evolve a political settlement, the government appears to have no clear-cut policy direction," the resolution observed. Besides, the BJP, utilising the grave situation in Doda district is seeking to communalise it for its "petty political advantage" by demanding declaration of the "disturbed area" and thus deepening the crisis, it added.

The central committee also discussed the preparations for the forthcoming "civil disobedience movement," initiated by the left parties from August 16 to September 9. So far, the party has enrolled over three million volunteers for the movement.

On Punjab, the committee regretted that the Akali leader, Mr Prakash Singh Badal, had chosen to ally with the BJP. "It is the unity of the Left, democratic and secular forces alone that can serve the interests of Punjab and the country," said the resolution.

West Bengal CPI Said To Be 'in Shambles'

94AS0403A Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA
in English 9 Jul 94 p 15

[Names as published]

[Text] Calcutta, July 8—The CPI [Communist Party of India] in West Bengal is in the doldrums. Despite the attempt by the central executive committee (CEC) of the party to bring together the official and dissident factions of the state CPI, the two groups continue to be at loggerheads, thereby leading the party to disintegration.

The situation has come to such a pass that 29 dissident state council members of the CPI, led by Mr Gurudas Dasgupta, MP [member of Parliament], and Mr Kamalapati Roy, general secretary of the state AITUC [All-India Trade Union Congress], submitted a 14-page document to Mr Indrajit Gupta, general secretary of the CPI, last month urging immediate intervention of the CEC.

It may be recalled that following the state party conference in 1992, 31 dissident party members refused to join the newly-elected state council alleging irregularities in the election. Since then, two of the dissident state council members, Mr Narayan Chaubey and Mr Dashu Roy, have been expelled from the party. The dissidents continued their factional war against the official group, led by the state party secretary, Mr Nandagopal Bhattacharya, from the head office of the state AITUC.

Last May, the CEC intervened in the matter for a reconciliation between the two factions. It urged the dissident members to join the state council and at the same time requested the official group to form the various departments in a composite manner with a "comradely and flexible attitude."

The dissident members then joined the state council and also the state executive committee. Everybody then hoped that unity would be restored in the party in a phased manner. But the official group continued to drive out from the party those having the slightest allegiance to the dissident group. The removal and expulsion of Mr Dashu Roy, treasurer of the state party, is a case in point.

Two months ago the dissidents walked out from the state council and the state executive committee for the second time, following differences over nomination of the party's office bearers in some newly-elected municipalities. The secretary of the state CPI, Mr. Nandagopal Bhattacharya, however, said he was not perturbed by the turn of events as the so-called dissidents did not constitute even 20 percent of the party members.

Meanwhile, the dissidents in their document to Mr Gupta have complained that the CEC practically did nothing to ensure implementation of the resolution adopted by it. No CEC member came down to Calcutta to explain the resolution to the state CPI leadership, they said. The CEC member from West Bengal, Ms Geeta Mukherjee, also did nothing in this regard.

The document points out that inner party differences are eating into the vitality of the state party and emasculating it.

The inner party situation has further deteriorated during the past one year. Disunity and division have become widespread at all levels. The striking power and the capacity for mass mobilisation of the party are gradually declining.

The document says more and more party members are becoming inactive and the reluctance of members to renew their membership is growing. In fact, many party members have left the organisation and many more may follow them.

CPI-M To Support Janata Dal Faction in Polls

94AS0405A Calcutta *THE STATESMAN* in English
8 Jul 94 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, July 7—The CPI(M) [Communist Party of India-Marxist] today identified the Bommai-faction of the Janata Dal as its electoral ally for the forthcoming polls saying that "only this faction is capable of fighting both the Congress(I) and the BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] in several States."

Briefing reporters after the conclusion of the three-day central committee meeting of the party, the CPI(M)

general secretary, Mr. Harkishan Singh Surjeet, claimed that the split in the Dal had been engineered by the Congress(I).

Admitting that the Dal had "inherent" defects—its plank of social justice was not enough—the CPI(M) general secretary claimed that in Bihar, only Mr. Laloo Prasad Yadav was capable of fighting the Congress(I) and BJP.

In Karnataka, too, the Janata Dal was quite strong and this had been proved by the fact that they had secured 65 percent of the seats in the Panchayat elections, Mr. Surjeet said.

Regarding the agitation against the Centre's economic policy, Mr Surjeet said that while an estimated one million people would court arrest, three million had already enlisted their names for the protests.

Reporter Tells Plans To Amend Patent Act

94AS0414A Bombay *THE TIMES OF INDIA*
in English 8 Jul 94 pp 1, 13

[Article by Priya Ranjan Dash: "Plan To Amend Patent Act"—names as published]

[Text] New Delhi, July 7—The Union government is planning to move amendments to the Patent Act of 1970 in the monsoon session of Parliament beginning later this month. This is in partial fulfilment of its obligations under the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] accord.

A successful vote on these amendments will indicate broader parliamentary support for the Uruguay Round's Final Act signed at Marrakesh on April 15.

Senior officials of the Union industry and commerce ministries confirmed that an inter-ministerial team, headed by the industry secretary, Mr Surendra Singh, is busy drafting key amendments to the Patent Act. The Final Act requires countries like India, which do not provide product patent protection for pharmaceuticals and agro-chemicals, to change their existing patent law to meet certain obligations by January 1, 1995, when the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is scheduled to come into being.

The United States Congress is expected to ratify the Marrakesh agreement by September this year. However, in case there is any delay, this will give a breathing space to other countries and the Indian Parliament can take up the amendment of the Patent Act even in the winter session.

The five key changes required in the Indian Patents Act (IPA), 1970 are as follows:

(i) The IPA will have to provide for a facility for filing of applications for product patents with effect from January 1, 1995.

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(ii) It will have to define the relevant criteria for patentability of products.

(iii) It will have to provide a queuing facility ("black box") which enables allotment of a priority number for applicants.

(iv) It will have to ensure that patent protection is offered with effect from the date of filing of applications, taking into account the period up to the actual grant of such protection, in short, offer "pipeline protection."

Finally (v) for such products where patents have been granted in an alien country, exclusive marketing rights have to be granted subject to certain provisions.

These are, that the patent in the alien country should have been granted on an application made after January 1, 1995, it should have received marketing approval in that country, it should have made an application for patent in this country, and should have received marketing approval by the Indian Drug Controller.

Given the parliamentary majority of the ruling Congress party and the political controversy generated by India's assent to the Marrakesh agreement, it is likely that the monsoon session may not be able to successfully vote through the required amendments, believe political sources. Even senior commerce and industry ministry officials concede that the bills may have to be referred to a select committee of both houses of Parliament, to be taken up in the winter session.

Given the time-table for the formation of the WTO, it is believed, India would still be in time for membership if the winter session votes the amendments through.

The agreement on trade related intellectual property rights (TRIPs) has created the maximum political controversy in this country among all other GATT pacts. This is because it requires a complete overhaul of the Indian Patent Act. The existing patent law, it is widely accepted, has served the country's pharmaceuticals industry well and has been instrumental in making available quality drugs at affordable prices to people.

Under the TRIPs agreement, India is required not only to grant product patents, but also very high level of patent protection including an expanded scope and longer period of patentability (from 14 years to 20 years). But as per the transitional arrangement provided under Part VI of the TRIPs agreement, India has time for another 10 years to effect these changes.

In effect, while India need not actually provide product patents for pharmaceuticals or agro-chemicals for another 10 years, it must amend its Patent Act before January 1, 1995 in a manner that is no less fundamental. The amendments to be made now are such that the changes required to be made later, though wider in scope, will in fact be in the nature of corollary measures.

The government's move to amend the Patent Act evoked a strong reaction from opposition parties. The BJP

[Bharatiya Janata Party] will oppose any move by the government to amend the Patent Act "tooth and nail," said Ms Sushma Swaraj, party spokesperson. "We will also try to work our floor co-ordination with other opposition parties to defeat the amendments," she said while adding the BJP would also build up a movement outside Parliament as well so that the government could be pressurised to desist from the move.

The president of the newly-formed Janata Dal (G), Mr George Fernandes, also made it clear that his group in Parliament would oppose the amendments if these compromised with India's sovereignty and the interests of Indian industry and scientists. He demanded the government must right away circulate the draft amendments for wider discussion among members of Parliament, scientific community and the Indian industry. He alleged that the government was hurrying through the amendments as it wanted to secure a "certificate" that it was first to fulfil the GATT commitments. "The government is in a hurry to sell out since the Americans are in a hurry to buy out," he added.

Court Moved for Injunction on Union Carbide Property

94AS0411A Calcutta *THE STATESMAN in English*
5 Jul 94 p 6

[Names as published]

[Text] Bhopal, July 4—Three voluntary organizations working among victims of the Bhopal gas tragedy, today moved the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mr Alok Jha, seeking an injunction against Union Carbide from removing or selling any movable or immovable property from its Bhopal pesticide plant, reports UNI.

The organizations also sought a directive to the Centre to submit a statement about the reasons for the inordinate delay in the extradition of the former Union Carbide Corporation [UCC] chairman, Mr Warren Anderson, from the United States.

Mr Anderson, an accused in the Bhopal gas disaster criminal case, has been declared an absconder for his non-appearance in the court which had directed to initiate extradition proceedings to secure his presence during the trial.

The application, moved by Mr N.D. Jayaprakash, for the Bhopal Gas Peedit Sangharsh Sahayog Samiti, Mr Dinkar Rao for the Bhopal Group for Information and Action and Mr Abdul Jabbar Khan for the Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Udyog Sangathan, sought a directive to the Centre and the CBI [Central Bureau of Investigation] to take control of the plant.

The organizations pointed out in their application that they were shocked to know that the management of Union Carbide had been surreptitiously tampering with vital evidence relating to the cases instituted against the company and its Indian subsidiary.

Quoting a newspaper report that the company had started dismantling its machinery and selling it the application said the report had raised some important questions.

The application said it was not clear when and why the CBI relinquished control of the pesticide plant, which it had seized and sealed after the disaster. The applicants also wanted to know how the Centre could allow the company to tamper with evidence.

The petitioners sought an appropriate order from the court for prohibiting senior officers of the company from entering the premises of the plant. They sought action against the management under sections 201 and 204 of the Indian Penal Code.

The organizations also sought a court directive to the management of Union Carbide to produce a detailed list of items, which they charged had been removed from the premises of the plant since the disaster in December, 1984.

They said the court should direct the Centre and the CBI to submit a statement before the court explaining why they allowed the company's management access to the plant which they had seized and sealed after the disaster.

In another application, the organizations, sought a separate directive to the CBI to immediately inspect the production processes and safety systems installed by the company at its pesticide plant in West Virginia, United States. "The Centre should send a CBI team to the Union Carbide plant in the United States to conduct necessary inspection of the plant," the application said.

The petition contended that there were differences in the safety standards adopted by the UCC in the United States and the one in India.

The petitioners said they had handed over a copy of the video film titled "The Betrayal of Bhopal," produced by Granada Television of the United Kingdom to the CBI on April 11, 1994. The film has highlighted that the safety systems installed by the UCC at its pesticide plant in Bhopal were under-designed and therefore totally inadequate for handling large quantities of ultra-hazardous chemicals, they said.

The applicants also pointed out that the film highlighted that the UCC was aware that there were reliable safe methods for storing and handling the chemical, Methyl Iso Cynate and the UCC chose an unreliable and unsafe method for storing and handling MIC [methyl isocyanate] at its Bhopal plant with a view to economizing the cost of production.

The disaster occurred by stockpiling huge quantities of the MIC under dangerous conditions close to the thickly populated area, the application said.

Pointing out that the film provided prima facie evidence that the UCC while installing safety systems in its

Bhopal plant, had intentionally adopted double standards, the applicants alleged that the UCC was criminally liable for intentionally causing death to several thousands of innocent victims and inflicting grievous injuries on thousands of others.

IRAN

Commentary on, Criticism of G-7 Meeting

94LA0228A Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 7 Jul 94 p 14

[Article by Dr Mahmud Mohammadi: "G-7 (Group of Seven) Meeting: One Bed and Several Dreams"]

[Text] On 17 and 18 Tir [8 to 10 July] [as published], the leaders of the world's seven great industrial nations [G-7] held their annual meetings in Naples. The short answer to the question of what the task at this meeting of the leaders of the world's seven industrial nations was is that the most important strategic decisions about the world are made at these meetings and that the leaders of the nations themselves guarantee and supervise these decisions in international policy.

Although these meetings have no legal basis of any kind and are not formed on the basis of any international organizations, laws or regulations, and although the implementation of their decisions is not binding on any country, and the meetings are merely a political club for the leaders of the world's powerful nations who are at the head of the world's legal, political, and financial institutions, due to its very position it makes use of all these international bodies, including the United Nations, the IMF, and the World Trade Organization, for its own security and interests and uses them as tools to implement its policies.

On the one hand, in addition to the fact that three of these seven industrial nations have the right of veto on the Security Council, all these countries also cooperate as allies in the framework of the NATO military alliance and politically under the European Security and Cooperation Conference Organization (ESCCO), and they also cooperate on the other hand in the Common Market and in regional transactions. This adds to the importance of these meetings and the need for those attending to understand one another's policies in the first stage and to cooperate and set a direction on international affairs on which they have a unanimous view in the next stage. The group of the world's seven industrial nations has a high profile throughout the world.

The original idea for these meetings was first proposed in the year 1975 by Giscard d'Estaing, the French president at the time. The motivation was economic, because after the passing of the golden age of the dollar in the year 1971 and the first oil crisis in the years 1973-74, cooperation between the great Western industrial nations in the areas of economics and energy became a vital matter.

With the passing of time, however, the meetings added international political issues to their agendas and in the 1980's they held talks and made decisions to study ways to develop nuclear energy as a solution to a possible oil crisis. In 1990 in Paris they discussed giving their financial support to Poland and Hungary, with political goals.

The next year for the first time, Gorbachev was invited to attend the London meetings as an observer, and in August the same year (1991), after the Russian coup d'etat, the G-7 promised economic support to Yeltsin. In the meetings the previous year [as published] in Tokyo they merely repeated the previous promises in order to bring Russia into line with the meetings, following the theory of making the financial support contingent upon receiving political concessions on international issues and differences, and making Russia fall into line with the G-7's policies and meetings by adding another member. For this purpose, Yeltsin will also participate for the first time in the Naples meetings and will sign the concluding statement of the sessions, in the hope that he will fall in line both in the Security Council and in solving international problems in the way desired by America, and in a way that will guarantee long-term Western interests.

In every meeting of today's G-7 and tomorrow's Group of 8 is the groundwork for activities by the world's great industrial nations. Some believe that the meetings are a world council that determines the world's policies, to be implemented by international organizations. Others worry that by following such a procedure, the international organizations will lose their credibility and positions, because if every kind of decision made by the United Nations, the IMF, GATT, and the World Bank has to follow the will and views of these countries, making that contingent on their own special policies as opposed to those of the other members of the international organizations, one must expect an intensified crisis and increased unrest arising from the self-designated preeminence of a small group of the nations in the world trying in the 21st century to impose on humanity an arrangement resembling the holy alliance after the Congress of Vienna (1815). Such an idea will not be acceptable for today's world, which is seeking to build a new age for life in the glow of peace and peaceful coexistence, after the passing of the nightmare of the Cold War.

The problems in the way of implementing the G-7's policies as "world policy" by a "world government" include the G-7's relationship with the Economic Cooperation and Development Organization on the one hand and with the world's other developing nations on the other. The new GATT regulations were really established to create a tie between these two poles in the world, so that by creating a suitable atmosphere for making use of the resources and capacities of these countries by the industrial nations and by creating competition among the multinational industries and the

national industries in the weaker nations, the long-term interests of the advanced industrial nations will be guaranteed.

Currently the industrial nations are thinking of creating employment, a consumer market and an original production base at the lowest price, and they are turning towards nations that are generally underdeveloped. These nations are suffering from the crisis of stability, security, discord, and strife. In reality the regions of interest to the G-7 are unstable politically, and they have also been unable to develop because of the lack of security. These nations have been a cause of worry for the group because they are of interest strategically, or because they have common water or land borders.

A more important point is the fact that the great industrial nations are generally dependent on two things: the energy in the oil-rich nations and the markets in the developing nations. If we divide the nations in today's world into the powerful and wealthy industrial nations, the developing nations and the poor and undeveloped nations, we will reach the conclusion that it is possible that the powerful industrial nations are without need of about 50 of the supposed nations of the world, which are responsible for 67 percent of the world's debt, but they definitely need and are dependent on the some 50 other nations that have more than 70 percent of the world's energy and wealth. They can pursue policies that will guide these countries towards self-centered national economic policies, a policy that will create basic difficulties for the existing world crisis, the economic conditions in these countries, and the basis for the new GATT regulations.

It must not be left unsaid that the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a midsize power and a country that has 1 percent of the world's population and about 20 percent of its wealth, reserves and energy, is regarded as a part of the bloc of wealthy and developing nations, which more or less confirms its successes with development policies and the efficiency of its system, programs and procedures.

The second basic problem at the heart of the meetings is the different visions of their members, the inequities, the greed, and the differing definitions each one has of its domain of influence, vital interests, national and regional security and its international role and position, which will show up as seven different colors in the backdrop of the Naples meetings.

America, as the democratic imperialist, has not yet forgotten the taste of being the temporary boss of the world, of course using the money of the Arab nations and with the cooperation of its Western allies. America's allies are concerned because America does not adhere to international regulations, does not act within the framework of the international organizations and prefers either to act on all its decisions and policies outside the framework of the United Nations and other regional organizations, or to draw these organizations along with its own policies.

America's allies never hide the fact that when they must face an important strategic issue, these organizations never have a crucial role, but rather America's national interests play the main role in the policies while others must simply watch the way these organizations are employed to achieve America's interests, and if a mission is assigned to them they must perform it well.

Therefore, America's outwardly silent allies believe that the reason these international organizations do not have the necessary efficiency and their international credibility with nations is constantly decreasing is that they have in a way become special institutions and bodies for implementing America's policies. These allies believe that America must take a comprehensive and realistic view of international conditions and then think of its strategic role, and that since the Cold War it has become weary of the security crisis and the unrest and greed in international affairs.

Clinton's election strategy was to look to domestic affairs, and that is what removed Bush from the domestic American political scene right at the peak of international power, and put Clinton—an unknown figure in America's foreign policy—in power.

It is clear that America cannot be indifferent to what Germany, as an important country and one of the world's seven great industrial nations, sees as connected to its security and national interests. Germany wants rapid and effective decisions concerning Eastern Europe and Russia, while America is thinking of ending the existing differences of opinion among the industrial nations concerning GATT in order to get peace of mind for the future on economic issues, and stability in international and regional policy.

America, by using the pressure it has begun to apply on the South and North American nations with regard to NAFTA, is seeking to create a new international trade organization by making changes in the World Bank and the IMF, in order to defeat the crushing economic and trade competition from its allies.

Japan is seeking to find a way to establish its relationship based on the new realities in Asia and the Pacific region (a prominent example of which is the 8-percent economic growth in the ASEAN member nations) in order both to follow America's leadership less on the Asian continent in implementing its role and policies, and to keep its own markets within America's sphere of influence, and, more important, Japan wants America to recognize this truth.

These differences of opinion are more acute with regard to policies having to do with Europe. Germany is worried about Eastern Europe, and about the fact that its allies are not rushing to give Germany financial aid, and complains that they are not working to achieve its security in the face of the economic crisis and the political instability in Eastern Europe and Russia.

France, on the other hand, is directing its attention to the southern Mediterranean and North Africa. It considers this area to be its sphere of influence and also the edge of European foreign policy, and it worries about intervention by its allies.

The Italians also, despite domestic problems and the fundamental changes they are facing in such circumstances, are no exception, because these problems do not prevent them from being concerned about their national interests and about fulfilling a role that is appropriate for them at the meetings of the G-7 Industrial Nations.

Even England, which has always according to America's dictates, is now warning America that as England aligns its foreign policy with that of a united Europe, America must expect more negative answers from it than positive ones. Therefore, in view of all these fears, hopes, visions and differences of views, one must not expect new decisions and the continuation of a unified strategy from the Naples meetings.

Perhaps among the most important of the issues on the agenda at the Naples meetings with respect to the nations and regions of interest to each of the G-7 member nations, whether economic, financial, commercial or political, no issue is more vital for the prestige and image of Europe and the West than the unequal war and genocide in Bosnia, a war that has wearied world public opinion of the human rights violations and genocide caused by racism, due to the lack of a common view, unanimity or attention from the group of the world's industrial nations.

If the Naples meetings cannot reach practical conclusions for ending this crisis and bloodshed, establishing peace and guaranteeing the rights of nations, no matter how small, there is no doubt that the G-7's golden dreams for the future of the world will never be realized. This is because if the foundations of the new world political and economic order are to be built on hostility between rich and poor and between the powerful and the weak, the history of the old imperialism will be an instructive text whose replaying by the modern imperialists will be more helpful for achieving their own interests and international security than sitting and making decisions.

Plight of Tajiks Discussed, West Blamed

94LA0226A Tehran KEYHAN in Persian

5 Jul 94 pp 16, 18

[Article by Mostafa 'Elmi, "Tajikistan: Increasing Oppression"]

[Text] The Republic of Tajikistan is one of the smallest and poorest newly independent Muslim republics. This republic has a population of 5.5 million. Most of the residents of Tajikistan are Muslims and speak Persian. The Tajiks were the last nation forced to accept Moscow's rule, 12 years after the establishment of the communist government and after years of war and resistance.

After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the people of this republic began working to achieve their independence and national identity. During bloody Bahman [21 January-19 February] of 1990, a number were killed and wounded as the result of a clash with communist supporters. With the spread of populist activities and the activation of political parties, after the defeat of the communists the people persuaded the government of the time to submit to their demands after a 51-day vigil in Martyr's Park in the city of Dushanbeh, the center of this republic, and after occupying a number of government centers. A coalition government was consequently formed consisting of a number of ministers from the former government and a number of opposition representatives. Despite the fact that in the coalition government only six ministries and government organizations were given to the opposition, within a short time a republic that had been captivated and dominated by the communists for 70 years was able to establish the foundation for an independent government answering to the people, relying on religion and national will.

During the several months when the coalition government was active, many reforms were made. These changes were so rapid and positive that many Western analysts and media described the formation of the coalition government as the formation of the first Islamic republic among the Muslim republics. During this period news of the changes and events in Tajikistan was presented as an important process at the top of the news in all the Western news media. During this period, by distorting the realities and deceiving the public, the Western media sought to lay the groundwork for defeating the oppressed Muslim people of Tajikistan. With propaganda about the growth of Islamic fundamentalists in Tajikistan, they regarded this as a threat to the nations of the region and to their imperialist interests. They knew well that if the coalition government had been able to strengthen its foundations, in a short time it could have become a suitable model for the Central Asian republics.

For this reason, and with the spread of the wave of Islamist activity among the Muslim people of Tajikistan, once again America and Russia, in an obvious political collaboration, meaning American economic and propaganda assistance and Russian military aid, sent in their thugs and bullies. Under the banner of support for the communist government and protected by Russian and Uzbek aircraft and tanks, they defeated and killed the defenseless Muslim Tajik people, who had no arms of any kind.

The crimes and disasters caused by the conquering forces were so extensive and disturbing that just a look at the statistics on the martyrs in these clashes will arouse the heart of any aware and free-thinking human being. In the less than two months of this one-sided war, or coup d'etat, against the lawful government that was supported by the people, the Kremlin's mercenaries killed more than 100,000 Muslim people and made refugees of about

2 million of the country's small population of 5.5 million. Yet the international organizations and the Western news media did not issue reports of any kind on the calamities and the slaughter of the people of Tajikistan, whose victims were mainly women, children and elderly people.

Although two years have passed since the time of the overthrow, the Tajik refugees are unwilling to return to their homeland because of fear of killing and aggression, although they are living in very insecure circumstances in Afghanistan without the slightest resources for living and health care.

Most of the people killed and the refugees are from the city of Kurgan-Tyube, the center of Tajikistan's Islamic movement. In less than one month the communists burned 800 of the 2,000 mosques that were built in this city during the coalition era. They burned Korans. They raped the Muslim women and even their young daughters in the mosques in the most savage way, and they destroyed the shrine of God's house. They killed the men wearing beards, they threw children into pots of hot oil, and they mutilated their mothers after raping them.

The dimensions of these crimes are so extensive and so inhumane that some readers may not be able to accept them. However, if they talk with the oppressed Tajik refugees, they will see that the instances mentioned are examples that can be published. The inhumane calamities caused by the Kremlin's mercenaries are so disturbing that the pen is ashamed to describe them.

However, what has touched the Muslim people of Tajikistan more than anything else in all this is the silence of the international media and organizations, and especially the media in the Islamic nations. When they call the present world a global village because of the growth in communications methods, why must the people of the world and the Islamic nations be without information about the oppression and the crimes visited on the Muslim people of Tajikistan? Why do all the Western media and international organizations react every time the Tajik combatants go into action and an aggressor Russian citizen is killed? Why are the pens broken and the tongues silent in the face of killing and making refugees of more than two-fifths of the population of a country?

It is in such an atmosphere that the duty of the media, especially the media in the Islamic Republic of Iran, is increased, and that duty demands that they convey the cries from the increased oppression of the Tajik Muslims to the ears of the people of the world, and that they expose the filthy and deceptive face of the pompous organizations that claim to favor humanity and civilization. They must not permit the oppression of combative Muslims to increase. They must declare to the world that the only crime of the Muslim people of Tajikistan and other people from the Islamic nations, who are the targets of the attacks by the so-called human Western civilization, is being Muslim. They must tell the Muslim

nations that the defense of Islam knows no borders, that it is incumbent upon every Muslim to defend the world of Islam and the rights of the Muslim nations, and that they must no longer induce boldness among the enemies of Islam. Otherwise, they will have to answer to the creator and to humanity.

Alleged Confessions of Sa'idi-Sirjani Discussed

94LA0201A Tehran *KEYHAN* in Persian
7 Jun 94 pp 14, 16

[Excerpts] Mr. Sa'idi-Sirjani, one of the symbols of antiregime intellectualism, a hero of the so-called avant-garde cultural movement, and one of the pillars of the nationalist and modernist movement of the so-called Iran of tomorrow, arrested two months ago in the act of smuggling narcotics, has now written a sincere letter to his interrogator, which can be the beginning of a new chapter in a more accurate understanding of domestic and foreign intellectual movements.

As we have learned in these two months, the only torture done to him by the interrogators was "conversation," and the main instruments of torture were "words." However, due to the mental barriers to which Sirjani himself has confessed, the worker has completed his task. Now, it is hoped that Sirjani's comrades-in-arms inside and outside the country, whose numbers great and small might even be as high as several persons, and who have always fed upon one another and have finally ended with tens of groups becoming one to 10 people, will benefit from Sirjani's confessions, because in a way they are also their own confessions.

Sirjani's arrest was severely condemned and questioned by the Human Rights Organization, the Voice of America, the BBC, the Voice of Israel, a group of people associated with the American Congress, some important and high-circulation Western newspapers, a group of counterrevolutionaries living abroad, by tens of like-minded intellectuals and writers who share his grievances inside the country, and also implicitly by several counterrevolutionary publications in Tehran.

This heavy international pressure on the revolutionary court bore no result. The interrogators turned Sirjani around with greater sensitivity and alertness so that finally the heroic writer talked. [passage omitted]

Now, before we mention several important matters, all cultural and press officials are advised to reread the text of Sirjani's letter. We also advise his friends in Tehran and outside the country to read the text of the letter "Intellectual in Chains" aloud to one another. Now, for what must be said clearly just at this time to friend and foe: In the last few years, much time has been spent by the forces of the revolution explaining what is clear and by the others to deny what is clear, with regard to the question of whether or not what is taking place is "cultural invasion, or cultural exchange."

It was natural that the one creating the invasion completely denied it and portrayed the situation as being normal. There was also a deceived and naive minority among the self-interested ones who sought an excuse to be deceived and sacrificed to the enemy. Instead of speaking in one voice with the cultural soldiers of the revolution, they declared themselves neutral, or sometimes, in their zest for life, aligned themselves with the enemy. For example, they would add their names to the white list of counterrevolutionaries and separate themselves from the young hezbollahis and so-called fanatics and basijis of the cultural front. They thought that reason and an open mind were the equivalent of this very cultural extravagance, naivete, and blurring the distinction between truth and falsehood. What could be more foolish than for someone to decide to reconcile the true and the false, and still consider himself a soldier of the truth?

After all the denials and all the talk about the superiority of Western culture and the idea that the reason we are imagining an "invasion" from the West is that the culture of the West is a productive and fruitful culture, while the culture of our revolution is barren and insignificant, ultimately the gentlemen themselves admit that what is happening is simply an invasion, a crime, hypocrisy and an obscenity, and that there is absolutely no thought of a sound exchange of ideas. Mr. Sirjani says: "How did it happen that Ashraf Pahlavi, Brigadier General Mahvi and others took up cultural work? Everyone knows who their supporters were... Compatriots, be on your guard. Take note that in the age of intellectual imperialism and the information explosion, the enemy has targeted your culture and your thought with firm determination, and he is doing it through the window of culture and art."

Then he says: "All the corrupt parasites of the imperial court are today pursuing one main goal in the creation of cultural foundations, magazines, publications, societies and other things, and that is to bombard your values in a dastardly way, to ridicule your beliefs and to make people despair of continuing the revolution." [passage omitted]

We are talking about the direct relationship the intellectual trend and the so-called literary, artistic and cultural press of the gentlemen in Tehran have with the leaders of SAVAK and the court in Los Angeles and London. [passage omitted]

For example, a long article in *DER SPIEGEL*, entitled "Theory of the Plot," has been translated and published by a group of people in Iran, stating that a few Fascists are treating every opposing theory and alternative way of thinking as some kind of plot designed by imperialism and the spy services, in order to avoid the trouble of struggling against them.

Now, after being off drugs for two months, he mentions the alternative thinkers themselves, each and every one of the individuals and so-called cultural institutions who

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acted as intermediaries between our alternative thinkers and intellectual press and the spy services.

Basically, the "Theory of the Plot" was presented just when public opinion had become stale and unenthusiastic and they were able to get around us. Unfortunately, a number of people came together, and it was this cry from our oppressed brothers, early risers, and elite fighters on the cultural front lines who came forward every time with loud voices to say that the sound exchange of ideas is not as represented and that these Machiavellian tactics, these relationships and words and writings of this kind are nothing more than plots and a hostile and dictatorial attack. That is because there are laws of criticism, free debate and the exercise of freedom, and if they are not obeyed, everything will turn against itself, and we see what happened.

Recently someone wrote, why do you attribute, with political terminology and crude analyses, a bad meaning to poems and literary and artistic materials in some publications, which contain poetic ambiguities and delicate and profound artistic allusions, and why do you take an intelligence analyst's approach to culture? Why should a word or expression with more than one possible meaning be interpreted as political and counterrevolutionary? Then on the other hand there were also examples from the newspaper KEYHAN, and if they were interpreted that way, every kind of interpretation could be made of every text and artist.

We are not talking about that respected person or specific persons, and it is not our intention here to criticize any specific newspaper. However, just to clarify how much some leeches influence the views of individuals and how far the tendency to naivete can go if one wants to promote it, we will present a report from a nameless source.

We know that the respected newspaper, in its series of subjects and of course with good intentions, has given emphatic support to Westernized intellectual trends to keep from being accused of having fascist inclinations. In one place he says one must not be pessimistic about the likes of Sirjani and Naraqi and that the nation's atmosphere must be so free that these intellectuals, like a fish in the water, will feel free.

Elsewhere he wrote that not only the intellectual elements but even America itself should not be dealt harshly, defensively, and angrily. He said it is not clear even with the leaders of the White House that there has been an ultimatum. Islam must be explained to them in pleasant language so the problems will be solved! He wrote asking why unaware and precipitous hard-liners speak harshly and uncompromisingly to Bazargan, Payman, Soroush, Naraqi, Sirjani, others, and even to the Western capitalist companies that run the West's media and cultural organs and its research institutions and universities, and why they accuse them, call them infidels and oppose them. He says this is a sign of weak thinking, youth, and immaturity.

They wrote and they wrote and it was not just the supporters of that one newspaper. This mistake was also made and is being made in other circles and in other press publications. The interesting thing, though, is what became of that same person who was chosen by those brothers. Sirjani wrote an editorial in that same newspaper implying and indeed stating explicitly that the defensive war and the heroic basiji resistance was a mistake, and in fact a stupid and obstinate thing. He made unbelievable accusations against all the aspirations of the revolution and even against His Holiness, the imam's, ideas. He questioned the revolution's entire past, and in spite of this his article was printed in the nation's official newspaper and even in a partisan spirit.

Here Mr. Sirjani himself writes:

"I had not yet understood what the revolution is and what it is doing. I tried it in my mind's court of injustice and issued the verdict my friends and I wanted. I levied the first punishment against the defendant—the revolution—in the form of the story of Sheikh San'an and dastardly proverbs and allegories, and I heard nothing but whistles and clapping from the opium smokers and spectators in my circle."

Now let us ask, if these proverbs of Sirjani's in the story of Sheikh San'an had been previously exposed in KEYHAN, wouldn't it have been accused of suspicion, misunderstanding, and taking a political and intelligence approach to profound literary and cultural works? Wouldn't this have been considered a denial of freedom and the sense of freedom for intellectuals, thinkers and artists?

This is what is called naivete, feigning ignorance, patronizing the enemy or even worse, flattering the enemy and playing with less than a full deck.

The financial and intellectual ties to the Western spy services and Israel were exposed two or three years ago by the alert revolutionary press, but this was received coldly and even with ridicule and brought charges of thinking in terms of plots, being precipitous, naivete, fascism, bullying, and immaturity. Now even this most reputable of intellectuals turns out to be connected to the spy services.

The network of Freemasonry, the Zionists, the SAVAK and the people of the Pahlavi court have all gotten involved in the cultural invasion and some of the intellectual press in Tehran get their wages and budget directly from the spy services. Some selfish, moderate, and democratic intellectuals receive wages in Tehran every month from Ashraf Pahlavi. They write articles in praise of freedom and about reason, tolerance, lenience, democracy, the scientific society of Fascism, bullying, and fundamentalism. They even teach at Tehran University. It is interesting that their publications have been and are subsidized by the government and the Muslim treasury and no one bothers them, but they still complain

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and talk, sling mud, and ridicule all the high aspirations of these people and this revolution.

God knows how much cultural loss to this society this weakness and naivete, which has taken hold of some people, will bring about from here on.

What has been said about the free exchange of ideas and the competition of views was not and will not be anything more than aid in realizing the scenarios of London and Washington. The problem is definitely not a matter of reviving thought, the publication of reason and a free atmosphere for criticizing government failings. The essence of the matter is nothing other than the generation of controversy, and the heart of the reality and the project is world imperialism's psychological warfare, the spread of despair about the future and doubt about the past of the revolution, questioning and undermining its aspirations, and ridiculing the Islamic revolution. Unfortunately, naive forces and those with an agenda also facilitate the enemy's work in the cultural invasion.

Freedom of the pen and of speech, pluralism, multiple parties with different ideas are old scenarios for the spy services, which have been used for 50 years in revolutionary nations and nations that have freed themselves from domination, in order to bring the revolutionary regimes into question and accuse them of despotism, rigidity and Fascism, and on the other hand to open the way for influence by intellectual pawns. Westernized people and dependent parties in the revolutionary country and to revert public opinion to prerevolutionary fundamentals

This is not a new project, and anyone familiar with international history in the last half century is basically quite familiar with the theory of liberal and democratic thinking and also with the ideas of modernization, reason, resorting to nationalistic and ethnic ideas and the sowing of discord, for these are the English, American and Zionist policies to overthrow revolutions and revolutionary governments.

This is not a new discovery. It is only the naivete of some friends and their intense desire to be well-regarded by both friend and foe that makes them want to be wise and fatherly and either resolve or dilute the deepest theoretical and practical conflicts. They do not know that if this conflict could be solved, God would never have raised the eternal questions of "faith" and "infidelity" and truth and falsehood in the Koran.

Industrial, Agricultural Development Compared

94LA0223A Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 2 Jul 94 p 6

[Article by Dr Gholamhoseyn Dalili: "Another Look at the Nation's Economic Strategy: Industrial Development or Agricultural Expansion?"]

[Text] Achieving self-sufficiency in agriculture and consequently not importing agricultural products, and completely ending Iran's dependence on sources outside the

country for food in the first phase, and developing an exporting industrial agriculture in the second phase, are considered and must be considered the nation's most essential and basic programs.

This program and only this program can bring about our nation's economic independence. A sound agriculture for Iran will create a sound and permanent economy. It will bring economic prosperity to the country and will establish the important factor for economic stability.

A look at the rapid increase in the world's population, which exceeds 6 billion and will soon reach 7 to 8 billion, in view of the globe's small size and the limitations of its food sources, makes clearer the indisputable importance of agriculture.

In future years, the masters of the globe will be America, France, Australia and Canada, which have advanced and export industrial agriculture. They will dictate their demands to other countries. One of the main reasons for Germany's defeat in the World War I and World War II was the shortage of food.

The export of agricultural products could free us from the need to export oil. It could be a firm foundation for trade with other countries and for obtaining needed foreign exchange, and finally, it could become the main element of the nation's economic stability and health.

The creation of material incentives and an economic foundation in the rural areas can slow the phenomenon of rural emigration to the cities, and ultimately it could reverse the flow of emigration and make it go from the cities to the rural areas, producing a relative unraveling of the problems in the municipalities and for the government.

Unfortunately, the government's policies in these last few years have been based on giving priority to industrial development, and they give more importance to industrializing the nation.

Along with industrializing the nation, some of the nation's budget is allocated for programs such as cable television and the like. A vast and low-population country like Iran, which is importing wheat and rice, is planning to create cable television! Yet we have no need for cable television now and will not need it in the near future.

The policy of developing industry is of absolutely no benefit to us; rather it is to our detriment.

Why?

1. The development of our economy through industrial development, in view of the scientific and technical resources (the shortage of scientific and technical cadres) and our limited economic resources (other than oil) will not have good results.

Our desire and our goal in industrial development is natural, reasonable, and logical, but the reality is that

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even if we succeed in this program (and the possibility of its success is quite small), we will still be backward industrially and economically and we will never have a sound economy, because the industrial nations are now in the second phase of their industrial advancement. They now have atomic and electronic energy and they have entered a much more complex period in terms of technology, production, and industry.

They have brought and are bringing their advanced and extensive capital, technical cadres, and economic resources to this area of industrial production. As they do these things, they are trying through any means, even by resorting to force and military invasion, to keep the backward countries from obtaining access to the second phase of industrial development.

Therefore, even if we are able to achieve what we want in the first phase of industrial advancement, our development gap of today will still be no less, even if it does not increase, and industrial independence and lack of need will remain a dream and an idea for us.

2. Today and tomorrow the industrial goods that are and will be built in the backward countries, compared to the complex industrial goods produced by the world's first-class nations, are and will be in the nature of raw materials.

As we have said, since the advanced nations have entered into a phase where they are using atomic and electronic energy, they are building more precise and complex machinery, and in the same way the industrial goods they build are much more advanced. At the same time, they are trying to direct the industrialization of the backward nations to their own advantage and to orchestrate the industrialization of these nations based on the interests of their nations. We cannot escape this clever tactic.

3. The goods built in Iran are absolutely unable to compete with the goods built in America, Europe, and Japan, even inside our own country. No Iranian who is not forced to do so is willing to give preference to goods built in the country over foreign goods. The reality is that the goods built in Iran (without going into the reasons for this) are not good, and, for example, there is not one item comparable to a European item that is built in our country. Not only are the goods built in Iran without any advantage, they are also not without defects.

4. In direct contrast with industrial goods, our country's agricultural goods are among the world's most desirable in terms of quality. There are few countries to be found in the world whose agricultural products can compete with Iran's agricultural products.

With all their stations and agricultural research laboratories, despite all the efforts by first-class agricultural experts, despite all the investments and despite all the expenditures and aid from the governments of Europe, none of the European nations has been able to produce

even 1 kg of peaches with the quality of Iran's peaches, and yet scientifically and technically our agriculture is quite backward.

Therefore, let us talk less and work more, and let us do everything we do thoughtfully and with a view to the future.

—Let us base our industrial development planning on the idea of meeting domestic needs only, and gradually, as we achieve self-sufficiency in each area, we can stop importing equivalent foreign products so that the people will be forced to consume the goods produced in the country. Let us not think at all about exporting industrial goods.

—Let us develop those sectors in industry that have to do with agriculture and that meet advanced agricultural needs. This means that we should permit development of industrial areas to the extent that they are in the service of agriculture, and not the areas that are not beneficial to agriculture.

—Those who are investing in industrial fields that do not serve agriculture must not receive government aid.

—Through careful planning, we must gradually stop exporting crude oil and develop industrial areas in the country that have to do with petrochemicals. If in this area we can act in such a way that we refrain from selling crude oil to the world's plotters and blood-suckers, even at enormous prices, we will have the hope of easily removing the other problems, we will achieve positive results in all our other programs and we will have the pride of knowing we have achieved one of the revolution's most basic goals.

Our economic independence and restoring the nation's historical greatness depend on agricultural self-sufficiency and our not being dependent on the sale of crude oil.

—Our huge country, with 1.065 million square km of land, has the ability to feed 300 million people, not 60 million.

With abundant production and the most desirable agricultural products in the world, our country can make the plunderers of the world come begging to its door, rather than being in constant fear and terror of their various plots.

The question may arise: How can a country that cannot fill the bellies of 60 million people feed 300 million people?

We can clarify the issue with a simple calculation:

As we know, Iran has 1.065 million square km, or 1.065 million hectares [ha] of area. More than half of the area of our country has been taken over by desert and salt plains. Assuming that we do nothing to prepare the deserts and make them arable, or that it is impossible or uneconomical to use them (this writer also believes that

we can also make relative use of Iran's deserts), on that basis, we have almost 80 million ha of good land.

If half of this area is cities, roads, mountains, and valleys that cannot be farmed, that leaves 40 million ha of arable land.

If we assume that the 40-million ha figure is exaggerated, naive and optimistic and if we decrease this area to 30 million ha of arable land, which is to say that we accept the same figure that the Ministry of Agriculture's Institute of Pedology and Soil Fertility has repeatedly estimated (this writer believes that the figure of 30 million ha is 60 to 70 percent of the our nation's arable land, not the entire area), with the calculation that each ha of land can be cultivated to support 10 people, it is clear that in Iran we can produce the food for exactly 300 million people.

—What are the problems, and where do we begin?

The main factors in agriculture are:

1. Water
2. Sun
3. Fertile soil

Through the study of the agricultural methods of many advanced nations, we see that despite the fact that their methods of planting, cultivating, and harvesting are scientific and are much more correct and better than ours, and despite the fact that they also have abundant water, the yield from their planting is quite high and satisfactory per hectare in terms of quantity, but in terms of quality it is lower than Iran's agricultural products.

While the work we do planting, cultivating, and harvesting is quite bad, and we often even sabotage our own efforts, and consequently the yield of our work per hectare is quite low in terms of quantity, in terms of quality our agricultural products are among the most desirable in the world.

With a little care we can see that none of the main reasons for the low yield per hectare from our efforts, which are improper planting, cultivating, and harvesting, are sealed mysteries of nature. All these mysteries have been solved, and their implementation depends on work, effort and planning on our part. They are not beyond our abilities. We can prevail over them and gradually improve our work.

The only serious problem in our agriculture is water. Water has not only reduced the yield of our work, it has also greatly reduced the area being cultivated in the country.

However, why is it that the Europeans and many other nations, despite scientific cultivation and abundant water, cannot produce products as desirable as Iran's agricultural products?

No one takes the sun factor into account, no one is thankful for this God-given blessing. Yes, the Europeans lack sufficient sunlight, and they can do nothing about that, while we have this blessing from God in abundance.

Moreover, we can also fight the lack of water, this natural oppression.

We can solve this serious problem. Our nation's sources for irrigation are abundant in comparison to the lands that can be irrigated. Currently, we cultivate about 3.5 million ha of land, and since as we have said, according to the estimate of the Ministry of Agriculture's Institute of Pedology and Soil Fertility, we have at least 30 million ha of arable land in the country. We have no limitation in terms of arable land. To raise agricultural yields, it will be enough for us to provide water and increase the area under cultivation, so that later in the long term, by improving seedlings and seeds, fighting pestilence, and in short by improving planting, cultivation and harvesting, we can also improve the yields on our work.

Now let us address the issue of water:

In our country, most of the existing water is wasted in transfer from the source to the field. The main reason for the loss of water during transfer are:

- Surface evaporation because of the sun's heat.
- Water seepage into the beds and walls of the transfer canals
- The growth of wild plants on the edges (water drawn by these plants and its loss due to evaporation from these plants—slowing the flow of water)
- The slight grade of the land, and the consequent slow flow of water
- The twisted courses run by the water channels (this is seen throughout Iran, and in measuring one of these water channels, this writer concluded that just straightening the water channel would cut the distance in half from the water source to the field)
- The cyclical flow of water in the irrigation channels in most of the rural areas because of the compulsory rotation of water.

Based on official estimates by the Technical Office of the Ministry of Energy, the volume of water procured in our country by various means is 60 billion cubic meters [m^3] per year, and based on the usual relations in agriculture, the water needed by cultivated plants is 5,000 m^3 per hectare per year.

If, as we said, we consider that amount of land under cultivation in the country to be 3.5 million ha, which it is, the amount of land we have under cultivation, in view of the water we have available, if none were wasted, should be 12 million ha, not 3.5 million ha. The figure of 3.5 million ha is less than 30 percent of the area that we should have under cultivation.

The problem is right here.

Thus, 70 percent of the water we procure is wasted, and we are using only 30 percent of our water.

Where is this 70 percent, meaning 42 billion m^3 of water, being wasted?

1. On the surface of the cultivated field.
2. During the transfer of the water from source to field.

Water waste on the cultivated field is caused by our traditional method of irrigation, the traditional irrigation method that is usual in the rural areas.

It is only possible to prevent water being wasted on the cultivated fields by creating a water sprinkling irrigation network, but sprinkling irrigation requires mechanized agriculture—huge and integrated units (more than 10 ha) and huge investments. One can forgo reaching this stage in the first 10 years of the Agricultural Development plan, because:

Provided the agricultural experts leave the rural people alone and do not order them to use the mechanized irrigation method, the traditional irrigation method that has been in use in our country for thousands of years can continue to be used until the water sprinkling irrigation network is implemented. This irrigation method currently loses less water than any of the other methods, and it loses less water than mechanized water cultivation (with the exception of sprinkling irrigation).

Based on test results, the yield from traditional irrigation in the rural areas is more than 60 percent, reaching up to 70 to 80 percent, meaning that only 20 to 30 percent, and possibly 40 percent of the water is wasted. Therefore, if we calculate water wasted in the field at 30 percent, 70 percent of the total 42 billion m^3 of wasted water, meaning 30 billion m^3 , is lost just during transfer from the water source to the field. This figure is exactly half the water that we procure every year.

With a thumbnail accounting one can conclude that in this stage alone, by preventing the waste of the water we have available, we can double or triple the amount of land under cultivation, and not only stop importing wheat and rice, but even export them.

To reach this target we must do the following:

1. Before everything else we must refrain from using the water behind the dams to produce electrical power, devote that water to the irrigation of lands under cultivation, and use it to produce electrical power only in the nonirrigation months and days.
2. We should deliver the water to the edge of the field by creating a pressurized network, and make it available to the farmers there. With regard to the irrigation cycle, the

necessary calculations must be done after study by the experts on the amount of water used by the various plants and the amount of area under cultivation. We must make the needed water available to the farmers on a cyclical basis or as requested by the farmers, or, like the piped water in the cities, on a permanent basis, so that the use of water is based on the will and desire of the farmers themselves.

By creating a national pressurized water network, the loss of 30 billion m^3 of water will be prevented and the current area of irrigated cultivation will be doubled, meaning it will increase from 3.5 million ha to 7 million ha, and this luminous result is due to the fact that the transfer of water by pressurized pipes is close to 100 percent and the water loss is close to zero.

In subsequent programs we can expand the sprinkling irrigation procedure in the country and also prevent the loss of water in the field, thereby tripling the current area under cultivation (with the water that we already have available every year).

While we are expanding the sprinkling irrigation networks we can also increase the per-hectare yield of crops by making use of new knowledge and the efforts of the researchers in the organizations for seedlings, seeds, pedology, pesticides, and other things.

With the creation of a national pressurized water network, the problem of home consumer water and sanitary water for rural people will also easily be solved. The national pressurized water network in subsequent programs will prepare the way for creating a network of sprinkler irrigation systems and will make this happen sooner and at less expense.

The national pressurized water network will make it possible to schedule irrigation in terms of irrigation seasons and the amount of water required, and in this way the waste of some water in the fields will also be prevented.

3. We must prevent nonagricultural uses of water (with the exception of home and health care uses).
4. We must stop the flow of water in border rivers into neighbor countries, as the Afghans have done with respect to the Hirmand River, with no regard for our demands and protests. We can do this while observing the rights of our neighbors, and in so doing we can obtain close to 40 billion m^3 of good and sweet water.
5. We must deal seriously with drains and sewers, abandoning the indifference of the past.

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